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\title{Moral pluralism on the trolley tracks: Different normative principles
are used for different reasons in justifying moral judgments}

\author{
Büsra Aktas\thanks{Özyegin University}
\and
Onurcan Yilmaz\thanks{Doğuş University}
\and Hasan G. Bahçekapili\thanks{Corresponding author:
Department of Psychology, Doğuş University, Istanbul, Turkey. Email: hbahcekapili@dogus.edu.tr.}
}

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\newcommand{\jhead}{Judgment and Decision Making, Vol.~12, No.~3}
\newcommand{\jdate}{May 2017}
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  \jdate \hfill Justifying moral dilemma responses \qquad}
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\begin{onecolabstract}
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  The psychological correlates of utilitarian choices in sacrificial
  moral dilemmas are contentious. In the literature, some research
  (Greene, et al., 2001) suggested that utilitarianism requires
  analytic thinking while other research (Kahane et al., 2015) showed
  that utilitarianism is correlated with psychopathy. In the present
  research, we looked at the relation of several normative views with
  analytic cognitive style (ACS), psychopathy and real-world
  utilitarianism in three Turkish samples. In Study 1 (\textit{n} =
  269), we used four ethical dilemmas and asked participants to select
  one normative principle as the grounds for their judgment in the
  dilemma: fatalism, virtue ethics, utilitarianism, deontology and
  amoralism. The results showed that the majority selected the
  deontological principle. Additionally, there was a considerable
  amount of fatalistic and virtue ethical
  justifications. Utilitarianism and psychopathy had a significant
  positive correlation. In Study 2 (\textit{n} = 246), we replicated
  Study 1 and showed a significant relation between ACS and moral
  minimalism (the view that the sacrificial act is permissible but not
  necessary). In Study 3, the results showed that the utilitarian
  option in the sacrificial dilemmas was positively correlated with
  both real-life utilitarianism and psychopathy, but the latter two
  variables were not correlated with each other. All in all, the
  results suggest that some people choose the utilitarian option in
  moral dilemmas from psychopathic tendencies (as Kahane argued),
  while others due to real-life utilitarian reasons (as Greene
  argued). The findings also indicate that virtue ethical and
  fatalistic justifications cannot be ignored in understanding lay
  people’s moral judgments.

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\smallskip
\noindent
Keywords: utilitarianism, moral minimalism, virtue ethics,
sacrificial moral dilemmas, psychopathy, analytic cognitive style
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{\renewcommand{\thefootnote}{}

\footnotetext{

Copyright: \copyright\ 2017.
The authors license this article under the terms of the
\href{http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/}{Creative Commons
  Attribution 3.0 License.}
}}

\saythanks

\section{Introduction}

Utilitarianism in normative ethics is focused on whether the
consequences of an action maximize well-being (Mill, 1861). Thus, for
example, in order to save five persons, one person can and should be
sacrificed. Deontology, on the other hand, is often focused on whether
the action accords with universal rights and duties (Kant, 1785). This
implies that the consequences of the action are often immaterial.  For
example, an innocent person should never be sacrificed even if the
sacrifice would lead to the survival of a much greater number of
persons.

Given these sometimes counterintuitive implications, the structure and
predictors of normative ethical positions, including utilitarianism and
deontology, have been intensely studied in the last 15 years. One of
the most popular frameworks of the psychology of moral judgment is the
dual-process approach (see Greene et al., 2001). In this perspective,
deontological and utilitarian judgments can be explained on the basis
of the operation of two separate mental processes. Type 1 processes are
evolutionarily older, intuitive and automatic. Cycling for someone who
is an experienced bike rider or recognizing an angry face in a crowd
typically engages Type 1 processing. Type 2 processes, on the other
hand, are evolutionarily more recent, analytic, controlled and
reflective. Type 1 processing can be thought of as default, whereas the
computationally more demanding Type 2 processes sometimes override the
more automatic processes. Solving a novel type of problem or spotting a
person in the crowd with a specific set of features engages Type 2
processing (Evans \& Stanovich, 2003; Frederick, 2005; Kahneman, 2011;
Morewedge \& Kahneman, 2010; Stanovich \& West, 2000). 

In Greene et al.’s (2004) two-process model of moral judgment,
utilitarian judgments stem from brain regions involved in analytic
thinking whereas deontological judgments stem from brain regions
related to emotional processing. The fact that making a utilitarian
judgment typically takes longer than a deontological judgment has been
offered as supporting this view.\footnote{ However, it is also
  possible that utilitarian judgments take longer when they are
  untypical or rare (Gürçay \& Baron, 2017; see also Baron, Scott,
  Fincher \& Metz, 2015).} Greene et al.\ (2004) also found that
utilitarian responding in moral dilemmas is associated with activation
in the high-effort thinking areas of the brain including the DLPFC and
the anterior cingulate cortex (see also Cushman, Murray,
Gordon-McKeon, Wharton \& Greene, 2012, for similar findings). In
addition, people primed to think analytically are more likely to make
utilitarian moral judgments (Kvaran, Nichols \& Sanfey,
2013).\footnote{ It should be noted, however, that the analytic
  thinking manipulation in this study involved mathematical operations
  which might have led the participants to automatically make “five is
  greater than one” judgments, rather than leading them to really
  think analytically. For this reason, a replication of this study
  with a non-mathematical priming method is in order (see Kahane,
  2012). See also Gürçay and Baron (2017) who failed to find this
  effect.} One other support for the dual-process model is provided by
mortality salience manipulations. Studies suggest that reminding
people of their own mortality suppresses analytic thinking by creating
a high cognitive load (Trémolière, De Neys \& Bonnefon,
2014). Mortality salience also leads to a suppression of utilitarian
judgments (Trémolière, De Neys \& Bonnefon, 2012). This finding seems
to support Greene et al.’s (2001) dual-process account whereby
mortality salience leads to a decrease in utilitarian judgments by
suppressing analytic thinking (see also Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg,
Nystrom \& Cohen, 2008; Paxton, Bruni \& Greene, 2014; but see Baron
\& Gürçay, 2016; Gürçay \& Baron, 2017; Tinghög et al., 2016, for
criticisms of the dual-process account).

