



Newsletter

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2008-2009 Executive Board

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The SJDM Newsletter, published electronically four times a year (March, June, September, and December), welcomes short submissions and book reviews from individuals and groups. Essays should: i) be less than 400 words, ii) use inline citations and no reference list, iii) not include a bio (a URL or email is ok). If you are interested in reviewing books and related materials, please email Dan Goldstein. The best way to send your contribution is via email, or as an MS Word email attachment.

Advertising Rates: Advertising can be submitted to the editor. Inclusion of the ad and the space given to the ad is at the editor's discretion. The current charge is \$200 per page. Contact Dan Goldstein for details.

Address Corrections: Please keep your mailing and/or email address current. Address changes or corrections should be sent Bud Fennema. Reports of problems in receiving or opening the pdf file should be sent to the editor.

Society membership: Requests for information concerning membership in the Society for Judgment and Decision Making should be sent to Bud Fennema.

Announcements

The program for the upcoming SJDM conference in Boston is now available at the SJDM website: <http://www.sjdm.org/> (*The preliminary program is also published at the end of this newsletter – Ed.*)

Some things to note about the schedule:

1. The welcome reception/early registration is Friday, Nov 20, 5-7pm, at the conference hotel (Sheraton Boston Hotel).
2. Talks start at 8:30am on Saturday.
3. The keynote speaker is Steven Pinker, and he will speak at *the luncheon on Monday*.

Information for speakers and poster presenters will be sent out soon. In the meantime, though, please note that poster space is 4 feet x 4 feet. (There will be 2 posters on each side of the 8' x 4' boards.)

The entire program committee looks forward to seeing you in Boston!

Craig McKenzie
2009 SJDM Program Committee Chair

The European Commission has recently published on its website a call for tender which is designed to investigate consumer decision-making in retail investment services from a behavioural economics perspective. The documents related to this call for tender can be found at the following web address:

http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/tenders/information/tenders/cont_notices_en.htm

We would appreciate if you could inform your members about this call for tender so that any interested party can apply in due time.

Secretariat of Unit B1 "Consumer Markets"
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mailto: SANCO-CONSULT-B1 at ec.europa.eu

Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making. Call for papers - Special Issue: 20 Years of Naturalistic Decision Making: Foundations and Progress

This is a call for papers for a Special Issue of the Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making Journal (JCEDM) devoted to the general theme of "Twenty Years of NDM: A Review of the Foundations and Progress."

The first Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) conference was held in 1989, bringing together a diverse set of researchers working on related problems. From that small group, the NDM community of practice has grown worldwide. Significant contributions include models that describe real-world decision making, and specialized methods for studying decision making in real-world settings. NDM research has led to innovations in system, training, and organizational design across a range of domains including firefighting, power plant control, piloting, nursing, and many others.

Two decades from the inception of NDM is an opportunity to review the foundations, share retrospective perspectives, and present new articles that reflect the progress in the field. The special issue editors invite submissions dealing with any of these topics including, but not limited to:

(1) Review of the foundations of NDM (2) Retrospections on NDM (3) New or refined NDM models (4) New or refined NDM methods (5) Critical analysis of NDM models and methods (6) Outcomes and applications of NDM research (i.e., innovative designs, improved understanding of phenomena, etc.) (7) Integrative writing highlighting links between NDM and other researcher communities.

Together, the collection of papers included in this special issue should provide an in-depth look at the past, present, and future of NDM research.

SCHEDULE FOR SUBMISSIONS

Manuscript Submission Deadline: December 15, 2009.

Acceptance Notification: March 31, 2010

Final Manuscript Due: May 31, 2010

Publication: Late 2010 or early 2011

Manuscripts should be 25-30 pages double-spaced, and will be subject to the standard JCEDM review prior to acceptance. Instructions for authors can be found at <http://www.hfes.org/web/PubPages/JCEDMauthorinfo.pdf> Manuscripts should be submitted electronically via <http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/jcedm> Please use the format prescribed in the APA Publication Manual (5th edition).

SPECIAL ISSUE GUEST EDITORS

This special issue is co-edited by Rhona Flin, who organized the third NDM conference, and serves on the editorial board for JCEDM, and Laura Militello who helped organize the second and fourth NDM conferences.

Elena Tougareva writes:

“I would like to inform you that one month ago LinkedIn group "Economic Psychology & Behavioural Economics" was created <http://www.linkedin.com/e/vgh/2045012/>
This LinkedIn group is aimed to connect researchers (predominantly academic) working in the field of economic psychology, behavioural economics and socio-economics. All interested professionals are welcome, in particular IAREP (International Association for Research in Economic Psychology), SABE

(Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics), SASE (Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics) and other allied associations members.

You are welcome to join LinkedIn group "Economic Psychology & Behavioural Economics?"
<http://www.linkedin.com/e/vgh/2045012/> Please, notify me in your request to join the group about your membership (tougareva at yandex.ru (primary))”

All are invited to attend and present at the 5th annual Pre-Conference on Judgment and Decision Making preceding the January 2010 Society for Personality and Social Psychology meeting in Las Vegas. The JDM pre-conference will be held during the day of January 28.

The goal of the pre-conference is to highlight the emerging nexus of social, personality, judgment, and decision making research. The meeting features an exciting lineup of speakers: Sonja Lyubomirsky, Dale Miller, Don Moore, Leif Nelson, Mike Norton, Daniel Oppenheimer, Ellen Peters, Timothy Wilson

With generous support from New York University's Stern School of Business, the pre-conference will offer competitive travel reimbursement to graduate students who are first author on a poster. The deadline for poster submissions is November 15, 2009. Registration is now open and will close when our limited space is filled or January 15th, whichever comes first. For registration and more, please visit: <http://www.socialthinking.org/jdm.html>

Organizers:
Carey Morewedge, Rebecca Ratner, Neal Roese, and Kelly See

From Charles Duhigg of the New York Times:

"I'm a reporter at the New York Times, seeking a researcher for a book project. This book, which will be published by Random House, is about the science of habit formation and business applications of habits research. I'm looking for someone who can help me find relevant academic literature and business case studies, and who is somewhat familiar with existing publications on the topics.

The position is about 10 hours a week, and offers competitive compensation. Hours are flexible, and most of our communication will be via email. I would like to find someone who knows academic literature, but can also find real-world case studies that appeal to a general audience. This will be one of Random House's more prominent titles - so, if you are interested in learning about writing popular non-fiction, it might be a nice opportunity. Please contact me at [charlesduhigg at yahoo.com](mailto:charlesduhigg@yahoo.com). Some background on my work at the Times can be found at <http://tinyurl.com/y8jjjka>"

Dan Goldstein writes:

“I would like to encourage all Society members to adopt the open-source R language for their statistical analyses. Because it is extremely powerful, completely free, and unencumbered by restrictive licenses, R has quickly become a lingua franca among statistical scientists. Since it runs on Windows, Mac, and Linux and can be downloaded and installed in minutes, it is ideal for teaching and for publishing code in journal articles.

To get started, there is an R video tutorial at <http://www.decisionsciencenews.com/?p=261>. Jon Baron has written an excellent guide for those interested in Psychological research with R at <http://www.psych.upenn.edu/~baron/rpsych/rpsych.html>. The home of the R project is <http://cran.r-project.org/>.”

Conferences

2009 ANNUAL MEETING OF THE SOCIETY FOR JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING

(See the end of this newsletter for the preliminary program and information. -Ed.)

 Association For Consumer Research Conference, Pittsburgh, Pa, Oct 22-25 2009

What: The Association for Consumer Research Annual North American Conference

When: October 22 – 25, 2009

Where: Westin Convention Center Hotel, Pittsburgh, PA, USA

<http://www.starwoodhotels.com/westin/property/overview/index.html?propertyID=1370>

Co-chairs: Margaret C. Campbell, University of Colorado; Jeff Inman, University of Pittsburgh; Rik Pieters, Tilburg University

Conference Announcement

<http://www.acrweb.org/acr/Public/index.aspx>

The 2009 North American Conference of the Association for Consumer Research will be held at the Westin Hotel in Pittsburgh, PA from Thursday, October 22 through Sunday, October 25, 2009.

The theme of ACR 2009 is “A World of Knowledge At the Point of Confluence.” Consumer researchers from around the world will meet in the City at the Point, where the Allegheny and the Monongahela rivers flow together to form the Ohio River. International consumer researchers will gather in Pittsburgh to share the ideas and data that converge to create knowledge.

The conference format will follow that of past years. A pre-conference Doctoral Symposium will be held Thursday (co-chaired by Stacy Wood and Dave Wooten). Thursday evening will feature an opening reception for ACR 2009. The conference program on Friday and Saturday will include Competitive Paper sessions, Special sessions, Roundtable discussions, Working Paper sessions, and the Film

Festival. A Gala Reception will be held Saturday evening at the Senator Heinz History Center, just two blocks from the Westin.

ACR 2009 will provide a confluence of consumer researchers for scholarly presentations, discussions, networking and collaborations.

2nd Annual Graduate Student Conference on Psychology and Policy-making
Princeton University
February 19th and 20th, 2010
Call for Papers Deadline: November 16th, 2009

Over the last few decades, insights from the fields of social and cognitive psychology have proven tremendously valuable to the study of public opinion and mass behavior. Less attention has been paid to psychological theories' implications for the study of political institutions, elite behavior, and other elements of the policy making process. This conference aims to bring together research on the frontiers of both of these areas.

The 2nd Annual Princeton Conference on Psychology and Policy-making solicits papers from graduate and post-doctoral students from across the social sciences whose research focuses on the intersections between psychology and the policy-making process. The conference will be held on February 19th and 20th at Princeton University. The goal of the conference is to provide feedback for papers that are in progress. As such, it will employ a workshop style format with eight panels, each offering rigorous consideration of a single paper. The conference will also include a keynote address by John Jost of New York University's Department of Psychology. We hope to build on the success of last year's conference to bring together a diverse group of psychologists, political scientists and other social scientists as paper presenters and discussants.

Submissions should consist of a complete draft (though not necessarily the final draft) of the paper to be presented. Please submit two copies, one without identifying information for blind review. Papers should not exceed 8,000 words in length. Complete papers are preferred but extended abstracts of 750-1000 words (not counting tables and figures) that include some discussion of the study's results will also be considered. Submissions are due via email to psychpol at princeton.edu by November 16th, 2009. All authors will be informed of the decision by January 8th, 2010. Papers not accepted for full presentations may be accepted for a poster session. Assistance for invited participants' travel and lodging is available by application. The organizing committee acknowledges the support of the Princeton University Departments of Politics and Psychology and the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics.

Please direct all questions to psychpol at princeton.edu or visit our website at www.princeton.edu/~psychpol

Registration is now open for the 31st annual meeting of the Society for Medical Decision Making, which will be held October 18-21, 2009 in Hollywood, California. It will be immediately followed in the same hotel by the 2nd annual Diagnostic Errors in Medicine meeting.

For full details, see: <http://www.smdm.org/2009meeting.shtml>

Carnegie Mellon University is proud to announce that it will host the 2010 conference on Behavioral Decision Research and Management in Pittsburgh, PA. Coinciding with the Pittsburgh Arts Festival, BDRM 2010 will be held Thursday June 10th to Saturday June 12th. Information on conference submissions, invited speakers, events, accommodations, and travel will be forthcoming.

There will be a conference entitled "New Risks and Loss Aversion" at Erasmus University Rotterdam, November 5th and 6th, 2009. More information at:

http://www.eur.nl/ese/english/expertise/ese_conferences/behavioral_economics/

First Annual Boulder Summer Conference on Consumers' Financial Decision Making June 27-29, 2010. Hotel Boulderado, Boulder, Colorado.

Please save the dates, June 27-29, 2010, for the 1st Annual Boulder Summer Conference on Consumer Financial Decision Making. The conference will be held at the historic Hotel Boulderado at a great time of year to visit Boulder, Colorado.

The conference will provide an opportunity for interdisciplinary exchange of ideas among researchers working on problems of consumer financial decision-making. Consumer welfare is strongly affected by household financial decisions large and small: choosing mortgages; saving to fund college education or retirement; using credit cards to fund current consumption; choosing how to 'decumulate' savings in retirement; deciding how to pay for health care and insurance; and investing in the stock market. In all of these domains, consumers are often poorly informed and susceptible to making serious errors that have large personal and societal consequences. Basic research in judgment and decision making, psychology, consumer research, behavioral finance, and behavioral economics can inform our understanding of how consumers actually make such decisions and how consumers can be helped to make better decisions by innovations in public policy, business, and consumer education.

The conference is co-sponsored by the Center for Research on Consumers' Financial Decision Making at the University of Colorado and by the Leeds School of Business.

Conference Format

Papers will be presented in two forums: a poster session the first night of the conference and in a series of 75 minute sessions. Each session will have two paper presenters, a discussant, and time for audience questions and comments.

Submission Deadlines for Extended Abstracts and Final Papers

Deadline for extended abstract submissions: December 15, 2009. The conference co-chairs will select papers for presentation at the conference based on extended abstracts, with the understanding that selected papers will be complete and available for review by discussants one month prior to the conference. Selections will be based on quality, relevance to consumers' financial decision making, and contribution to breadth of topics across the conference as a whole. Some preference may be given to papers by junior faculty.

Deadline for completed papers: May 27, 2010. Complete papers to be presented at the conference should be provided to the conference co-chairs and discussants one month in advance of the conference. Please see the conference website at: <http://leeds.colorado.edu/bouldersummerconference>

Call For Papers - Journal of Artificial General Intelligence Special Issue on Model Comparison for Cognitive Architectures and AGI

The purpose of this special issue is to explore the merits of a comparative approach for understanding Artificial General Intelligent (AGI) systems. This approach is common in the field of cognitive modeling, where different theories of cognition are instantiated as computational architectures and applied to common tasks to establish to their respective scope and limits. Within the field of cognitive modeling, comparison efforts have been recognized as crucial for making scientific progress, and the method is now finding its way into a number of related fields in cognitive science. But model comparison need not be viewed only as a theoretical exercise; in fact, the drive to implement unified theories of cognition as computational architectures and test them against a range of human performance data in dynamic, complex and potentially ill-structured task environments is, at root, no different than the call to develop AI systems that can generalize beyond narrow, task-specific applications. In this light, we view model comparison as a means to advance both cognitive science and the study of AGI systems and to reconcile traditions that historically emerged as complementary but have since evolved, for all practical purposes, as independent disciplines.

The structure and content of this special issue are influenced by a particular model comparison challenge recently organized to explore a generic dynamic decision making task, the Dynamic Stocks and Flows (DSF) (please see: <http://www.hss.cmu.edu/departments/sds/ddmlab/modeldsf/results.html> for details). The DSF task was designed to be as simple and accessible as possible to computational modelers while focusing on two key ubiquitous components of general intelligence: the control of dynamical systems and the prediction of future events. A general call for participation was submitted to invite independent modelers using distinct computational approaches to simulate human performance in DSF. Participants in this challenge developed computational models to simulate human performance on the DSF task in a variety of conditions. The goal was to reproduce human behavior, including learning, mistakes and limitations in a way that would generalize to new conditions of the task undisclosed to the modelers. Results from three of the models submitted were selected for presentation at the 2009 International Conference on Cognitive Modeling. Human learning data in DSF as well as the results from all the models participating in the model comparison are available on the comparison web site and can be used for the purposes of analyses and publication in this special issue.

We welcome submissions from those who participated in the DSF model comparison challenge as well as from those who are in a position to comment on the following general topics relevant to model comparison within the context of the DSF challenge:

* Many computational fields have seen the emergence of challenge tasks to prod the development of new techniques and measure their progress toward the goal (e.g., Robocup). What are the requirements of such challenge tasks for AGI? Should they provide independent tests of specific capacities, integrated tests of functionality, or both?

* Progress is often measured on the relative evaluation of alternatives in a common setting. But what are the constraints of such comparisons for cognitive models? Are acceptable mechanisms limited to those that are judged cognitively - or even biologically - plausible? Should the complexity of a model be taken into account? Which levels of description are acceptable? Should models aim to predict human performance in new conditions, or is suitable post hoc reproduction of known performance data sufficient?

* The methodology developed by cognitive psychology for evaluating fits of model to human data is strongly dependent upon experimental control and scales poorly to complex, open-ended tasks. Sets of criteria for evaluating cognitive architectures have been proposed, but specific instantiations on AGI-level tasks have been lacking.

* Human behavior models based on cognitive architectures are usually developed for very specific tasks and at substantial effort to the modeler. While cognitive architectures keep being refined, cumulative progress in the form of model reuse has been elusive. New mechanisms and/or practices for composing and/or generalizing models of simple tasks are required for scaling up to models suitable for general, open-ended intelligence.

* Despite their stated goal of providing an integrated theory of human intelligence, specific cognitive architectures are usually applied to a relatively narrow set of cognitive activities, often laboratory tasks. Attempts to apply cognitive architectures to open-ended, naturalistic environments (using virtual or robotic embodiments) have raised substantial issues about their robustness and scalability beyond laboratory environments.

Submissions should be sent by December 1st, 2009 to DSFChallenge at gmail.com. Manuscripts should conform to the JAGI formatting guidelines that can be found at the journal's web site, <http://journal.agi-network.org/>, and should not exceed 20 pages of total length. Manuscripts will be submitted to a traditional anonymous peer-review process with publication of accepted contributions expected by summer 2010. Authors will be required to provide the final camera-ready, formatted and copy-edited manuscript. Inquiries regarding this special issue can be sent to DSFChallenge at gmail.com or directly to any of the special issue editors at the addresses below.

Special Issue Editors

Christian Lebiere, Psychology Department, Carnegie Mellon University, cl at cmu.edu

Cleotilde Gonzalez, Social and Decision Sciences Department, Carnegie Mellon University, coty at cmu.edu

Walter Warwick, MA&D Operation, Alion Science and Technology, wwarwick at alionscience.com

Jobs

The University of Chicago Booth School of Business is seeking to hire tenure-track faculty with interests in the areas of decision-making, negotiations, social psychology and organizations, all broadly defined. We will consider candidates who are completing their PhD's as well as more experienced candidates. Candidates must have earned a PhD (or equivalent) or expect to receive a doctorate in the near future.

We are looking for candidates with strong disciplinary training in any of the social sciences who can use that discipline background to conduct research on aspects of behavior relevant to management in organizations and to introduce MBA students to behavioral science principles. This position is part of the Managerial and Organizational Behavior area, whose members are responsible for teaching courses such as Managing in Organizations, Managerial Decision Making, Power and Politics, and Negotiations. Candidates should be qualified to teach at least one of these courses plus another MBA elective. The group maintains two well-equipped laboratories for experimental research.

We will begin reviewing applications on October 15, 2009, although we will continue to accept applications until the position has been filled. Please submit an application online, including a cover letter briefly describing your plans for future work, a vita, a written sample of your present work, and two letters of reference, at <http://facultyapply.chicagobooth.edu>. Hardcopy applications will not be accepted. The University of Chicago is an Equal Opportunity/Affirmative Action employer.

Research Associate for Empirical Research on the Neurobiology of Decision-Making: Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging and Behavioral Experiments

Requirements

Demonstrated skills and experience in behavioral neuroscience research and in programming (Matlab and Eprime). Demonstrated ability to do work independently and having the necessary social skills and positive attitude to interact with test persons. Either a Master or PhD in psychology, neurobiology, cognitive science or a related field (possibly also in computer science, but with an interest in behavioral decision-making and cognitive neuroscience). Demonstrated relevant abilities are more emphasized than the specific degrees or work experience.

Job Duties

Insead is a leading business school with campuses in France and Singapore and a center in Abu Dhabi. This is an opportunity for a candidate post-master level with a background in behavioral neuroscience/ neuro-psychology / BDM with knowledge in neuroscience to conduct rigorous applied research on economic decision-making with a particular focus on food consumption. The research associate will work for faculty from the Marketing area at INSEAD and Neuroscientists from Aix-Marseille Université and from the Department des Etudes Cognitive of the Ecole Normale Supérieure. The researcher is expected to program experiments in Eprime, recruit subjects and assist fMRI data and behavioral data collection as well as doing simple data analysis steps using software like SPM, Matlab and Stata or R. She/he is required to speak English and French fluently. The position is for 12 months on a part time basis (~2 days a week). Application deadline is 30.09.2009 and start date is Nov 2009.

Campus: Europe/Fontainebleau. Status: Cadre. Contact person: Veronique Pereira. Contact email: cvbox@insead.edu

Hilke Plassmann, PhD
e-mail: hilke.plassmann@insead.edu

Behavioral Economics/Neuroeconomics Multi-Department Search

The University of Southern California, College of Letters, Arts, and Sciences, invites applicants for a tenure-track position as Assistant Professor in behavioral economics / neuroeconomics, broadly defined. Areas of interest include, but are not limited to, neurocomputational models of learning, neuroscience of decision-making, affective neuroscience, behavioral and experimental game theory and economics studies of bounded rationality. Eventual appointment will be in either Psychology, Economics, or Neurobiology.

USC offers many opportunities for collaboration across these and other units of the university. Resources include the Dana and David Dornsife Cognitive Neuroscience Imaging Center, the Brain and Creativity Institute, the Institute for Economic Policy Research, and a broad interdisciplinary Economics and Neuroscience community composed of more than 70 faculty members in the basic, engineering, and clinical sciences. USC strongly values diversity and is committed to equal opportunity in employment. Women and men, and members of all racial and ethnic groups, are encouraged to apply.

Applications received before November 1 2009 will be given preferential review; interviews will begin shortly thereafter. Candidates must have a PhD or equivalent doctoral degree at the time of the appointment. Please send representative reprints/preprints and a curriculum vita electronically to multisearch@college.usc.edu. A minimum of three letters of reference should be sent by email to the same address or by post to USC College Search, ATTN: Ann Langerud, Department of Psychology, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089-106

Florence Levy Kay Fellowship In Psychology And Behavioral Economics

Brandeis University invites applications for a two-year, non-renewable Florence Levy Kay Postdoctoral Fellowship for teaching and research at the intersection of Psychology and Economics, beginning Fall 2010. This interdisciplinary joint appointment will be in the Departments of Psychology and Economics with the possibility of linkages with programs such as Neuroscience. The Fellow, who will be appointed as a faculty member at the rank of lecturer, will teach one course per semester, covering topics such as attitude formation and change, co-operation and competition, prosocial behavior, decision-making, game theory, behavioral economics, neuroeconomics, and distributive justice. The Fellow will also actively pursue his or her own research interests with the support of an \$8000 research fund.

We are particularly interested in candidates with expertise in any of the following fields as applied to the interface of psychology and economics: (i) motivated and emotion-guided choice, (ii) decision-making under uncertainty, (iii) valuation or utility; (iv) fairness, trust, and reciprocity; [v] empathy, sharing, and co-operation; (v) subliminal persuasion; (vi) individual or cultural differences; [vii] learning and emotion. Potential topics for study include the attentional, cognitive, and physiological (including neuroendocrine, hemodynamic, and neurophysiological) correlates of the phenomena listed above. Opportunities are available for collaboration in research labs involving cross-cultural issues, lifespan development and aging, electrophysiology, neuroimaging, and neuroendocrine assessments, and eye-tracking.

The Ph.D. must be in hand by September 2010. The salary for the first year is \$53,732, plus university employee benefits and up to \$1500 in moving expenses. Send letter of interest, CV, brief description of research, copies of relevant publications, teaching evaluations, and three letters of recommendation to Kay Fellowship Search Committee,

Department of Psychology MS 062, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA 02454-9110. First consideration will be given to candidates whose complete applications are received by January 15, 2010, but we will accept applications until the position is filled.

The Marketing department of the Rotterdam School of Management (RSM), Erasmus University, the Netherlands seeks a postdoc for a 3-year project on ‘Emotions and (Financial) Decision Making’, starting asap.

You will work as a team member of xDELIA, a recently funded FP-7 EU research consortium whose aim is to study the role of emotions and expertise in financial decision making. xDELIA, which stands for “Excellence in Decision-making through Enhanced Learning in Immersive Applications”, is investigating the role of behavioral biases and emotions in professional financial trading, private investment, and personal finance (i.e. the financial capability of the general public). An important goal of the xDELIA project is to develop sensor and serious game technologies to support non-formal learning in building financial competence and expertise. A key task of the postdoc is to contribute to the theoretical underpinnings of the xDELIA project, utilizing his/her expertise into the psychology of decision making, emotions and emotion regulation. The empirical research will consist of conducting experimental research (in the lab and in situ), testing for example the effect of biofeedback (physiological measures of affect) on decision making, and publishing these results in top academic outlets. Conducting online panel surveys or online field experiments into personal finance decisions is also expected to be part of the project.