Despite these findings, Kahane (2012) argues that choosing the
utilitarian option in sacrificial dilemmas does not necessarily
reflect an underlying utilitarian outlook. The main reason is that the
utilitarian option involves actively harming someone and the tendency
toward harm can be caused by a wide variety of motives. To find out
the underlying cause of choosing the utilitarian option, Kahane et
al.\ (2015) investigated the relation between responses in sacrificial
dilemmas and utilitarianism in the traditional sense. They found that
utilitarian choices were positively correlated with ethical
transgressions in a business context, with sub-clinical psychopathy,
and with rational egoism, and negatively correlated with giving to
charity and with identification with humanity. Such choices were not
related to real-world utilitarianism, self-sacrifice or impartiality.
These findings seem to support Kahane’s (2012) view that utilitarian
responses in sacrificial dilemmas are more indicative of psychopathy
than of real-world utilitarianism. Insofar as we can infer anything
from fMRI studies (see Uttal, 2011 for a critique), Wiech et al.\
(2013) demonstrated, consistent with Kahane’s (2012) view, that a
brain area related to empathic concern (subgenual cingulate cortex),
and not high-effort thinking areas, becomes active during utilitarian
responses. Similarly, Koenigs et al.\ (2007) showed that damage to the
prefrontal cortex, presumably an analytic thinking area, increases
rather decreases utilitarian responding (but see Greene et al., 2004,
for findings that link abstract reasoning regions in the brain and
utilitarian responding).  Finally, Djeriouat and Trémolière (2014)
found that psychopathy as a personality trait is positively correlated
with utilitarian responses and decreased harm sensitivity mediates
this relationship (see also Bartels \& Pizarro, 2011, and Patil, 2015,
for other findings linking psychopathy and utilitarianism).

Royzman, Landy and Leeman (2015) extended previous research by having
participants make moral judgments based on how permissible and how
required an act is rather than just how right or wrong it is (see also
Banerjee, Huebner \& Hauser, 2010 for a similar question format). In
the footbridge dilemma, for instance, a participant who judged killing
one person to save five as both permissible and required was
classified as a utilitarian whereas someone who judged killing one as
permissible but not required was classified as a moral minimalist. Two
studies by Royzman et al.\ (2015) showed that scores on the Cognitive
Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005) were correlated with minimalism but
not with utilitarianism. Utilitarianism was instead correlated with
psychopathy, in parallel with Kahane et al.\ (2015). This again
suggests that the so-called utilitarian option in sacrificial dilemmas
is a poor measure of individual differences in traditional
utilitarianism.

One limitation of the foregoing studies is that they were all
conducted in Western Christian cultures with college students or mTurk
participants. For this reason, it is imperative to test the generality
of the findings on non-Western and non-Christian samples (Henrich,
Heine \& Norenzayan, 2010). Another limitation is that, although
previous studies focus on the opposition between utilitarianism and
deontology, other normative ethical views exist and might shape
people’s moral judgments. Consistent with this, Uhlmann, Pizarro and
Diermeier (2015) claim that moral judgments are influenced by the
character of the actors in the dilemmas as well as their actions.  In
other words, participants make separate judgments about whether the
actor is a good or a bad person and whether the action in question is
right or wrong. Accordingly, Uhlmann et al.\ (2015) claim that people
act like intuitive virtue theorists when making moral judgments. This
makes sense from an adaptive point of view because what we need to
evaluate in an everyday context is whether a person we encounter is
trustable or would make a good friend, and the person’s general moral
character, rather than individual actions, is more predictive in this
regard. For example, a person who smothers a baby to save a group of
fellow citizens might be judged to perform the right action from a
utilitarian point of view but still be undesired as a friend because
of a presumed defect in his character (Uhlmann et al.,
2015).\footnote{Note that, in the present context, we have a
  restricted definition of utilitarianism where only maximization of
  immediate well-being, and not character traits, development of
  virtues etc., are seen as the relevant consequences of an action.}

In the present set of studies, in addition to eliciting moral
judgments in sacrificial dilemmas (e.g., the trolley dilemmas, see
Greene et al., 2001), we asked the justification of right/wrong
judgments regarding the actions in the dilemmas. In addition to the
utilitarian and deontological reasons, we added another question that
purported to measure virtue ethical reasons as described above. We
also surmised that people might have other reasons to make right/wrong
judgments. One possibility in a predominantly Muslim society is not to
interfere with what fate has already in store for a person. Deaths on
a massive scale as in earthquakes, accidents, wars, etc., are
routinely attributed to fate and are deemed to be unavoidable (Cesur,
2003). This principle might lead some participants to refrain from
intervening in the course of events to kill one to save five, just as
a typical deontological or virtue ethical principle might. The reason
would be to avoid taking responsibility for the death of one
person. The death of the five persons, on the other hand, is arguably
determined by divine authority and is not under the purview of the
participant. For this reason, we added a fourth item that purported to
measure fatalism as the justification of the right-wrong
judgments. Finally, we added a fifth item to test the possibility that
ethical principles might not have played a significant role in the
participants’ judgments (amoralism).

The research reported here has thus two main aims: to determine the
reason/justification behind the judgments in sacrificial dilemmas and
to investigate how different moral judgments relate to analytic
thinking and psychopathy. A subsidiary aim was to test the arguments by
Greene and Kahane in a non-Western sample. In Study 1, we sought to
delineate the reasons participants gave for their utilitarian or
deontological responses in sacrificial dilemmas in a forced-choice
format by presenting them with five options. We also investigated the
utilitarianism-psychopathy and minimalism-analytic thinking
associations in a predominantly Muslim sample. We replicated these
associations in Study 2. In Study 3, we had the participants rate the
importance of each reason on a continuous scale and investigated their
relation with utilitarianism-minimalism scores, analytic thinking,
psychopathy, and real-life utilitarianism. 