Within RSM, you will be a member of the Marketing department, well-known for its expertise on consumer behavior and behavioral decision making and you will have the opportunity to collaborate with neuroscientists at the Erasmus Center for Neuroeconomics. In your research you will have access to the excellent lab facilities at the Erasmus Behavioural Lab. We are looking for an experimentally trained (social) psychologist, consumer behavior researcher or cognitive scientist with an interest in financial decision making (relevant PhD or expected to hold one shortly).

Information and application

For more information on the job, our requirements and our offer, see the full description here. Your application consisting of a letter of motivation, your CV and preferably two letters of reference can be sent by email to asmidts@rsm.nl.

Professor Ale Smidts
Erasmus University Rotterdam

THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND DECISION SCIENCES AT CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY seeks candidates to fill a junior-level tenure-track position in behavioral decision research and policy.

Candidates should have a strong commitment to applying behavioral decision research to public policy and to creating the basic research foundations for such applications. They should have a background in both normative/analytical and behavioral decision research, with a strong research program in at least one. Although their application interests could be in any policy area, the department has strengths in environment, energy, health and safety, finance, national security, and risk. Teaching would support the department's graduate and undergraduate programs.

The department is interdisciplinary, with faculty members from psychology, economics, political science, decision science, and history. Several have joint appointments in other departments, notably Engineering and Public Policy. Collaboration is a hallmark of the Department and University.

<http://www.hss.cmu.edu/departments/sds/>

Applicants should send a CV, two papers, three letters of recommendation, and a statement of research interests to: Chair, Behavioral Decision Research and Policy Search Committee Carnegie Mellon University Department of Social and Decision Sciences Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890. Please submit applications by October 15, 2009.

The Chair of Decision Theory and Behavioral Game Theory at the ETH Zurich has multiple openings for Ph.D. candidates and Postdocs.

Potential candidates should be interested in studying human decision making and have interests and training in some of the following areas: experimental research methods in human decision making, decision theory, cognitive psychology, experimental economics, behavioral game theory, statistics and mathematical modeling.

Our team's research focuses on individual decision making under risk and uncertainty and behavioral game theory. We are an interdisciplinary group, bringing together methods from experimental economics, cognitive psychology, and mathematical modeling to gain insights into how humans make decisions. In one line of research we study the dynamics of trust based cooperation among

interdependent decision makers. This work examines various mechanisms that stave off the unraveling of trust and facilitate cooperation between interacting decision agents. In another line of work, we study how decision makers adapt and make trade-offs when making sequential choices among alternatives in a risky and dynamic environment.

Please apply online and submit your documents such as a copy of your curriculum vitae, a cover letter and copies of all relevant certificates/grades. Applications will be reviewed starting October 1, 2009 and on an ongoing basis until the positions are filled.

Online application:

Email any questions regarding the openings to: secretary@dbgt.gess.ethz.ch

Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy University of Virginia Open Rank Search in Leadership and Public Policy

The Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy at the University of Virginia seeks applications for an open rank, tenure track position in leadership and public policy to begin in August 2010. Candidates must have an earned doctorate in political science, psychology, sociology or related field; must be willing to teach applied core courses on leadership skills for professional and master's students in public policy; and must show a record or the promise of scholarly productivity and publications in high-quality academic venues. Candidates must have their Ph.D. in hand at time of appointment. Areas of potential research interest include but are not limited to: leadership as it relates to organizational behavior, judgment and decision-making, communication and persuasion, motivation, negotiation and conflict resolution, cross-cultural understanding, and crisis management. A joint appointment in an appropriate social science department in the College of Arts and Sciences is possible.

One of the newest public policy schools in the nation, the Batten School currently offers a five-year bachelors/ MPP program that graduated its first class last May. In the future, the School will offer a two-year MPP degree program as well as programs for undergraduates. The School aspires to become one of the nation's top public affairs schools with distinctive commitments to leadership as a key skill required for success in public policy, the application of innovative research to effective problem solving, the integration of domestic and international policy in an increasingly globalized world, and is made possible by a \$100 million endowment gift from retired media executive Frank Batten, Sr. Harry Harding was appointed founding dean July 1, 2009.

To apply, visit: <https://jobs.virginia.edu> and search on Posting Number 0604309. Complete a Candidate Profile and attach a cover letter outlining research and teaching interests in leadership and public policy and a curriculum vitae. Please submit samples of written work to: Chair, Leadership Faculty Search Committee, University of Virginia, Varsity Hall, 136 Hospital Drive, P.O. Box 400893, Charlottesville, Virginia 22904-4893. In addition, please have three recommenders submit letters to the above address. Review of applications by the committee will begin October 1, 2009; however, the position will remain open to applications until filled.

The University of Virginia welcomes applications from women and members of underrepresented groups, seeks to build a culturally diverse intellectual environment and is committed to a policy of equal employment opportunity and to the principles of affirmative action in accordance with state and federal laws.

<https://jobs.virginia.edu/applicants/jsp/shared/frameset/Frameset.jsp?time=1252438800033>

The University of Oregon Psychology Department invites applications for two tenure-track positions, for candidates with an active research program in social psychology, personality, and/or emotion, broadly construed. The appointments will be at the Assistant Professor level. Commitment to excellence in research as well as teaching at both the undergraduate and graduate levels is required. Ph.D. by Fall 2010 required. Materials should include a curriculum vitae, a three-page statement on research and teaching interests, selected manuscripts, and three letters of recommendation. Requested materials and reference letters may be submitted online at www.academicjobsonline.org. To be assured of full review, applications should be received by October 15, 2009. The position will remain open until filled. The University of Oregon is an EO/AA/ADA institution committed to cultural diversity. We seek candidates who share our commitment to diversity and can work effectively with students, faculty, and staff from diverse backgrounds. As a federal contractor, the University of Oregon has federal statistical reporting and affirmative action monitoring requirements.

Department of Psychology University of Maryland

The Department of Psychology at the University of Maryland in College Park is seeking to fill three tenure track positions at the assistant or early associate professor level. For all positions we seek candidates who are leaders or rising leaders in their fields and who will enrich ties across the department and university.

Counseling Psychology: We are especially interested in candidates in the areas of multicultural counseling/development, assessment, psychotherapy process/outcome, marital/family therapy, or career development/counseling.

Developmental Psychology: We are particularly interested in candidates with developmental research foci in social, cognitive, and/or affective neuroscience, basic cognitive and affective processes, language and communication, and social relationships.

Social, Decision, and Organizational Sciences (SDOS): SDOS is comprised of social psychologists, organizational psychologists, and judgment and decision-making researchers who collectively study how individuals perceive and process information about their social environment and themselves, make decisions, and manage their interdependencies with others in dyadic, team, organizational, and societal contexts. We are particularly interested in applicants with strong research programs in social cognition, judgment and decision making, affective or social neuroscience, or cross-cultural research. Individuals trained in any area of social psychology are encouraged to apply.

In addition to SDOS, Developmental and Counseling, the other Ph.D. programs in the new training structure at the University of Maryland are Clinical Psychology and Cognitive and Neural Systems. Many faculty members participate in more than one program, thereby fostering a rich web of collaborations throughout the department. The scientific core of the department spans neural, functional, and social levels of analysis. University-wide interdisciplinary initiatives strengthen the department's connections to the broad and rapidly growing research community across campus. Among these initiatives are the Program in Neuroscience and Cognitive Science, the START Center for the Study of Terrorism, the Center for Advanced Study of Language, the Infant Studies Consortium, and a newly created Brain Imaging Center. To learn more about our department, visit us at <http://psychology.umd.edu/>.

In addition to excellent research productivity and interest in forming collaborative ties within and across programs and departments, successful candidates will have a record of, or demonstrated potential for, securing external funding. A strong commitment to teaching and mentorship at both the undergraduate and graduate levels is required. Salary is highly competitive, research conditions are excellent, and there are extensive opportunities for interdisciplinary collaboration both on campus and at universities and Federal laboratories in the Washington DC metropolitan area.

Please apply electronically by sending PDF files with your cover letter, a CV, a statement of research and teaching interests, and up to three articles to search@psyc.umd.edu. Please put the word COUNSELING, DEVELOPMENTAL or SDOS in the subject heading of your email, followed by your last name. Also arrange to have three letters of recommendation sent electronically to the same address. The subject heading for recommendation letters should state the name of the search and your last name followed by the word RECOMMENDATION.

In addition, send a signed copy of your cover letter to Ms. Julia Coldren (SDOS Search) or Ms. Ellen R. Lockwood (Counseling and Developmental Searches), Department of Psychology, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742.

Inquires regarding the positions can be addressed to the search committee chairs, Dr. Karen O'Brien (kobrien@psyc.umd.edu) for the counseling search, Dr. Jude Cassidy (jcassidy@psyc.umd.edu) for the developmental search, and Dr. Charles Stangor (stangor@psyc.umd.edu) for the SDOS Search. Applications will be reviewed as they are received, but for best consideration materials should be received by October 30, 2009. Review of applications will continue until the position is filled. The University of Maryland is an Affirmative Action/Equal Employment Opportunity Employer.

The Department of Psychology at Appalachian State University invites applications for a tenure-track position at the rank of assistant professor beginning in August, 2010 in the area of *Experimental Psychology with an emphasis on Judgment and Decision Making*. Successful applicants will be expected to provide instruction and mentoring at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. Preference will be given to candidates who are committed to excellence in teaching and mentoring of students and who have a well-developed research agenda. Instructional duties may include on-line instruction and/or instruction at off-campus sites. Scholarly duties include publication, thesis supervision, and a willingness to seek external funding to support research. This is a 9-month position with opportunities

for summer teaching. Appointment is contingent upon completion of all requirements for the doctoral degree in psychology.

Appalachian State University is a member institution of the sixteen-campus University of North Carolina System. Located in Boone, North Carolina, the University has approximately 16,000 students and has been ranked by /US News and World Report/ as one of the top 15 among southern regional universities since 1986. The Department has 33 full-time doctoral level faculty members, approximately 700 undergraduate majors and 80 full-time graduate students in four master's degree programs and is pursuing permission to plan a Ph.D. program in Rural Clinical Psychology.

Applications consisting of a vita, statement of teaching and research interests, photocopy of graduate transcripts, and three letters of recommendation should be sent to James Denniston, Chair, Department of Psychology, Appalachian State University, Box 32109, Boone, NC 28608. Applications will not be accepted by e-mail. A review of completed applications will begin on October 26th, 2009 and continue until the position is filled. Appalachian State University is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Employer. Applications from minority candidates and candidates with disabilities are encouraged. Additional information about the Department of Psychology, the University, and the surrounding area is located on the Psychology web site at: <http://www.psych.appstate.edu/>

Online Resources

SJDM Web site

<http://www.sjdm.org>

Judgment and Decision Making – The SJDM journal, entirely free and online

<http://journal.sjdm.org>

SJDM Newsletter – Current and archive copies of this newsletter

<http://www.sjdm.org/newsletters>

SJDM mailing list – List archives and information on joining the email list

<http://www.sjdm.org/mail-archive/jdm-society/>

Decision Science News – Some of the content of this newsletter is released early in blog form here

<http://www.decisionsciencenews.com>

2009 SJDM Advance Meeting Registration and Annual Dues Form

(Mailed forms received after November 13th will be treated as on-site registrations)

Name: _____

Phone: _____

First Name for Nametag: _____

FAX: _____

Address: _____

E-Mail: _____

Check if this is a new address

	<u>Member</u>	<u>Student</u>	<u>Non-Member</u>
2009 Meeting Registration Fee (Boston, MA)	<input type="checkbox"/> \$195.00	<input type="checkbox"/> 105.00	<input type="checkbox"/> \$230.00
Late Registration (after November 6 th)	<input type="checkbox"/> 220.00	<input type="checkbox"/> 125.00	<input type="checkbox"/> 255.00
Annual SJDM Membership Dues	<input type="checkbox"/> 35.00	<input type="checkbox"/> 10.00	
Past Dues	<input type="checkbox"/> _____	<input type="checkbox"/> _____	
Women in SJDM Lunch (Saturday)	<input type="checkbox"/> 15.00	<input type="checkbox"/> FREE	<input type="checkbox"/> 25.00
Total	\$ _____	\$ _____	\$ _____

Note: Registration includes coffee breaks, continental breakfasts (Saturday, Sunday, and Monday), Sunday social, and Monday luncheon. Dues are separate from registration fees.