\section{Study 1}

While Greene et al.\ (2001) claim that utilitarian judgments in
sacrificial dilemmas are really utilitarian and related to analytic
thinking, Kahane et al.\ (2015) claim they are not related to
real-life utilitarianism and are related to psychopathy
instead. Royzman et al.\ (2015), on the other hand, demonstrated that
analytic thinking is associated not with utilitarianism but with moral
minimalism.  Minimalism in this context is defined as judging the
one-person sacrifice as permissible but not obligatory. In Study 1, we
treated permissible and obligatory judgments as continuous and
measured them as such instead of treating them as categorical and
forced choice options as in Royzman et al.’s (2015) original study. In
addition, we explored other normative moral principles (e.g., virtue
ethics) as possible motivators of moral judgments in sacrificial
dilemmas. Finally, in contrast to most studies in the moral psychology
literature, we used a predominantly Muslim sample in the study. We
presented the personal and impersonal versions of the Transplant
dilemmas and the Footbridge-Trolley dilemmas and asked about the
justifications for judging the sacrifice as morally right or wrong. We
also used a continuous measure of utilitarianism and minimalism and
examined their relation to CRT and psychopathy.

\subsection{Method}

\subsubsection{Participants}

\renewcommand{\baselinestretch}{1.02} \large\normalsize 

A total of 269 undergraduates from Doğuş
University (Turkey) took part in the study for extra course credit
(mean age = 21.57, \textit{SD} = 4.21; 204 women, 63 men, two
unreported). The majority of the participants identified themselves as
Muslim (\textit{n} = 209). Of the remaining, 20 were atheists, 24
reported believing in God with no affiliation with an established
religion, four were affiliated with a religion other than Islam and one
did not respond. 

\subsubsection{Materials}

\textbf{Moral Vignettes. }Four different dilemmas were used to examine
the participants’ moral judgments (in the Appendix). Two of them were
“personal,” involving direct harm to the person involved in the
scenario (Organ Transplant personal and Footbridge) and two were
“impersonal,” involving only indirect harm (Organ Transplant
impersonal and Trolley; see Moore, Clark \& Kane, 2008; Moore, Lee,
Clark \& Conway, 2011).

In the Trolley scenario, a train is out of control and will kill five
persons unless a button is pressed, in which case the train will change
tracks and will kill one other person instead of five. The participant
is asked to judge whether it is morally right to press the button and
cause one person to die in order to save five.

The Footbridge dilemma is the personal version of the Trolley dilemma.
It involves pushing one person in the tracks to his death in order to
stop the train and save the five persons.

The personal Organ Transplant scenario involves a surgeon who can save
five patients only by killing one critically injured patient by
severing his jugular and transplanting his various organs to the five
patients. In the impersonal version of the Organ Transplant scenario,
the surgeon allows the one patient to die by not stopping a nurse who
is about to perform an erroneous operation and accidentally lead to the
death of the patient. The participants were asked in all scenarios to
judge whether it is morally right to kill one patient in order to save
five.

More specifically, the first question asked the participants to make a
categorical right-wrong judgment. The second and the third questions
asked about how required and how permissible the sacrificial action
was. Unlike in Royzman et al.\ (2015), we asked these two questions on a
Likert scale from 1 to 7, higher scores indicating higher requiredness
and higher permissibility. Utilitarianism was defined as the sum of the
requiredness and permissibility scores whereas moral minimalism was
defined as the difference between the permissibility and requiredness
scores. Thus, minimalism in this context meant seeing the sacrificial
action as permissible but not required. A general utilitarianism and
minimalism score was computed by summing over all four scenarios.

Finally, to understand the grounds for making the judgments they did,
we presented the participants five items which corresponded to five
different moral justifications. The first one corresponded to acting
on non-moral grounds: “Moral reasons did not play an important role in
my judgment.” The second item expressed a virtue-ethical principle:
“Someone who intentionally harms an innocent person cannot be moral.”
The third item expressed deontology: “Intentionally harming an
innocent person is against fundamental moral rules and is thus
unacceptable regardless of its intended consequence.” The fourth item
expressed classical utilitarianism: “Moral action is what ensures the
well-being of maximum number of people.” The fifth item expressed an
acceptance of fate and avoiding responsibility: “It is wrong to
interfere with consequences that arise as a result of the natural
course of events no matter what the ensuing harm is.” The participants
were asked to choose one of the five justifications for their choices
in each of the four dilemmas presented. The order of the five items
was randomized across participants.

\textbf{Cognitive Reflection Test. }To measure the thinking dispositions
of the participants, we used the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT;
Frederick, 2005), which is used frequently in the literature. The test
consists of three questions that assess analytic or intuitive thinking
styles, which correspond to a high-effort or low-effort thinking
disposition. Each question has one true and one intuitive false answer.
For example, the question “A bat and a ball cost \$1.10 in total. The
bat costs \$1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?”
immediately brings to mind a false intuitive answer (10 cents), whereas
the correct answer (5 cents) requires analytic thinking. Correct
answers to each of the three questions were added up and a total CRT
score was computed ($\alpha$ = .540). Mean CRT-correct
score for this study is 1.30 (\textit{SD} = 1.00). 

\textbf{Psychopathy. }To assess the psychopathy level of the
participants, the Turkish translation of the psychopathy subscale of
the Dark Triad scale was used (Paulhus \& Williams, 2002). The
subscale is a 1--5 Likert-type scale and consists of nine items
($\alpha$ = .731). One sample item is “Payback needs to be quick and
nasty.”

\textbf{Demographic form. }A demographic form was given at the end where
gender (0 =female, 1 = male), age, religiosity (1 = not at all
religious, 7 = highly religious), etc. were asked.

\renewcommand{\baselinestretch}{1.00} \large\normalsize 

\subsubsection{Procedure}

Materials were distributed in a classroom setting
and took 20--30 minutes to complete using paper and pencil. To minimize
order effects, the order of the scales was counterbalanced. 

\subsection{Results and discussion}

\paragraph{Right-wrong judgments.} The majority of the participants judged
killing behavior to be morally wrong in all four dilemmas: 94\% in the
Personal Transplant dilemma, 93\% in the Impersonal Transplant dilemma,
58\% in the Trolley dilemma, and 87\% in the Footbridge dilemma. Table
1 shows the cross-tabulations between justifications and approval and
disapproval judgments. 

\begin{table}[t]\centering
\caption*{Table 1. Right/wrong judgments in four moral dilemmas.}
\begin{tabular}{ll*{5}{C{.4in}}}\toprule
 &  & Pers. Transplant & Impers. Transplant & Trol\-ley & Foot\-bridge  & Total\\\midrule
\mc{7}{l}{Right Judgment}\\
 & Deontological & {\ } 2 & {\ } 0 & 10 & {\ } 1 & 11\\
 & Utilitarian & {\ } 3 & {\ } 4 & 43 & 12 & 62\\
 & Fatalistic & {\ } 2 & {\ } 3 & 12 & {\ } 0 & 24\\
 & Virtue Ethical & {\ } 1 & {\ } 0 & {\ } 3 & {\ } 1 & {\ } 6\\
 & Amoral & {\ } 6 & {\ } 8 & 37 & 17 & 69\\
\mc{2}{l}{Total} & 14 & 15 & 105 {\ } & 31 & 172 {\ } \\\midrule
\mc{7}{l}{Wrong Judgment}\\
 & Deontological & 131 {\ } & 134 {\ } & 61 & 100 {\ }  & 421 {\ } \\
 & Utilitarian & {\ } 8 & {\ } 8 & 10 & {\ } 6 & 28\\
 & Fatalistic & 41 & 40 & 42 & 54 & 196  {\ } \\
 & Virtue Ethical & 46 & 48 & 28 & 48 & 182 {\ } \\
 & Amoral & 22 & 20 & 12 & 23 & 75\\
\mc{2}{l}{Total}  & 248 {\ } & 250 {\ }  & 153 {\ } & 231 {\ } & 902 {\ } \\\bottomrule
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\begin{table*}[t!]\centering
\caption*{Table 2. Correlations among variables, Study 1.
\textit{\textsuperscript{***}}\textit{p }{\textless} .01;
\textit{\textsuperscript{**}}\textit{p }{\textless} .05; \textit{*p
}{\textless} .061.}
\begin{tabular}{l*{7}{d{1.5}}}\toprule
Variables & \mc{1}{c}{1}& \mc{1}{c}{2}& \mc{1}{c}{3}& \mc{1}{c}{4}& \mc{1}{c}{5}& \mc{1}{c}{6}& \mc{1}{c}{7}\\\midrule
1-Utilitarianism & \mc{1}{c}{1}& .036 & -.067 & .151^{**} & .130^{**} & .014 & -.087\\
2-Minimalism & & \mc{1}{c}{1}& .135^{*} & -.006 & .108 & -.011 & -.153^{**}\\
3-CRT & & & \mc{1}{c}{1}& .012 & .062 & .040 & -.153^{**}\\
4-Psychopathy & & & & \mc{1}{c}{1}& .277^{***} & -.120^{*} & -.076\\
5-Gender) & & & & & \mc{1}{c}{1}& .016 & -.182^{***}\\
6-Age & & & & & & \mc{1}{c}{1}& -.015\\
7-Religiosity & & & & & & & \mc{1}{c}{1}\\\bottomrule
\end{tabular}
\end{table*}

\begin{table*}[t]\centering
\caption*{Table 3. Correlations of personal and impersonal moral dilemmas with
CRT and psychopathy, Study 1. \textit{\textsuperscript{***}}\textit{p
}{\textless} .01; \textit{\textsuperscript{**}}\textit{p }{\textless}
.05; \textit{*p }{\textless} .075.}
\begin{tabular}{l*{6}{d{1.5}}}\toprule
Variables & \mc{1}{c}{1}& \mc{1}{c}{2}& \mc{1}{c}{3}& \mc{1}{c}{4}& \mc{1}{c}{5}& \mc{1}{c}{6}\\\midrule
1-Uti-Personal & \mc{1}{c}{1}& .529^{***} & .126^{**} & .010 & -.073 & .126^{**}\\
2-Uti-Impersonal & & \mc{1}{c}{1}& .075 & -.082 & -.057 & .114^{*}\\
3-Min-Personal & & & \mc{1}{c}{1}& .492^{***} & .117 & .062\\
4-Min-Impersonal & & & & \mc{1}{c}{1}& .127^{*} & -.060\\
5-CRT & & & & & \mc{1}{c}{1}& .012\\
6-Psychopathy &  &  &  &  &  & \mc{1}{c}{1}\\\bottomrule
\end{tabular}
\end{table*}

As can be seen in Table 1, the majority of the participants who judged
the sacrifice of one person to be wrong chose the deontological
principle as their justification in all four dilemmas. Although there
is more variation among those who judge the sacrifice to be right, the
two most common justifications were the utilitarian principle
(\textit{n} = 62) and amorality (\textit{n} = 69). Somewhat surprising
is the small minority which chooses utilitarianism or amoral reasons as
their justification for judging that killing one person is morally
wrong. That the majority points to deontological reasons for rejecting
killing is consistent with Holyoak and Powell’s (2016) account that
commonsense moral reasoning mostly seeks deontological coherence. In
addition, fatalism and virtue ethics, rarely discussed in the
psychological literature, are also seen by a sizeable part of the
sample as the grounds for rejecting killing. This provides some support
to Uhlmann et al.’s (2015) claim that laypeople act like naïve virtue
theorists. The fact that those who condoned killing did so mostly on
non-moral grounds is at odds with Greene’s dual-process account and
Greene et al.’s (2001) findings. In fact, utilitarianism was less
frequently chosen in the present study than amorality for judging that
killing one person is morally right. This might be interpreted as
supporting Kahane’s (2012) claim that the so-called utilitarian option
in sacrificial dilemmas is not \textit{always} the same as real-world
utilitarianism, at least for some people.