Method of Payment:

Check/Money Order (Please, no cash); Make checks payable to Society for Judgment and Decision Making

MasterCard VISA American Express Discover

Account Number _____

Signature _____ Expiration Date _____

If paying by credit card:

Name on credit card _____

Home address _____

Mail this form with payment to: SJDM c/o Bud Fennema, Florida State University, 821 Academic Way, P.O. Box 3061110, Tallahassee, FL 32306-1110 (or fax to 850-644-8234). **DO NOT FAX AFTER NOVEMBER 13.** Receipts will be distributed at the conference registration.

Journal Note: SJDM Members are entitled to discounts on the following journals: *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* and *Journal of Behavioral Decision Making*. Contact the publishers for details. Links to journal websites may be found on the SJDM website (www.sjdm.org) under related links.

Society for Judgment and Decision Making

The 2009 30th Annual Conference



Sheraton Boston Hotel, Boston, MA
39 Dalton Street
Nov 20 – 23, 2009

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2009 Program Committee: Craig McKenzie (Chair), Wändi Bruine de Bruin, Melissa Finucane, Nathan Novemsky, Michel Regenwetter, Ulf-Dietrich Reips, Alan Schwartz, Gal Zauberman.

Thanks to Julie Downs (conference coordinator), Jon Baron (webmaster), Dan Ariely (President), Mike Norton (social event), Shahar Ayal (book auction), and the ad hoc reviewers: Rachel Barkan, Lyle Brenner, Gretchen Chapman, Ravi Dhar, Dan Goldstein, Mike Norton, Ilana Ritov, Baba Shiv, Klaus Wertenbroch.

2009 SJDM Conference Master Schedule
Sheraton Boston Hotel, Boston, MA
November 20-23, 2009

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 20

Psychonomic Society JDM Sessions (See p. 5 of this program and the Psychonomic Society program for details)

5:00-7:00 pm **Welcome Reception / Early Registration** Back Bay Ballroom A (2nd floor)
 7:00-9:00 pm **Executive Board Dinner** TBA

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 21

7:30-8:30 am **Registration** and Continental Breakfast Fairfax (3rd floor)
 8:30 -10:00 am **Paper Session #1** Back Bay Ballroom A, B (2nd fl), Commonwealth (3rd fl)
 10:00 -10:30 am Morning Coffee Break Fairfax (3rd fl)
 10:30-12:00 am **Paper Session #2** Back Bay Ballroom A, B (2nd fl), Commonwealth (3rd fl)
 10:30-12:00 am **Special Symposium: Medical Dec. Making** Back Bay Ballroom B (2nd fl)
 12:00-1:45 pm **Women in SJDM Networking Event** Harvard University
 12:00-1:45 pm Lunch Break (on your own)
 1:45-2:45 pm **Paper Session #3** Back Bay Ballroom A, B (2nd fl), Commonwealth (3rd fl)
 3:00-4:30 pm **Paper Session #4** Back Bay Ballroom A, B (2nd fl), Commonwealth (3rd fl)
 4:30-5:00 pm Afternoon Coffee Break Fairfax (3rd fl)
 5:00-6:30 pm **Paper Session #5** Back Bay Ballroom A, B (2nd fl), Commonwealth (3rd fl)
 6:30-8:30 pm Graduate Student Social Event Liberty Ballroom (2nd fl)

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 22

8:30-10:30 am **Poster Session #1** w/ Continental Breakfast Hynes Convention Center, 3rd level, Ballrooms A, B, C
 (Attached to Sheraton through walkway)
 10:30-12:00 am **Paper Session #6** Back Bay Ballroom A, B (2nd fl), Commonwealth (3rd fl)
 12:00-1:30 pm Lunch Break (on your own)
 1:30-2:15 pm **Presidential Address by Dan Ariely** Independence Ballroom (2nd fl)
 2:30-4:00 pm **Paper Session #7** Back Bay Ballroom A, B (2nd fl), Commonwealth (3rd fl)
 4:00-4:30 pm Afternoon Coffee Break Fairfax (3rd fl)
 4:30-5:00 pm **Einhorn Award** Independence Ballroom (2nd fl)
 5:00-7:00 pm **Poster Session #2** & Cash Bar Hynes Convention Center, 3rd level, Ballrooms A, B, C
 (Attached to Sheraton through walkway)
 9:00pm-1:00am **SJDM Evening Social Event** King's Bowling, 50 Dalton Street

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 23

8:00-8:45 am **Business Meeting** w/ Continental Breakfast Independence Ballroom (2nd fl)
 8:45-10:15 am **Paper Session #8** Back Bay Ballroom A, B (2nd fl), Commonwealth (3rd fl)
 10:15-10:30 am Morning Coffee Break Fairfax (3rd fl)
 10:30-12:00 am **Paper Session #9** Back Bay Ballroom A, B (2nd fl), Commonwealth (3rd fl)
 12:00-1:30 pm **Luncheon** Independence Ballroom (2nd fl)
Keynote address by Steven Pinker

2009 SJDM Conference Paper Sessions – SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 21

	Track A Back Bay Ballroom A (2nd fl)	Track B Back Bay Ballroom B (2nd fl)	Track C Commonwealth (3rd fl)
SESSION #1	<u>Symposium: Seeing the Future Self as an Other: Intertemporal Choices As Interpersonal Decisions</u>	<u>Competition</u>	<u>Affective Forecasting</u>
8:30	Rachlin - Hyperbolic All Around? Similarities...	Radzevick - Competing To Be Certain...	Tsai - The Effects of Duration Knowledge on...
8:50	Kennedy - When the Self is Someone Else...	Garcia - The N-Effect: More Competitors, Less...	Liersch - Choosing to re-experience painful...
9:10	Milch - Investing In and For Oneself...	Budescu - The Appeal of Vague Financial...	Morewedge - Motivated Underpinnings of the Impact...
9:30	Ersner-Hershfield - Is it Just in Your Head?...	Karelaia - Under-achievement and the glass ceiling...	Promberger - Public policy and predicted preference...
SESSION #2	<u>Helping and Giving</u>	<u>Special Symposium: Connections with Medical Decision Making</u>	<u>Behavioral Finance</u>
10:30	Chou - Helping the less fortunate, but not the...	Kostopoulou (w/ Russo) - Coherence-based...	Rixom - One or Many: How number of accounts...
10:50	Kogut - Someone to blame: When identifying...	Zikmund-Fisher (w/ Gaissmaier) - What does "less..."	Rick - Account Aversion: When More Debt is...
11:10	Mellers - An Economical Way to Increase the...	Medow (w/ Ayton) - Are residents' decisions...	Salisbury - The Effects of Information Disclosure...
11:30	Sanna - Construing Cooperation: Broadening...		Carp - Toward a Testable Behavioral Asset Pricing...
SESSION #3	<u>Affect and Emotion</u>	<u>Interpersonal</u>	<u>Knowledge and Chance</u>
1:45	Bereby-Meyer - Cool down, it is worth money...	Shen - Belittling Can Be Flattering	Hadar - Subjective Knowledge and Willingness to Act...
2:05	Kassam - Decisions under distress: Stress...	Arora - Status as a Guide in Strategic Coordination...	Fox - Internal versus external modes of expressing...
2:25	Maimaran - Rosy Side of Negative Emotions...	Acquisti - The Impact of Relative Standards on...	Hogarth - When "hope springs eternal": The role of...
SESSION #4	<u>Incidental Influence I</u>	<u>Motivation</u>	<u>Effects of Uncertainty</u>
3:00	Lerner - Disgust Promotes Disposal: Souring...	Hsee - "Please Give Me A Reason to Be Busy!"...	Rottenstreich - The Endowment Effect Under...
3:20	Häubl - The Signature Effect: How Signing...	Fujita - Moving beyond deliberative control of ...	Milkman - Unsure What the Future Will Bring? You...
3:40	Williams - From formulas to faith: Consistency...	Broomell - Understanding of Global Climate...	Gong - Why and When does Uncertainty Reduce...
4:00	Larson - The Balance Metaphor and its Effect...	Gao - Mere Influence Effect: When Motivation to...	Zhang - Temporal Distance and Objectivity-Seeking...
SESSION #5	<u>Incidental Influence II</u>	<u>Feedback and Performance</u>	<u>Symposium: Are Crowds Always Wiser?</u>
5:00	Levav - Physical Contact Increases Financial...	Finkelstein - Giving, Seeking, and Responding to...	Simmons - Are Crowds Wise When Predicting...
5:20	Ahn - Being Hot or Being Cold: The Influence...	Kettle - Motivation by Anticipation: Expecting...	Soll - Outliers in Groups: Most Valuable but Least...
5:40	Liu - Does Resisting Temptation Evoke...	Wu - Goals, Performance, and Satisfaction in...	Lee - The Emotional Oracle: Predicting Crowd...
6:00	Buell - The Labor Illusion: When Waiting...	Page - The momentum effect in competitions...	Herzog - Dialectical Bootstrapping: When Should...

2009 SJDM Conference Paper Sessions – SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 22

Track A Back Bay Ballroom A (2nd fl)		Track B Back Bay Ballroom A (2nd fl)		Track C Commonwealth (3rd fl)	
POSTERS 8:30	POSTER SESSION #1 W/CONTINENTAL BREAKFAST Hynes Convention Center, 3rd level, Ballrooms A, B, C (Attached to Sheraton through walkway)				
SESSION #6	<u>Symposium: Whither Optimism: Inquiries into the Existence and Persistence of Optimistic Biases</u>	<u>Judgment under Uncertainty</u>	<u>Choice Models and Methodology</u>		
10:30	Massey - Keeping the Faith: The Persistence of...	Dai - How Does Motivation Affect Judgment?	Leland - The “Nothing to Gain/Nothing to Lose”...		
10:50	Windschitl - The Role of Selective Exposure in...	Oppenheimer - Categorical Cue Weighting	Regenwetter - Choice Variability Versus Structural...		
11:10	Moore - Motivation and Overconfidence	Gray - Torture and Judgments of Guilt	Pardo - Verbatim and Gist Cues Produce Opposite...		
11:30	Dunning - Top-Down Self-Beliefs Alter...	Haran - The More, the Merrier: The Perverse...	Horton - Online Experiments for Judgment and...		
ADDRESS 1:30	PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: Dan Ariely – Independence Ballroom (2nd fl)				
SESSION #7	<u>Consumer Behavior and Incentives</u>	<u>Subjective Probability</u>	<u>Intertemporal and Medical Choice</u>		
2:30	Isaac - Disposal Biases: Why Sellers of Used...	Li - A pairwise-contrast model of intuitive...	Scholten - Three reasons why discounting doesn't work		
2:50	Hall - Mental Accounting in the Context of Poverty	Abbas - Assessing Joint Probability Distributions...	Hardisty - I want it now! Why discount rates for...		
3:10	Handgraaf - Private Payment versus Public Praise...	Wayts - Perceiving Intentions Makes Streaks...	Sah - Burdening Patients with Doctors' Conflicts...		
3:30	Slonim - Will there be blood? Incentives and...	Frederick - Unpacking Unpacking: When Greater...	Schwartz - Are patients too trusting? The unintended...		
EINHORN 4:30	EINHORN AWARD PRESENTATION – Independence Ballroom (2nd fl)				
POSTERS 5:00-7:00	POSTER SESSION #2 W/CASH BAR Hynes Convention Center, 3rd level, Ballrooms A, B, C (Attached to Sheraton through walkway)				

2009 SJDM Conference Paper Sessions – MONDAY, NOVEMBER 23

SESSION #8	<u>Heuristics</u>	<u>Consumer Behavior</u>	<u>Metacognition</u>
8:45	Simonsohn - Ignoring invalid information just fine...	Huh - Thought for Food: Top-down Processes...	Critcher - Inferring Preferences From Mental...
9:05	Smith - The (lack of) Downstream Consequences...	Zhu - Can Visual Images in Advertisements Curb...	Zhang - When a choice is too easy: Meta-cognitive...
9:25	Hertwig - Simple heuristics in the ultimatum game	Wisdom - Calorie Posting in New York City...	Alter - How Much Do I Know? When Abstraction...
9:45	Schweickart - On the role of recognition and...	Milosavljevic - Are Fast Choices Driven by Value...	Schrift - Complicating Choice
SESSION #9	<u>Choice under Uncertainty</u>	<u>Dual Processes</u>	<u>Choice Set</u>
10:30	Venkatraman - Individual Differences in Strategic...	Inbar - People's Intuitions About Intuitive...	Parker - The Rejectable Choice Set: How Seemingly...
10:50	Koehler - Probability Matching in Choice under...	Cokely - Mechanisms of Superior Judgment...	Slovic - Pseudo-Inefficacy: When Awareness of Those...
11:10	Rubaltelli - Loss aversion and the comparative...	Tennant - An Empirical Comparison of Intuitive...	Kirkebøen - The cost of changing your mind...
11:30	Shapira - Graininess, Similarity and Decision...	Hardman - Reflecting on dilemmas: Individual...	Fan - Comparison Process at Retrieval (CPR)...
LUNCHEON 12:00-1:30	LUNCHEON AND KEYNOTE ADDRESS: Steven Pinker – Independence Ballroom (2nd fl)		

2009 SJDM Conference Special Events

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 19

5:30-7:00 pm Psychonomic Society Poster Session Hynes Convention Center Ballroom
JDM posters: 1026 - 1038

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 20

Psychonomic Sessions (Sheraton Boston Hotel):

10:20-11:55 am Decision Making I Republic Ballroom
12:00-1:30 pm Psychonomic Society Poster Session Hynes Convention Center Ballroom
JDM posters: 2165-2178
1:30-3:25 pm Models of Decision Making Back Bay Ballroom D
6:30-8:00 pm Psychonomic Society Poster Session Hynes Convention Center Ballroom
JDM posters: 3001-3005
5:00-7:00 pm **Welcome Reception & Early Registration** Back Bay Ballroom A

Please join us at the Welcome Reception at the Sheraton Boston Hotel (39 Dalton Street). The reception will feature appetizers and a cash bar. This event will also provide an opportunity for early conference registration so that you can avoid the lines Saturday morning. The reception is generously sponsored by Fidelity Investments' Center for Applied Behavioral Economics.