\paragraph{Predictors of utilitarianism and minimalism.} Table 2 shows the
correlations among variables. Table 3 also shows the correlations of
individual scenarios (Personal vs.\ Impersonal). Previous research
(Royzman et al., 2015) indicates that CRT predicts moral minimalism but
not utilitarianism, in direct contrast to the dual-process account by
Greene (2007). Unlike Royzman et al.\ (2015), who treated minimalism and
utilitarianism as categorical variables, we measured them as continuous
variables to see their relation with CRT. Results indicated an
almost significant positive correlation between CRT scores and
moral minimalism, \textit{r} = .135, \textit{p} = .061.

Kahane et al.\ (2015) report that utilitarianism scores in sacrificial
dilemmas are positively correlated with psychopathy and rational egoism
scores and negatively correlated with donating to charity and humanism.
In addition, Royzman et al.\ (2015) suggest that the negative
correlation between behaving in a utility optimizing manner and
empathic concern indicates that utilitarianism is related to
psychopathy rather than analytic thinking. In parallel with this
account, the present study also found a positive correlation between
utilitarian responses and psychopathy, \textit{r} = .151, \textit{p} =
.019. In other words, the results replicate the previously found
association of CRT scores with moral minimalism and psychopathy scores
with utilitarianism with a continuous measurement scale. In Study 2, we
sought to replicate the findings on a sample with a more diverse age
range since the association between CRT and minimalism in Study 1 was
only marginal.

\section{Study 2}

\subsection{Method}

\subsubsection{Participants}

A total of 246 participants took part in Study 2
(mean age = 27.31, \textit{SD} = 9.41; 170 women, 69 men, seven
missing). One research assistant randomly contacted the participants on
the streets of Istanbul. The majority of the participants identified
themselves as Muslims (\textit{n} = 180). Of the remaining
participants, 18 reported themselves to be atheists, 13 as being
affiliated with a religion other than Islam, 32 as believing in God
without being affiliated with a religion and three did not respond. 

\subsubsection{Materials and Procedure}

Two dilemmas (Trolley and Impersonal Transplant scenarios) were used
instead of four. In addition, no justification was asked of the
participants regarding their right/wrong judgments. The rest of the
procedure was the same as in Study 1. Mean CRT-correct score for this
study is 1.36 (\textit{SD} = 1.07).  The reliabilities of the
Psychopathy scale and the CRT were .70 and .63, respectively.

\begin{table*}[t]\centering
\caption*{Table 4. Correlations among variables, Study 2.
\textit{\textsuperscript{***}}\textit{p }{\textless} .01;
\textit{\textsuperscript{**}}\textit{p }{\textless} .05; \textit{*p
}{\textless} .061.}
\begin{tabular}{l*{7}{d{1.5}}}\toprule
Variables & \mc{1}{c}{1}& \mc{1}{c}{2}& \mc{1}{c}{3}& \mc{1}{c}{4}& \mc{1}{c}{5}& \mc{1}{c}{6}& \mc{1}{c}{7}\\\midrule
1-Utilitarianism & \mc{1}{c}{1}& -.085 & .004 & .185^{***} & .100 & -.021 & .112\\
2-Minimalism &  & \mc{1}{c}{1}& .233^{**} & .062 & .101 & -.086 & -.129^{*}\\
3-CRT &  &  & \mc{1}{c}{1}& .047 & .170^{*} & .025 & -.169^{*}\\
4-Psychopathy &  &  &  & \mc{1}{c}{1}& .258^{***} & -.144^{*} & -.072\\
5-Gender  &  &  &  &  & \mc{1}{c}{1}& .022 & .013\\
6-Age &  &  &  &  &  & \mc{1}{c}{1}& -.013\\
7-Religiosity &  &  &  &  &  &  & \mc{1}{c}{1}\\\bottomrule
\end{tabular}
\end{table*}

\subsection{Results and Discussion}

Table 4 shows the correlations among variables. While utilitarianism
was significantly correlated with psychopathy (\textit{r} = .185,
\textit{p} = .005), moral minimalism was significantly correlated with
CRT (\textit{r} = .233, \textit{p} = .001) in this study. However,
neither utilitarianism is related to CRT, nor moral minimalism to
psychopathy. This replicates Royzman et al.’s (2015) findings with a
continuous measure and supports Kahane’s account.

In addition, the previous study’s results implicate moral views other
than utilitarianism and deontology that guide individuals’ moral
judgments in sacrificial dilemmas. Although the majority of the
participants chose deontology as their guiding principle, virtue ethics
and fatalism were also chosen as the guiding principle for a sizeable
portion of the sample for the wrong judgments. For the right judgments,
the majority of the participants chose amorality as their guiding
principle rather than utilitarianism.

\section{Study 3}

In Study 1, the guiding principle was measured categorically: the
participants were forced to choose one principle among five. In Study
3, taking into account the possibility that more than one principle
may be guiding the participants’ choices at the same time, we asked
them to rate the importance of each principle on a scale from 1 to
5. Study 3 also included several questions measuring real life
utilitarianism in addition to psychopathy and CRT and their relation
to the guiding principles was examined.