7:00-9:00 pm **Executive Board Dinner**

Members of the executive board, JDM officers, and program chairs for this year and next year are invited to a working dinner off-site. Contact Craig McKenzie (cmckenzie@ucsd.edu) for further details.

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 21

Psychonomic Sessions (Sheraton Boston Hotel):

8:00-9:35 am Decision Making II Back Bay Ballroom D
3:50-5:25 pm Applications of Decision Making Independence Ballroom

10:30-12:00 pm **Special Symposium: Connections with Medical Decision Making** Back Bay Ballroom B

This special symposium, supported by the National Science Foundation Decision, Risk, and Management Sciences program, brings three members of the Society for Medical Decision Making to the SJDM annual meeting to present recent work in MDM that connects with JDM work but has not been widely disseminated in the JDM literature. Each SMDM presenter will be paired with an SJDM researcher whose basic work complements the applied work of the SMDM researcher, and these research pairs will present together. A sister symposium by SJDM members is being held at the annual meeting of the SMDM in October.

12:15-1:30 pm **Women in SJDM Networking Event**

All (women and men) are welcome to attend the sixth annual Women in SJDM Luncheon, focused on promoting the advancement of women in JDM. The event will feature lunch and networking opportunities. The event will take place on Saturday, November 21st, from 12:15 - 1:30 pm (during the conference lunch break). The event will take place at, and is hosted by, the Harvard Decision Science Laboratory, directed by SJDM member Jennifer Lerner. The cost is free for students and post-docs, \$15 for faculty, and \$25 for nonmembers (preregistration required). Free shuttle service will be provided. Those who have registered for the lunch should wait on the sidewalk in front of the hotel at the Dalton Street entrance immediately following the last morning session, at noon. This year's event is also cosponsored by the Center for Public Leadership and the Women and Public Policy

Program of the John F. Kennedy School of Government as well as the Society for Judgment and Decision Making. For more information, contact Mary Steffel (mary.steffel@cba.ufl.edu).

6:15-8:15 pm **Graduate Student Social**

Liberty Ballroom

This informal event will provide student members of SJDM an opportunity to imbibe and network with the future stars of the field. But wait, there's more: SJDM is buying the first round of drinks! For more information contact Julie Downs (downs@cmu.edu).

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 22

1:30-2:45 **Presidential Address: Dan Ariely**

Independence Ballroom

4:30-5:00 pm **Einhorn Award Presentation**

Independence Ballroom

The winner will make a presentation of the research paper for which he/she won the award.

9:00 pm-1:00 am **SJDM Social Event**

SJDM is sponsoring a party at King's Bowling (address below), which is essentially across the street from the conference hotel, from 9pm to 1am. In addition to unlimited use of the pool tables (and feel free to rent lanes to bowl as well!), there is a dessert bar and the first 250 people to arrive at the venue will receive a free drink ticket. There will also be a surprise guest (think "mindreading magician"...).

King's Bowling
50 Dalton Street
Boston, MA 02115

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 23

8:00-8:45 am **Business Meeting & Breakfast**

Independence Ballroom

All members of SJDM are invited to attend the business meeting (and it's where the food is). Remember, every vote counts.

12:00-1:30 pm **Luncheon and Keynote Address: Steven Pinker**

Independence Ballroom



"A History of Violence"

Contrary to the popular impression that we are living in extraordinarily violent times, rates of violence at all scales have been in decline over the course of history. I explore how this decline could have happened despite the existence of a constant human nature, and why people systematically misjudge the historical trend.

The luncheon will also include a presentation of the student poster awards by Joe Johnson.

2009 SJDM Conference
PAPER ABSTRACTS LISTED BY SESSION

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 21

(1A) Symposium: Seeing the Future Self as an Other: Intertemporal Choices As Interpersonal Decisions

Organizers: Olivola, Christopher Y. (University College London); Ersner-Hershfield, Hal (Northwestern University)

Intertemporal and interpersonal decision-making have largely been considered separate domains of inquiry. Yet some theorists have suggested parallels between the two. Until recently, however, this assertion was based mainly on introspection and often considered purely metaphorical. This symposium examines how the perception of one's future-self –as either an extension of the current-self or as a different person altogether– can have serious implications for intertemporal choice. The research presented here demonstrates that these parallels are more than metaphors: people literally seem to treat their future-self much like another person. Rachlin and Jones show that interpersonal discounting follows the same hyperbolic functional form as intertemporal discounting. Kennedy, Olivola, and Pronin show that decisions for future-selves resemble decisions made for other people more than those made for the present-self –a tendency rooted in a lack of attention to the internal subjective experiences of future-selves and others. Milch, Weber, and Higgins find that fewer resources are allocated to the future-self when it is perceived as another person and they explore the specific elements of future-self connectedness. Finally, Ersner-Hershfield, Wimmer, and Knutson show that neural differences that arise from thinking about the current-self compared to the future-self can predict discounting of future rewards.

Constituent papers:

Hyperbolic All Around? Similarities Between Social and Delay Discounting

Rachlin, Howard (Stony Brook University); Jones, Bryan A. (University of Arkansas For Medical Sciences)

We show parallels between delay and social discounting. Specifically, we find that the amount of present money forgone to obtain a fixed amount in the future (delay discounting) is a hyperbolic function of delay. Similarly, the amount of money forgone by one person to give a fixed amount to another person (social discounting) is a hyperbolic function of the social distance between them. Furthermore, the shape of the function relating delay of reward for one person to an equal-magnitude immediate reward for other people at varying social distances can be predicted from individual delay and social discount functions.

When the Self is Someone Else: Parallel Effects of Temporal and Social Distance on Decision Making

Kennedy, Kathleen A. (Princeton University); Olivola, Christopher Y. (University College London); Pronin, Emily (Princeton University)

Four studies demonstrated that decisions for future-selves differ from those made for the present, ongoing self, but resemble decisions made for other people. These comparable effects of temporal and social distance seem to stem from a lack of attention to internal subjective experiences, making decisions for future-selves and others psychologically parallel. By contrast, decisions for present-selves appear uniquely dependent on internal thoughts and feelings. Consequently, manipulating attention to subjective experiences affects decisions (e.g., increased salience of future-self subjective experiences mitigated the effects of temporal distance, resulting in decisions resembling those for present-selves). Implications for intertemporal and interpersonal decision-making are discussed.

Investing In and For Oneself: The Meaning of Feeling Close to One's Future Self and Other Determinants of Intertemporal Resource Allocation

Milch, Kerry F. (Columbia University); Weber, Elke U. (Columbia University); Higgins, E. Tory (Columbia University)

What does it mean to "feel close" to one's future self? How does closeness interact with other factors that affect divisions of resources between now and later? We show that closeness to future self can be manipulated and is distinct from attitude toward future self (liking/disliking). Closeness, not attitude, influences intertemporal resource allocation. Additionally, framing of a resource's value is shown to interact with closeness to future self. We explore individuals' theories about stability in self-concept over time and examine which elements of closeness to future self (similarity, empathy, responsibility) matter for how people divide resources between present and future.

Is it Just in Your Head? Neural Measures of Future Self-Continuity Predict Temporal Discounting

Ersner-Hershfield, Hal (Northwestern University); Wimmer, G. Elliott (Columbia University); Knutson, Brian (Stanford University)

According to a future self-continuity hypothesis, individuals perceive and treat the future self differently from the present self, and so might fail to save for their future. Neuroimaging offers a novel means of testing this hypothesis, since previous research indicates that self- versus other-judgments elicit activation in the rostral anterior cingulate (rACC). Using event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we predicted and found not only individual differences in rACC activation while rating the current versus future self, but also that individual differences in current versus future self activation predicted temporal discounting assessed behaviorally a week after scanning.

(1B) Competition

Competing To Be Certain (But Wrong): Social Pressure and Overprecision in Judgment

Radzevick, Joseph R. (Carnegie Mellon University); Moore, Don A. (Carnegie Mellon University)

Overprecision in judgment is both the most robust and the least understood form of overconfidence. In this paper, we investigate whether the competitive social pressure of a market contributes to overprecision among those competing for influence. We find evidence that markets do indeed exacerbate overprecision. This evidence comes from two experiments in which advisors attempt to sell their advice. In the first experiment, advisors must compete with other advice sellers. In the second, advisors and decision makers are paired. Overprecision exists in both studies, and it helps advisors' sell their advice. However, the market also exacerbates overprecision.

The N-Effect: More Competitors, Less Competition

Garcia, Stephen (University of Michigan); Tor, Avishalom (University of Haifa)

This paper introduces the N-Effect – the discovery that increasing the number of competitors (N) can decrease competitive motivation, controlling for expected payoffs. Studies 1a-b found evidence that average test scores (e.g., SAT scores) fall as the average number of test-takers at test-taking venues increases. Study 2 found that individuals trying to finish an easy quiz among the top 20 percent in terms of speed finished significantly faster if they believed they were competing in a pool of 10 versus 100 competitors. Studies 3-5 replicated the N-Effect in other domains and found that it is mediated by the social comparison process.

The Appeal of Vague Financial Forecasts

Budescu, David V. (Fordham University); Du, Ning (DePaul University)

We analyzed earnings forecasts over 11 years and documented a higher proportion of range estimates than point forecasts, contradicting with the general preference for precision. Overall, range forecasts are quite narrow and inaccurate. Experimental results suggest that investors' preference for forecast precision coincides with managers' possibly because they believe that the (less precise) range forecasts are appropriate to represent the underlying vagueness, and judge them to be of higher quality. The preference for vague forecasts is curvilinear – it peaks for low levels of imprecision and diminishes when the ranges get wider – as predicted by the trade-off between accuracy and informativeness.

Under-achievement and the glass ceiling: Evidence from a TV game show

Hogarth, Robin M. (ICREA & Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain); Karelaia, Natalia (INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France); Trujillo, Carlos Andrés (Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia)

We use a TV game show to test gender differences in competitive behavior where there is no discrimination or gender-specific external constraints. In each game, six contestants answered general knowledge questions, and the worst performer is eliminated in each round. Despite equality in starting numbers, women earn less than men and voluntarily exit the game earlier. We draw a parallel to the process by which employees rise through the levels of a corporation. It appears that “glass ceilings” may result, in part, from women's own behavior and this raises the issue of how women are socialized to behave.

(1C) Affective Forecasting

The Effects of Duration Knowledge on Forecasting Versus Actual Affective Experiences

Tsai, Claire I. (University of Toronto); Zhao, Min (University of Toronto)

We propose that the duration knowledge of an affective episode would interfere with the process of hedonic adaptation by intensifying the experience towards the end and thus increase the extremity of the overall experience. However, people are generally unaware of this effect of duration knowledge. In three experiments, we show that although people prefer to know the duration of negative episodes (e.g., listen to a pop song by a terrible singer) but not for the positive episodes (e.g., listen to a pop song by the original singer), duration knowledge intensifies affective episodes experienced over time and increases the overall enjoyment/pain.