\subsection{Method} 

\subsubsection{Participants} A total of 389 undergraduates from Doğuş
University (mean age = 22.33, \textit{SD} = 3.13; 244 women, 138 men,
seven missing) took part in Study 3 for extra course credit. The
majority identified themselves as Muslim (\textit{n} = 286). Of the
remaining participants, 32 were atheists, 59 believed in God but were
not affiliated with a religion, nine were affiliated with a religion
other than Islam and three did not respond. 

\subsubsection{Materials and Procedure}All materials and procedure were the
same as in Study 1 except the following: As in Study 2, two impersonal
moral dilemmas (Trolley and Impersonal Transplant scenarios) were given
instead of four. Right/wrong and permissible/required judgments were
asked as in Study 1. After each of the two dilemmas, participants were
asked to rate five moral principles from 1 (completely disagree) to 5
(completely agree) as to how important each principle was in their
choice. Consequently, a score for each of the five principles
(non-moral, virtue ethics, fatalism, utilitarianism and deontology) was
formed by taking the sum of the ratings in the two dilemmas (see Table
5 for mean scores obtained for the five principles). 

\begin{table}[t]\centering
  \caption*{Table 5. The mean justification ratings for two dilemmas,
    Study 3. \textit{SD}s in parenthesis.}
\begin{tabular}{llrrr}\toprule
 & Justifications & Organ & Trolley & Total\\\midrule
 & Deontological & 3.88 (1.21) & 3.67 (1.31) & 3.77 (1.17)\\
 & Utilitarian & 2.86 (1.41) & 3.02 (1.38) & 2.94 (1.31)\\
 & Fatalistic & 3.39 (1.27) & 3.24 (1.27) & 3.31 (1.16)\\
 & Virtue Ethical & 4.05 (1.26) & 3.98 (1.28) & 4.01 (1.17)\\
 & Amoral & 2.88 (1.29) & 2.92 (1.29) & 2.89 (1.17)\\\bottomrule
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\begin{table*}[t]\centering
\caption*{Table 6. Correlations among variables, Study 3.
\textit{\textsuperscript{***}}\textit{p }{\textless} .01;
\textit{\textsuperscript{**}}\textit{p }{\textless} .05; \textit{*p
}{\textless} .061.}
\begin{tabular}{l*{8}{d{1.5}}}\toprule
Variables & \mc{1}{c}{1}& \mc{1}{c}{2}& \mc{1}{c}{3}& \mc{1}{c}{4}& \mc{1}{c}{5}& \mc{1}{c}{6}& \mc{1}{c}{7}& 8\\\midrule
1-Utilitarianism & \mc{1}{c}{1}& -.076 & -.052 & .235^{***} & -.072 & .042 & .111^{*} & .172^{***}\\
2-Minimalism &  & \mc{1}{c}{1}& .068 & -.111^{*} & .036 & -.100^{*} & -.222^{***} & -.146^{***}\\
3-CRT &  &  & \mc{1}{c}{1}& .142^{**} & -.082 & -.144^{**} & -.080 & -.040\\
4-Psychopathy &  &  &  & \mc{1}{c}{1}& -.030 & -.033 & .019 & -.044\\
5-Gender  &  &  &  &  & \mc{1}{c}{1}& -.076 & -.018 & .012\\
6-Age &  &  &  &  &  & \mc{1}{c}{1}& .039 & -.061\\
7-Religiosity &  &  &  &  &  &  & \mc{1}{c}{1}& .282^{***}\\
8-Reallifeuti. &  &  &  &  &  &  &  & \mc{1}{c}{1}\\\bottomrule
\end{tabular}
\end{table*}

\begin{table*}[t]\centering
  \caption*{Table 7. Additional correlations among variables (not shown
    in Table 6), Study 3.
    \textit{\textsuperscript{***}}\textit{p }{\textless} .01;
    \textit{\textsuperscript{**}}\textit{p }{\textless} .05.}
\begin{tabular}{l*{8}{d{1.5}}}\toprule
Variables & \mc{1}{c}{1}& \mc{1}{c}{2}& \mc{1}{c}{3}& \mc{1}{c}{4}& \mc{1}{c}{5}& \mc{1}{c}{6}& \mc{1}{c}{7}& 8\\\midrule
1-CRT & \mc{1}{c}{1}& .142^{***} & -.040 & .036 & -.006 & -.112^{**} & -.042 & -.054\\
2-Psychopathy &  & \mc{1}{c}{1}& -.044 & -.143^{***} & -.124^{**} & .091 & -.053
& .052\\
3-Reallifeuti. &  &  & \mc{1}{c}{1}& .105^{**} & .125^{**} & .195^{***} & .133^{**} & .089\\
4-Virtue &  &  &  & \mc{1}{c}{1}& .713^{***} & .066 & .398^{***} & -.023\\
5-Deontology &  &  &  &  & \mc{1}{c}{1}& .119^{**} & .466^{***} & -.053\\
6-Utilitarianism &  &  &  &  &  & \mc{1}{c}{1}& .090 & .023\\
7-Fatalism &  &  &  &  &  &  & \mc{1}{c}{1}& -.036\\
8-Amorality &  &  &  &  &  &  &  & \mc{1}{c}{1}\\\bottomrule
\end{tabular}
\end{table*}

In addition to CRT ($\alpha$ = .726) and the psychopathy
scale ($\alpha$ = .690) used in the previous two studies,
two items were asked to measure real life utilitarianism (see Kahane et
al., 2015): “It is morally required for well-off people to give to
charity for the benefit of children in poor countries” and “It is
morally required to give up luxuries in our personal lives in order to
slow down global warming and to leave a habitable planet to future
generations” ($\alpha$ = .640). Mean CRT-correct score
for this study is 0.80 (\textit{SD} = 1.04).

\subsection{Results and Discussion}

Table 5 shows the mean justifications, and Table 6 shows the correlations
among variables. The utilitarian option in the sacrificial dilemmas
was positively correlated with real-life utilitarianism (\textit{r} =
.176, \textit{p} = .001) and with psychopathy (\textit{r} = .186,
\textit{p} {\textless} .001). In addition, the utilitarian option in
the dilemmas was positively correlated with the rating of the
utilitarian principle as the justification of the choice (\textit{r} =
.308, \textit{p} {\textless} .001). In other words, thinking that
sacrificing one person to save five is both permissible and required
is correlated with agreeing with the statement ``moral behavior is
that which promotes the well-being of the maximum number of people.''
The utilitarian choice, on the other hand, was negatively correlated
with virtue ethics (\textit{r} = --.271, \textit{p} {\textless} .001),
deontology (\textit{r} = --.311, \textit{p} {\textless} .001) and
fatalism (\textit{r} = --.270, \textit{p} {\textless} .001). No
correlation was found between CRT and the utilitarian choice
(\textit{r} = --.084, \textit{p} = .120). This replicates the findings
of both Study 2 and Royzman et al.\ (2015). It is also consistent with
Baron et al.’s (2015) account which argues that the inconsistent
findings regarding the relation between CRT and utilitarian choices
stem from the fact that CRT is imperfectly correlated with actively
open-minded thinking, which is the real predictor of utilitarian
choices.

Moral minimalism, thinking that sacrificing one person to save five is
permissible but not required, was negatively correlated with our
measure of real-life utilitarianism (\textit{r} = --.146, \textit{p} =
.003). CRT, on the other hand, was not correlated with moral
minimalism (\textit{r} = .068, \textit{p} = .210). Furthermore, moral
minimalism was negatively correlated with deontology (\textit{r} =
--.203, \textit{p} {\textless} .001) and fatalism (\textit{r} =
--.230, \textit{p} {\textless} .001) as moral principles, marginally
so with virtue ethics (\textit{r} = --.088, \textit{p} = .088), and
not correlated with the utilitarianism principle (\textit{r} = --.078,
\textit{p} = .129).

Table 7 also shows the correlations among the main variables (CRT,
psychopathy and real-life utilitarianism) and justifications scores.
The results showed that CRT is negatively correlated with utilitarian
justification (\textit{r} = --.112, \textit{p} = .038), but not
significantly correlated with any other justification. Psychopathy was
negatively correlated with both virtue ethics (\textit{r} = --.143,
\textit{p} = .006) and deontology (\textit{r} = --.124, \textit{p} =
.016), but not significantly correlated with utilitarianism
justification (\textit{r} = .091, \textit{p} = .078). Real life
utilitarianism was positively correlated with all of the justifications
except amorality (see Table 7).

The finding that the utilitarian choice is associated with both
real-life utilitarianism and psychopathy might indicate that some
participants choose the utilitarian option for one reason and some for
the other. The finding that real life utilitarianism is not related to
psychopathy, whereas utilitarian choice in the sacrificial moral
dilemmas is significantly related to psychopathy, supports this view
(see Table 6) 

Our findings indicate, in contrast to Greene et al.'s
(2001) account, that while utilitarian choices are associated with
psychopathy, it is moral minimalism that is associated with analytic
thinking. On the other hand, the positive correlation between
utilitarian choices and real-life utilitarianism is consistent with
Greene et al.\ (2001). The results suggest that different, in fact
diametrically opposed (i.e., caring for humanity vs.\ psychopathy),
motives might underlie utilitarian responses in sacrificial dilemmas.

\section{General Discussion} 

The principal aim of the study was to determine the moral principles
that guided individuals’ choice of the utilitarian and moral minimalist
options in sacrificial moral dilemmas. The findings supported Kahane’s
(2012) account in that the participants who chose the so-called
utilitarian option (sacrificing one person to save five) were not
mainly guided by real-life utilitarianism defined as the immediate
maximization of well-being. In addition, other moral principles which
are generally neglected in the literature, like fatalism and virtue
ethics (and also non-moral reasons), were chosen as guiding a
significant number of participants’ choices.

All three studies indicate that when the sacrifice was rated separately
as permissible and as required, psychopathy was positively correlated
with utilitarianism (“permissible and required” judgments), but the
findings are mixed on the relation between CRT scores and moral
minimalism (“permissible but not required”). One of the three samples
showed a significant, one almost significant, and one non-significant
relation between CRT scores and moral minimalism. This finding provides
additional empirical support to Kahane’s arguments and partial support
to Royzman et al.’s (2015) from a non-western and predominantly Muslim
sample. 

Study 3 findings indicate that the utilitarian principle used to justify
moral choices was correlated with the choice of the utilitarian option.
This lends some support to the idea that the utilitarian option in the
dilemmas is chosen, at least in part, because of utilitarian motives.
Additionally, real-life utilitarianism is also correlated with
utilitarian choices, but not with psychopathy. Interestingly, however,
utilitarian choices in sacrificial moral dilemmas are also correlated
with psychopathy in all three studies. This seems to suggest that some
people make utilitarian choices in sacrificial dilemmas out of
utilitarian concerns, as per Greene et al.’s (2001) account, and other
people make utilitarian accounts out of a psychopathic lack of care for
the plight of the one sacrificed person, as per Kahane’s account. Study
1 also revealed that the two most common justifications in judging that
killing one person is morally right, were utilitarianism (consistent
with Greene’s account) and amorality (consistent with Kahane’s
account).

\subsection{Implications} 

To the best of our knowledge, this set of studies is the first to go
beyond the utilitarianism-deontology dichotomy in sacrificial moral
dilemmas and to include other moral views such as virtue ethics and
fatalism (agreeing with the general approach of Uhlmann et al.,
2015). In addition, the scarcity of studies on non-western populations
in this field of research makes it difficult to generalize the
findings (see Ahlenius \& Tännsjö, 2012, for a comparative analysis
done in the USA, Russia and China; see also Arutyunova, Alexandrov \&
Hauser, 2016, and Moore et al., 2011 for investigations in non-Western
populations). In this respect, another contribution of the present
study is to extend previous findings in moral psychology to a
non-western, predominantly Muslim sample using continuous measures for
moral judgments.