Choosing to re-experience painful memories: Duration neglect in memory, but not in prospective choice

Liersch, Michael J. (NYU (Stern)); McKenzie, Craig R. M. (UC San Diego)

When evaluating uncomfortable experiences, people often neglect duration, instead only attending to peak and end moments of pain. As a consequence, people can remember longer, objectively more painful experiences as subjectively better. In two experiments, we examined whether people would prospectively choose an objectively more painful experience that they would remember as less painful, or an objectively less painful experience that they would remember as more painful. A majority of participants indicated they would choose an objectively less painful experience that would be remembered as more painful. Normative implications are discussed.

Motivated Underpinnings of the Impact Bias in Affective Forecasts

Morewedge, Carey K (Carnegie Mellon University); Buechel, Eva C. (University of Miami); Vosgerau, Joachim (Carnegie Mellon University)

Affective forecasters exhibit an impact bias, overestimating the intensity and duration of their emotional reaction to future events. We suggest that forecasters make extreme forecasts to motivate themselves to produce desirable outcomes. In two studies, affective forecasts were more extreme when outcomes were more important, and when forecasters could influence an outcome than when it was determined but unknown. Subsequent studies found that the extremity of forecasts determined the amount of mental and physical effort forecasters expended to produce desirable outcomes. Errors in affective forecasting may thus not be solely cognitive in origin, but have a motivated component as well.

Public policy and predicted preference change

Promberger, Marianne (King's College London); Baron, Jonathan (University of Pennsylvania)

When they think about public policy proposals, how do people predict everyone's preferences to change in response to the policies, and does that prediction influence what they think of the policy? In several studies, we asked subjects about hypothetical policy proposals. Subjects consistently predicted preferences to change in their favored direction: subjects who initially think the policy is good predict preferences to change adaptively, and vice versa. Second-order preferences are a possible cause: subjects who think the policy is good for everyone want others to like it; those who think the policy is bad want others not to like it.

(2A) Helping and Giving

Helping the less fortunate, but not the most unfortunate: The Attribution-Prospect-Empathy-States (APES) model of helping behavior

Chou, Eileen (Northwestern University); Murnighan, J. Keith (Northwestern University)

How do we decide who and when to help? The APES model, validated by three lab and field studies, suggests that loss aversion increases people's helping tendency, independent of why others need help or how empathic the potential helpers feel. However, loss aversion deters people from helping those who are less likely to succeed – people prefer to minimize their own loss more than other people's. Psychological sanctioning increases overall volume of helping while retaining the same egocentric loss aversion. A blood donations field experiment suggests that people are more motivated by their potential impact than how urgently help is needed.

Someone to blame: When identifying a victim decreases helping

Kogut, Tehila (Ben-Gurion University)

People's willingness to contribute (WTC) more resources to identifiable victims (as compared to unidentifiable ones) is known as The Identifiable Victim Effect. Previous research suggests that the emotional arousal toward a single identified victim is a major source of the effect. However, the emotional response to identified targets may also strengthen negative emotions in situations where the target is perceived responsible for his/her plight. In the current research we show that identification may decrease helping in such cases, especially when the perceiver holds strong beliefs in a just world. Such beliefs have a weaker influence on WTC to unidentifiable targets.

An Economical Way to Increase the Pleasure of Gift Giving

Mellers, Barbara (UC Berkeley); Ritov, Ilana (Hebrew University)

People spend billions of dollars on gifts each year. To economists, gift giving leads to deadweight losses because recipients have far more detailed information about their own preferences than do gift givers. This analysis overlooks the fact that, to most gift givers, it is the pleasure a recipient derives from the gift, not the material value of the gift that really matters. We conducted three studies to examine how surprise influence pleasure. Value may have little to do with the pleasure of the gift, and gifts are more pleasurable when surprising. The results are consistent with decision affect theory.

Construing Cooperation: Broadening Construals to Increase Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

Sanna, Lawrence J. (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)

Many of the most challenging issues faced by society involve increasing the collective good, but people are often caught between cooperating and competing, called social dilemmas. Although most people agree that contributing to public services, recycling

waste, conserving energy, and refraining from overharvesting are great ideas, fewer engage in such activities. Individuals can exploit the collective. This research tests a novel, theoretically driven approach to furthering cooperation in social dilemmas following construal level theory (CLT). Using a fishing analogue, it was hypothesized and found that high-level, relative to low-level, construals increased cooperation in social dilemmas.

(2B) Symposium: Connections with Medical Decision Making
(Special symposium by members of the Society for Medical Decision Making, paired with members of SJDM)

Organizers: Alan Schwartz (University of Illinois), Craig R. M. McKenzie (UC San Diego)

The goal of this symposium is to present and discuss recent work in MDM that connects with JDM work but has not been widely disseminated in the JDM literature. Each SMDM presenter will be paired with an SJDM researcher whose basic work complements the applied work of the SMDM researcher. SJDM members are presenting a complementary symposium at this year's annual meeting of SMDM. This symposium swap is supported by National Science Foundation grant SES-0921776/SES-0922023.

Constituent papers:

Coherence-based reasoning in medical diagnosis

Kostopoulou, Olga (King's College London)

Paired with SJDM member: Russo, J. Edward (Cornell University)

What does "Less is More" Mean in the Real World?: Operationalizing Simplified Information Presentations for Breast Cancer Decision Making

Zikmund-Fisher, Brian J. (University of Michigan)

Paired with SJDM member: Gaissmeier, Wolfgang (Max Planck Institute for Human Development)

Are Residents' Decisions Influenced More by Specialist or Decision Aid Opinion?

Medow, Mitchell (Boston University School of Medicine)

Paired with SJDM member: Ayton, Peter (City University London)

(2C) Behavioral Finance

One or Many: How number of accounts facilitate spending or saving behavior

Mishra, Himanshu (University of Utah); Mishra, Arul (University of Utah); Rixom, Jessica (University of Utah)

The current recessionary trend has motivated people to control spending and increase savings. The stock market crisis has led several people to prefer liquid accounts in FDIC insured banks. Across three studies we find that people save more and spend less when they maintain a single account compared to multiple accounts. We find that this occurs because people are able to justify spending with multiple accounts (since there is more ambiguity about the amounts in each account) but not with single accounts (since it provides precise account information). We demonstrate the effect across three studies and test the underlying process.

Account Aversion: When More Debt is Preferred to Less

Rick, Scott (University of Michigan); Cryder, Cynthia (Washington University in St. Louis)

Most decision research on credit cards has focused on understanding why consumers over-spend with credit. Much less is known about how consumers make debt repayment decisions. We observe evidence of account aversion: because it is easier to evaluate the number of credit card accounts carrying debt than the total amount of debt across accounts, there are situations in which high debt (concentrated in a single account) is less distressing than low debt (spread over several accounts). This can lead to repayment mistakes (allocating payments to cards with the lowest balances, rather than the highest interest rates). Deliberation reduces account aversion.

The Effects of Information Disclosure on Consumer Debt Repayment Decisions

Salisbury, Linda Court (Boston College); Lemon, Katherine N. (Boston College)

We examine the effects of minimum required payment (MinReq) and supplemental interest cost information on credit card debt repayment decisions. We examine differential effects of "time" versus "money" information, as well as temporal framing of cost information (monthly versus total). Results revealed a strong negative effect of MinReq information on repayment amount. This effect was attenuated by disclosing interest cost and time-to-payoff information. Temporal framing of cost information, individuals' future orientation, and financial knowledge moderated the information effects. Total dollar cost information led consumers to pay more than time-to-payoff information, but this effect was eliminated for consumers with an immediate-orientation.

Toward a Testable Behavioral Asset Pricing Model

Carp, Sari (Hebrew University of Jerusalem); Feldman, Ronen (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

We use text mining to construct an empirically verifiable asset pricing model grounded in both finance and psychology. Our model incorporates a version of the traditional financial asset pricing model, the CAPM, then adds two types of behavioral factors. One, generated by text mining techniques across thousands of news articles, quantifies the degree of negative or positive sentiment toward a particular stock. The others are pure psychological factors structured around Tversky and Kahneman's three main heuristics. We use text mining and the psychology of language to predict their effects. Our model demonstrates significant predictive value over traditional financial models alone.

(3A) Affect and Emotion

Cool down, it is worth money: evidence from Ultimatum and Trust games

Bereby-Meyer, Yoella (Ben-Gurion University); Moran, Simone (Ben-Gurion University); Halali, Eliran (Ben-Gurion University); Schweitzer, Maurice (Wharton, University of Pennsylvania)

We explore the role of emotion regulation in economic decision-making. As predicted, in line with Gross's Emotion Regulation theory, regulating positive and negative emotions by means of cognitive reappraisal, compared to expressive suppression, led to more economically rational decisions. In Experiment 1, employing an ultimatum game, participants in the reappraisal condition responded to extremely unfair offers with lower rejection rates than participants in the suppression and the no regulation conditions. In Experiment 2, employing a trust game, participants in the reappraisal condition responded to extremely generous proposers by returning lower amounts than participants in the suppression and no regulation conditions.

Decisions under distress: Stress profiles influence anchoring and adjustment

Kassam, Karim (Harvard University); Koslov, Katrina (Harvard University); Mendes, Wendy Berry (Harvard University)

Understanding how stress affects decision making is complicated by the fact that not all stress responses are created equal. Challenge states are characterized by efficient cardiovascular profiles and are associated with approach motivation. Threat states, in contrast, involve less efficient cardiovascular profiles and are associated with withdrawal motivation. We randomly assigned participants to conditions designed to engender challenge and threat states, as well as a control condition. Participants then completed an anchoring and adjustment questionnaire. Those assigned to the challenge condition adjusted more than those assigned to the threat condition. Cardiovascular responses mediated the relationship between condition and adjustment.

Rosy Side of Negative Emotions: The Effect of Anger in Decision-Making

Khan, Uzma (Stanford University); Maimaran, Michal (Kellogg – Northwestern University); Dhar, Ravi (Yale University)

While anger is generally perceived as negative, in four studies we show positive effects of anger on decision-making. Study 1 shows that angry people are less likely to defer choice. Study 2 demonstrates that anger decreases a bias to choose the compromise option. Study 3 shows that the effects are driven by a decreased tendency to make attribute-level tradeoffs among angry participants. Study 4 replicates the choice-deferral findings and additionally shows greater post-choice satisfaction among angry people. Taken together, these studies suggest that anger plays an important role in eliminating several decision biases and can lead to potentially better decisions.

(3B) Interpersonal

Belittling Can Be Flattering

Shen, Luxi (The University of Chicago Booth School of Business); Hsee, Chris (The University of Chicago Booth School of Business); Zhang, Jiao (The University of Miami School of Business); Dai, Xianchi (The University of Chicago Booth School of Business)

This research examines how one affectively reacts to a special form of interpersonal evaluations, others' guesses at the value of an aspect one cares about. Existing literature and common knowledge hold that more positive evaluations make people happier than less positive evaluations. However, we found that in certain situations people feel happier with less positive guesses than with more positive guesses. We propose a model that accounts for this effect and specifies when it will happen and when it will not happen. The present research extends previous research on self-enhancement theory and offers practical recommendations on interpersonal interactions.

Status as a Guide in Strategic Coordination: The Minimal Status Effect

Arora, Poonam (Columbia University); Krantz, David H. (Columbia University); Higgins, E. Tory (Columbia University)

We examine the influence of status decoupled from power in strategic coordination hypothesizing that status changes expectations of the other's actions and thus what one should do to coordinate. Prior to the coordination task, participants were randomly assigned to Teammate or Competitor dyads followed by a game that resulted in a winner and a loser. Competitor Losers perceived themselves at a lower status despite lack of any legitimate basis for the lower status. They expected behavior suiting the higher status of their Competitor Winner and made choices accordingly, thereby accepting sub-optimal outcomes. Manipulated status mediated choice in the coordination task.

The Impact of Relative Standards on Concern About Privacy

Acquisti, Alessandro (Carnegie Mellon University); John, Leslie (Carnegie Mellon University); Loewenstein, George (Carnegie Mellon University)

We present the results of two studies that illustrate the impact on the propensity to reveal personal information of our own situation in the past and the situation of other people. One study focuses on the impact of receiving information about the self-revelations made by others on an individual's self-revelatory behavior. The other study focuses on the comparative nature of sequential judgments about the intrusiveness of personal questions. We find that admission to sensitive and even unethical behaviors by others elicits information disclosure and admissions by the subject, and that questions of increasing sensitivity throughout a survey inhibit information disclosure.

(3C) Knowledge and Chance*Subjective knowledge and Willingness to Act in Riskless Choice*

Hadar, Liat (The Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Israel); Sood, Sanjay (UCLA Anderson School of Management)

Willingness to bet in the face of ambiguity depends on decision-makers' subjective feeling of knowledge: Decision-makers prefer betting when they feel competent or knowledgeable, but they avoid betting when they feel ignorant or unknowledgeable (e.g., Heath & Tversky, 1991). We show that decision-makers are reluctant to act in any situation in which they feel ignorant, whether the situation involves risk or not, especially when only few choice options are available. The results of three studies demonstrate that feelings of ignorance reduce willingness to join pension plans or to purchase a product. An opportunity to improve knowledge, however, attenuates this effect.

Internal versus external modes of expressing uncertainty

Fox, Craig R. (UCLA); Ülkümen, Gülden (USC); Malle, Bertram F. (Brown University)

We show that speakers and listeners distinguish INTERNAL mode statements (e.g., "I am 80% sure that...") that express EPISTEMIC uncertainty (in the mind of the speaker) from EXTERNAL mode statements (e.g., "I think there is an 80% chance that...") that express ALEATORY uncertainty (chance factors). Speakers place more weight on singular information (e.g. feeling-of-knowing) when using "%sure" statements and more weight on distributional information (e.g. relative frequencies) when using "%chance" statements. Meanwhile, listeners associate "sure"/"confident" language with singular reasoning and uncertainty in the speaker's mind whereas they associate "chance"/"probability" language with distributional reasoning and uncertainty in the world.

When "hope springs eternal:" The role of chance in risk taking

Karellaia, Natalia (INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France); Hogarth, Robin M. (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain)

In most naturally occurring situations, success depends on both skill and chance. We contrast experimental market entry decisions where payoffs depend on skill as opposed to combinations of skill and chance. Our data show differential attitudes toward chance by those whose self-assessed skills are low and high. Making chance more important induces greater optimism for the former who start taking more risk, while the latter maintain a belief that high levels of skill are sufficient to overcome the vagaries of chance. Finally, although we observed "excess entry" (i.e., too many participants entered markets), this could not be attributed to overconfidence.

(4A) Incidental Influence I*Disgust Promotes Disposal: Souring the Status Quo*

Han, Seunghee (Carnegie Mellon University); Lerner, Jennifer S. (Harvard University); Zeckhauser, Richard (Harvard University)

Humans naturally dispose of objects that disgust them. Is this phenomenon so deeply embedded that even incidental disgust triggers disposal? Two experiments were designed to answer this question. Two film clips served as disgust and neutral primes; the objects were routine commodities (boxes of office supplies). Results revealed that the incidental disgust condition powerfully increased the frequency with which decision makers traded away a commodity they owned for a new commodity, thereby countering otherwise robust status quo bias. Decision makers were unaware of disgust's impact. Even when warned to correct for it, they failed to do so.

The Signature Effect: How Signing One's Name Affects Behavior

Häubl, Gerald (University of Alberta); Kettle, Keri (University of Alberta)

Can providing a signature affect subsequent decisions and actions? We propose that, because a signature symbolizes a person's identity, signing one's name promotes identity-consistent behavior. Four studies demonstrate that merely signing one's name has strong, contrasting effects on information search and choice – it amplifies the difference between product experts and non-experts in terms how much product information they inspect (Study 1) and how much time they spend in a retail store (Study 2), and it widens the gap between female and male participants in terms of their inclination to consume snack food (Study 3) and to buy chocolate (Study 4).

From formulas to faith: Consistency leads to confidence

Williams, Elanor F. (University of Florida); Dunning, David (Cornell University)

Systematic research is vital to scientific progress; systematic decision making, however, may have unintended consequences. In three studies we found that consistency increased miscalibration between confidence and accuracy, making people more confident in their judgments without making them more accurate. When completing logic problems, estimating calories, and searching for hidden images, participants who were more systematic were more confident but no more accurate in their responses than unsystematic participants. We suggest that people may rely on how they make a decision as a guide to its quality, rather than what the decision was or their true ability to make it.

The Balance Metaphor and its Effect on Choice

Larson, Jeff (Brigham Young University); Billeter, Darron M. (Brigham Young University)

According to research on embodied cognition, our understanding of abstract concepts is grounded in our physical experience. One indication of this grounding is the use of perceptual-motor terms to communicate abstract concepts. Metaphorical language serves to strengthen the association between perceptual-motor experiences and abstract concepts. We investigate the impact of the physical metaphor of balance on choice behavior and find that activating balance increases the selection of the compromise choice. In three experiments, we show that the effect holds when balance is physically activated, conceptually activated, and that activating balance on one task can carry-over and impact subsequent choice.

(4B) Motivation*"Please Give Me A Reason to Be Busy!" The Needs for Busyness and for Busyness Justifications*

Hsee, Christopher (University of Chicago Booth School of Business); Yang, Adelle (Shanghai Jiaotong University)

We theorize that people dread idleness, yet they need a justification to be busy. Specifically, we propose (a) that without a justification, people will choose to be idle rather than to be busy, (b) that with a justification to be busy, people will choose to be busy, even if the justification is specious, and (c) that people are happier when busy than when idle, even if they are forced to be busy. Four experiments tested and confirmed these hypotheses. This research suggests that many purported goals people are pursuing may be merely justifications to keep themselves busy.

Moving beyond deliberative control of impulses: The effect of construal levels on evaluative associations and self-control

Fujita, Kentaro (The Ohio State University); Han, H. Anna (St. Mary's College of Maryland)

Many theories propose that self-control requires deliberative control of impulses. Three experiments suggest that people's subjective mental construals of events can alter temptation impulses without requiring effortful deliberation. High-level construals (mental representations that capture core, essential, and abstract features of events) vs. low-level construals (representations that capture secondary, incidental, and concrete features) promoted associating temptations with negativity, as measured by the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald et al., 1988). Importantly, these associations also mediated the effect of construals on subsequent self-control choices. Rather than requiring effortful deliberation, self-control decision-making may simply entail seeing the proverbial "forest beyond the trees."

Understanding of Global Climate Change: Beliefs vs. Actions

Broomell, Stephen (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign); Han-Hui Por (Fordham University); David Budescu (Fordham University)

Research on global climate change (GCC) is surrounded by uncertainty and fierce debates. This makes it difficult to communicate to the public clear and easy to interpret information. We report results of a survey (n=456) and analyze several variables which are expected to affect both the belief in GCC and to intention to act on GCC. The results support the claim that beliefs in GCC and intentions to act are distinct and they are influenced by different variables. We highlight the important role of beliefs in the free market system in predicting intentions to act.

Mere Influence Effect: When Motivation to Influence Drives Decision

Dai, Xianchi (University of Chicago); Gao, Leilei (Chinese University of Hong Kong)

People want to make sure that they are living a meaningful life. One way to make life meaningful is to show that their actions can influence the environment around them. We propose that this motivation for influence, independent of hedonic consideration of the choice options, can systematically affect decision making. In three studies, in the contexts of actual presidential elections, donation decisions of real consequence, and program evaluations, we find strong support for the mere influence effect. Our theorizing also

provides an alternative explanation for the well recorded phenomenon in political elections called the Incumbent Rule (Panagakis, 1989).

(4C) Effects of Uncertainty

The Endowment Effect Under Uncertainty

Liersch, Michael J (Stern (NYU)); Rottenstreich, Yuval (Stern (NYU)); Kunreuther, Howard (Wharton (Penn)); Gong, Min (Penn)

In standard endowment effect experiments, participants cannot lose their holdings. However, endowment is often uncertain. For example, post-Madoff, investors worry their investments will disappear. We examine how uncertainty impacts reluctance to trade by extending standard experiments: after trades are completed, there is a 50% chance that participants will lose their holdings. We find that uncertainty exacerbates the reluctance to trade. Evidently people are even more averse to trade when they cannot count on maintaining their holdings. This finding suggests that attachment does not underlie reluctance to trade. One should presumably be less attached to items that are only tentatively held.

Unsure What the Future Will Bring? You May Overindulge: Uncertainty Increases the Appeal of Wants over Shoulds

Milkman, Katherine (The Wharton School)

I examine the effect of uncertainty about the future on whether individuals select want options (e.g., junk foods) or should options (e.g., healthy foods). Three studies demonstrate that uncertainty about what the future may bring increases individuals' tendency to favor want options over should options, and these results hold even when individuals are able to make choices contingent upon the outcomes of uncertain events. These results are strongest in situations where uncertainty pertains to similar outcomes, suggesting that the effects of uncertainty are enhanced when a decision maker finds it more difficult to distinguish between the possible contingencies she faces.

Why and When does Uncertainty Reduce Inter-group Competition and Encourage inter-group Cooperation

Gong, Min (Columbia University); Baron, Jonathan (University of Pennsylvania); Kunreuther, Howard (University of Pennsylvania)

Previous research has shown groups were less cooperative than individuals in a prisoner's dilemma, but were more cooperative than individuals in a stochastic version of the game. This paper investigates why and when uncertainty reduces inter-group competition and encourages inter-group cooperation. Three mechanisms underlying group cooperation are examined. The data support the hypothesis that groups are more risk-concerned than individuals and more likely to cooperate to reduce risks. Uncertainty reducing inter-group competition is replicated in various scenarios, but the effect of uncertainty encouraging inter-group cooperation was moderated by two factors: whether mutual-cooperation removes uncertainty and whether the game is repeated.

Temporal Distance and Objectivity-Seeking in Choice

Zhang, Jiao (University of Miami)

People often choose for future consumption (e.g., reserving a hotel for a future vacation). In this research, I distinguish between objective attributes, those on which it is certain which option is better, and subjective attributes, those on which it is uncertain which option is better, and propose that because people are uncertain about their preferences and outcome utilities in the future and want to minimize such uncertainty, they are more likely to choose an option superior on an objective attribute over one superior on a subjective attribute in the distant future than in the near future.

(5A) Incidental Influence II

Physical Contact Increases Financial Risk-Taking

Levav, Jonathan (Columbia University); Argo, Jennifer J. (University of Alberta)

In three experiments, with both hypothetical and real payoffs, we show that a light, comforting pat on the shoulder by a female leads to greater financial risk-taking. This effect was both mediated and moderated by feelings of security in both male and female subjects. We establish the boundary conditions for the impact of physical contact on risk-taking behaviors by demonstrating that the effect does not occur when the touching is performed by a male and when the type of touch is a handshake. The results suggest that subtle physical contact can be influential in decision-making and the willingness to accept risk.

Being Hot or Being Cold: The Influence of Temperature on Judgment and Choice

Ahn, Hee-Kyung (University of Toronto)

Temperature-related words such as "hot" and "cold" are often used to describe impulsive and calculated behaviors, respectively. These metaphoric connotations of thermal concepts raise the question as to whether temperature, psychological states and decision making are related to each other, and if so, how. The current paper examines these questions and finds support for a relationship.

Across five studies, I demonstrate that the actual experiences of physical temperature trigger decision outcomes in line with the metaphoric association between temperature and impulsivity. Moreover, these temperature effects persist when the concept of temperature is primed by temperature-related words and pictures.

Does Resisting Temptation Evoke Displaced Anger?

Gal, David (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University); Wendy Liu (Anderson School of Management, UCLA)

Prior research shows that yielding to temptation evokes feelings of guilt. In the present research, we propose that there is an analogous process whereby resisting temptation evokes feelings of anger. We argue that resisting temptation evokes anger because resisting temptation represents a restriction of one's freedom to act on one's desires. However, because people are unlikely to have a schema to interpret the situation as anger-provoking, they may not be able to subjectively recognize their affective state as anger. Nonetheless, anger arising from resisting temptation will be displaced to subsequent tasks.

The Labor Illusion: When Waiting Increases Liking

Buell, Ryan W. (Harvard Business School); Norton, Michael I. (Harvard Business School)

A ubiquitous feature of even the fastest online search interfaces is the wait. While conventional wisdom suggests that the longer people wait, the less satisfied they become, we document and explore waiting's ironic benefits. In particular, we demonstrate that when websites signal the work in which they are engaging, for example by displaying the steps in the search process, people not only mind the wait less, but actually value the experience more. Due to what we term the "labor illusion," people can actually prefer websites with longer waits to those that return instantaneous results, even when those results are identical.