The findings on the principles used in moral justification, however,
should be seen as preliminary since each principle for each scenario
was based on a single item. One natural avenue for future research is
to develop a reliable and valid instrument to assess the use of each
moral principle used in this study (virtue ethics, fatalism,
non-morality, utilitarianism, and deontology), and perhaps other
principles, and relate them to the so-called utilitarian and
deontological choices in the sacrificial dilemmas. An item without the
word “moral” for the justifications might also be more informative
(since the term may be interpreted narrowly, compared to its use in,
e.g., philosophy). For instance, some people might simply choose the
following option without any moral considerations: “If you have a
choice between one death and five, you should choose the one.''  Our
real-life utilitarianism questions are comprised of only two items,
which may not be consistent with some forms of utilitarianism, and
which therefore lack a complete conception of real-life
utilitarianism.

Another limitation of the present set of studies is that they are all
correlational (see Gawronski \& Beer, 2016). One way to experimentally
check the validity of the present findings would be to prime real-life
utilitarian concerns and then to see whether the rate of “permissible”
and “required” responses in sacrificial dilemmas increases. It should
be possible to persuasively summarize the main points of real-life
utilitarianism in the form of a short text as a means of manipulation
(see Yilmaz \& Bahçekapili, 2015, for the use of such texts to prime
meta-ethical views). 

Although the effect of cognitive styles on moral judgment has been
investigated (i.e., Paxton et al., 2014), another theoretically
interesting question would be whether various normative ethical views
have differential effects on cognitive style. Priming real-life
utilitarianism and moral minimalism through texts and seeing whether
they change analytic thinking tendencies might be one way to
experimentally test the correlational findings in all three studies. 

\subsection{Conclusion}

In conclusion, the preliminary findings in the present set of studies
suggest that there are moral principles apart from utilitarianism and
deontology that guide individuals’ moral judgments. We suggest that
moral psychology move beyond the utilitarianism-deontology dichotomy
and try to delineate these other principles. It should perhaps also
move beyond the sacrificial dilemmas to elicit moral judgments since,
as Kahane argues, the options in these dilemmas (e.g., the utilitarian
option) do not necessarily reflect the moral principles they are
supposed to measure (e.g., utilitarianism as an impartial concern for
the greater good; see also Gawronski \& Beer, 2016, for a recent
review paper about the issue of the real meanings of the judgments on
moral dilemmas). One alternative is to use “rule dilemmas” where
participants decide whether to violate a deontological rule to achieve
a superior outcome (e.g., whether to use an unapproved treatment
method to treat a patient who is sure to die if untreated; see Baron,
Gürçay \& Luce, 2017). Another alternative is to use realistic moral
dilemma situations and compare the results with hypothetical dilemmas
since it is known that individuals’ aversion to harming others differ
in the two types of situation (FeldmanHall et al., 2012; see also
Baron, Gürçay \& Luce, 2017; Camerer \& Mobbs, 2017; Francis, et al.,
2016; Patil, Cogoni, Zangrando, Chittaro \& Silani, 2014; Sabo \&
Giner-Sorolla, 2017, for the importance of using more realistic
situations to test moral views).

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\end{hangparas}

\bigskip

\section*{Appendix: Scenarios}

\paragraph{Surgery: Personal.}

You are a doctor. You have five patients, each of whom is about to die
due to a failing organ of some kind. A new person is rushed into the
hospital after a serious car accident. This person is
critically injured, and will die without immediate surgery. It is
likely you can save this accident victim, though it would involve long
and complicated surgery. You realize that if you purposely cut his
carotid artery during surgery it would cause his death and no one would
ever know. Then you could harvest his organs for transplant into the
bodies of the other five patients. If you do this, the other five
patients will live, but the accident victim will die.  Is it
appropriate for you to kill the accident victim in order to save your
five patients? 

\paragraph{Sugery: Impersonal-Instrumental.}

You are a doctor. You have five patients, each of whom is about to die
due to a failing organ of some kind. A new person is rushed into the
hospital after a serious car accident. This person is
critically injured, and will die without immediate surgery. While
involved in long and complicated surgery on the accident victim, you
notice that a nurse is about to give him an inappropriate
medication. You know that this error will be lethal and by ignoring
this mistake and allowing it to happen, the patient will die. This
would allow you to harvest his organs for transplant into the bodies of
the other five patients. If you do this, the other five patients will
live. Is it appropriate for you to ignore the lethal mistake in order
to save your five patients?

\newpage

\paragraph{Modified footbridge/trolley: Personal.}

A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five workmen who
will be killed if the trolley proceeds on its present course. You are
standing next to the track on which the trolley is traveling, but you
are too far away from the workmen to warn them of the impending
danger. Next to you there is a very large stranger who is minding his
own business.  It occurs to you that if you pushed this person onto
the tracks in front of the trolley, it would stop the trolley and save
the five workmen from certain death. However, this would most
certainly kill the stranger.  Is it appropriate for you to push this
stranger onto the tracks to save the five workmen?

\paragraph{Modified footbridge/trolley: Impersonal-incidental.}

A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five workmen who
will be killed if the trolley proceeds on its present course. You are
standing next to the track on which the trolley is traveling, but you
are too far away from the workmen to warn them of the impending
danger. Next to you there is a control switch for the tracks that can
reroute the trolley.  You could divert the trolley onto another track
and spare the five workmen from certain death. However, there is
another workman on the new track that will certainly die if you divert
the trolley. Is it appropriate for you to divert the trolley and kill
the lone workman in order to save the five workmen? 

\end{document}