(5B) Feedback and Performance

Giving, Seeking, and Responding to Negative Feedback

Finkelstein, Stacey R (University of Chicago, Booth School of Business); Fishbach, Ayelet (University of Chicago, Booth School of Business)

What increases the likelihood that a person will decide to pursue a goal, getting negative feedback on unsuccessful actions or getting positive feedback on successful actions? In four studies, we explore when individuals give and seek positive versus negative feedback, and what are the motivational consequences of these distinct feedbacks. We propose a model stating that as individuals gain expertise in a domain of goal pursuit (e.g., taking a language class), they seek and give more negative feedback. In addition, these individuals respond more to negative feedback by increasing their efforts in that domain.

Motivation by Anticipation: Expecting Rapid Feedback Reduces Optimism But Enhances Performance

Kettle, Keri (University of Alberta); Häubl, Gerald (University of Alberta)

People tend to appear less optimistic about their performance the closer they are to receiving feedback on it. This research examines whether the anticipated temporal proximity of feedback also affects actual performance. A field experiment involving a consequential behavior (student presentations in a university course) shows that individuals perform better when they anticipate more proximate feedback, even though they make less optimistic performance predictions. These findings have important implications for all those who are responsible for (mentoring and) evaluating the performance of others.

Goals, Performance, and Satisfaction in Marathon Running

Wu, George (University of Chicago); Markle, Alex (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology); Sackett, Aaron (University of St. Thomas); White, Rebecca (University of Chicago)

Marathon running offers a compelling and real-world context for understanding the motivating forces underlying goals. We surveyed approximately 2000 runners across 15 major marathons regarding their marathon goals, performance, and satisfaction, both before and after race day. We show that goals act as reference points: both anticipated pre- and actual post-marathon satisfaction exhibit the properties of the prospect theory value function. Notably, satisfaction with performance exhibits loss aversion. The decrease in satisfaction for every minute performance falls short of the goal is approximately two times the increase in satisfaction for every minute performance exceeds the goal.

The momentum effect in competitions: field evidence from tennis matches

Page, Lionel (University of Westminster/University of Cambridge)

It is often suggested that there is a psychological advantage to be leading in a competition. It is, however, hard to identify such an effect statistically. Using a Regression Discontinuity Design over a large dataset of tennis matches (N=634,095) the present paper exploits the randomised variation in first set results that occurs when the first set is decided by a close tie break (N=72,294). I find that winning the first set by the closest margin makes the player much more likely to win the second set. Winning seems therefore to have a positive influence on subsequent performances.

(5C) Symposium: Are Crowds Always Wiser?

Organizers: Herzog, Stefan M (University of Basel); Lee, Leonard (Columbia Business School)

The “wisdom-of-crowds” hypothesis maintains that the aggregation of independent information in groups will often result in better judgments than any single member of the group could make. This symposium brings together four recent papers that present boundary conditions to and extensions of the “wisdom-of-crowds” phenomenon. Simmons, Nelson, Galak, and Frederick show that point spread betting markets led to systematically biased predictions of NFL football winnings, even when bettors had the opportunity to learn throughout the season. However, using estimates of point differentials, rather than point spreads, led to improved predictions. Soll, Mannes, Benson, and Payne demonstrate that interacting three-person-groups often ignore valuable, outlying estimates. These groups are often outperformed by a simple average of their member’s private prior estimates, which includes the outlier. Lee, Pham, and Stephen argue that using one’s feelings (as opposed to one’s deliberative thoughts), can improve one’s predictions of a wide variety of crowd behavior (e.g., movies’ box-office revenues, Dow Jones index, 2008 Democratic presidential nomination). Herzog and Hertwig propose exploiting the power of aggregation to improve judgments of a single person using an approach they call “dialectical bootstrapping”: averaging a first estimate with a second, dialectical one, stemming from the same person.

Constituent papers:*Are Crowds Wise When Predicting Against Point Spreads? It Depends on How You Ask*

Simmons, Joseph P. (Yale University); Nelson, Leif (University of California at San Diego); Galak, Jeff (Carnegie Mellon University); Frederick, Shane (Yale University)

Point spread betting markets are considered an important example of crowd wisdom, because point spreads are accurate and are believed to reflect the “crowd’s” predictions of sporting events. However, a season-long experiment found that a sample of football bettors was systematically biased and performed poorly when predicting which team would win against a point spread. Moreover, the crowd’s biases worsened over time. However, when the crowd was instead asked to predict game outcomes by estimating point differentials, its predictions were unbiased and wiser. Thus, the same “crowd” of bettors can appear wise or unwise, depending on how predictions are elicited.

Outliers in Groups: Most Valuable but Least Heard

Soll, Jack B. (Fuqua School of Business, Duke University); Mannes, Al (Carnegie Mellon University); Benson, Lehman (University of Arizona); Payne, John (Fuqua School of Business, Duke University)

In any three-person group, one member’s quantitative opinion will typically be more discrepant than the others. We show that although this outlier opinion is often least accurate individually, it should be included in any average of two estimates; the added diversity of the outlier more than offsets the lower individual accuracy. We also find that groups underweight outliers, to the detriment of accuracy. Surprisingly, groups put the least weight on outliers precisely when their inclusion in a composite adds the most value, which is when the other two group members agree on the same answer.

The Emotional Oracle: Predicting Crowd Behavior with Feelings

Lee, Leonard (Columbia Business School); Pham, Michel T. (Columbia Business School); Stephen, Andrew T. (INSEAD)

Predictions of crowd behavior are often associated with careful reasoning and logic. However, what role do emotions play? We examine how reliance on feelings affects the accuracy of such predictions across four studies covering short- and long-range forecasts and four distinct prediction contexts (movies’ box-office revenues, the Dow Jones stock market index, the 2008 Democratic presidential nomination, and American Idol 2009). We find greater accuracy in feeling-based predictions than those based more on logical reasoning, and propose that reliance on affect helps foster a more comprehensive processing of available information, distilling the situation to its gist or essential elements.

Dialectical Bootstrapping: When Should You Trust Your “Crowd Within”?

Herzog, Stefan M. (University of Basel); Hertwig, Ralph (University of Basel)

We propose exploiting “The Wisdom of Crowds” to improve judgments of a single person using an approach we call dialectical bootstrapping: Reducing a person’s error by averaging his or her first estimate with a second, dialectical one that harks back to somewhat different knowledge and assumptions or stems from a different estimation strategy. We present evidence for accuracy improvement and that the benefits of dialectical bootstrapping can go beyond mere reliability increases. Analytical results show that averaging the first and dialectical estimates stemming from the same person is the preferred strategy under a surprisingly broad range of situations.

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 22**(6A) Symposium: Whither Optimism: Inquiries into the Existence and Persistence of Optimistic Biases**

Organizer: Massey, Cade (Yale)

For years optimistic biases of many sorts were considered ubiquitous (Weinstein, 1980). Indeed, the debate focused far more on whether these biases were adaptive than whether they existed (Taylor & Brown, 1988). In recent years this orthodoxy has been challenged by research showing, for example, that people actually underestimate their performance on easy tasks (Kruger, 1999), or more generally, that many biases can be readily explained by a Bayesian model of judgment (Moore & Healy, 2008). Even the evidence for an effect as simple and intuitive as the desirability bias has been called into question (Krizan & Windschitl, 2007). In this session we bring together researchers with differing perspectives on this debate. The group focuses on mechanisms that facilitate or mitigate optimistic biases, such as desirability, selective exposure and top-down beliefs. By considering this research side-by-side we hope to sharpen the debate about where optimistic biases do and don't exist, and why.

Constituent papers:*Keeping the Faith: The Persistence of Optimism and the Role of Desirability*

Massey, Cade (Yale); Simmons, Joseph (Yale); Armor, David (San Diego State)

Does optimism persist in the face of feedback? To investigate we asked NFL fans to predict outcomes throughout the football season. Participants were optimistic before the season, predicting their favorite team would perform better than did neutral parties. Optimism was robust, persisting until the season's final weeks. It was also strongly related to desirability. An advantage of this setting is that the desirability of team outcomes varies significantly with eligibility for post-season play. Using data from publicly traded prediction markets we find an extremely strong relation between post-season eligibility and optimism. In short, where there is hope, there is optimism.

The Role of Selective Exposure in Overconfidence Effects and the Desirability Bias

Windschitl, P.D. (Iowa); Scherer, A.M. (Iowa); Smith, A.R. (Iowa); Rose, J.P. (Iowa)

After making a tough decision, people tend to select information that is consonant rather than dissonant with their choice. Our first study demonstrated that people exhibit a similar tendency after making a prediction. While this tendency has been theorized as a possible cause of overconfidence, could it also be a mediator of the desirability bias? In a second study, we used a monetary incentive to make one possible outcome more desired than another. This caused participants, who did not make initial predictions, to select evidence consonant rather than dissonant with the desired outcome, resulting in inflated likelihood judgments.

Motivation and Overconfidence

Moore, Don A. (Carnegie Mellon); Benoit, Jean-Pierre (London Business School); Dubra, Juan (Universidad de Montevideo); Haran, Uriel (Carnegie Mellon); Shidlovski, Daniella (Hebrew University)

Many researchers have assumed that overconfidence is driven by motivation: that people are motivated to believe that they are better than they are and that they are better than others. But the glaring gap in this literature is direct evidence that changes in motivation influence these beliefs. In two experiments, we find that manipulating motivation has little effect on the tendency to overestimate one's own performance or to claim that it is better than that of others. Instead, we find that motivation can increase actual performance but also that strong motivation can undermine performance (choking under pressure).

Top-Down Self-Beliefs Alter Perceptions of Bottom-Up Experience: Implications for Performance Evaluation

Dunning, David (Cornell); Critcher, Clayton R. (Cornell)

People's top-down, usually overly-optimistic, self-beliefs influence their performance evaluations of how well they have objectively done on a specific task--with this influence producing more error than accuracy. New data suggest that those top-down beliefs affect performance evaluations because they shape perceptions of bottom-up experience with the task. People who believe they are skilled think they find solutions faster and expend less effort than those without such favorable self-beliefs. These perceptions are unrelated to actual objective measures of bottom-up experience. Implications for undue optimism and self-stereotyping effects are discussed.

(6B) Judgment under Uncertainty*How Does Motivation Affect Judgment?*

Dai, Xianchi (University of Chicago); Hsee, Chris (University of Chicago)

We propose a two-process model of the effect of motivation on judgment. According to our model, motivation leads to two opposite effects. One is wishful thinking, in which people's evaluation is assimilated toward their motivated expectation. The other

is a contrast effect, in which people use their motivated expectation as a reference point to evaluate reality. We further propose that ownership status determines the relative weight of the two processes. We tested our model in three studies about volume, size, and product quality judgments.

Categorical Cue Weighting

Shah, Anuj K. (Princeton University); Oppenheimer, Daniel M. (Princeton University)

Equal weighting heuristics are known to be accurate, effort-reducing strategies. But other simple weighting principles are relatively understudied. Here, we test the hypothesis that decision-makers might partition cues into different categories of information and subsequently weight these partitions equally (rather than weighting individual cues equally). In a series of studies, we show how this behavior can occur spontaneously and how partition-level labels can change the weighting of identical pieces of information. Finally, we discuss how this relates to other effort-reduction strategies and heuristics.

Torture and Judgments of Guilt

Gray, Kurt (Harvard University); Wegner, Daniel M (Harvard University)

Although torture can establish guilt through confession, how are judgments of guilt made when suspects don't confess? Perhaps perceived guilt is based inappropriately upon how much pain suspects suffered during torture. Dissonance suggests that those complicit with torture will see pain as evidence of guilt, while moral typecasting (Gray & Wegner, 2009) suggests that those distant from torture will see pain as evidence of innocence. Participant evaluations of a confederate tortured in the lab supported these predictions. These results help explain the torture debate: unlike the distant public, those involved with torture (e.g., government) perceive victims to be guilty.

The More, the Merrier: The Perverse Effect of Additional Victims on Moral Judgment

Haran, Uriel (Carnegie Mellon University); Cain, Daylian M. (Yale University)

Murdering ten is worse than murdering two; all else being equal, the worse the outcome of an act, the harsher the judgment should be against the agent. However, people's judgments sometimes display the opposite pattern. Two lab studies demonstrate that as the number of victims increased, each victim was incorrectly perceived to be suffering less, even when the actual suffering was held constant across victims and all were harmed at once. This discounting of individual harm sometimes was so great that participants perceived hurting many victims as less harmful overall than the same act against only one or few victims.

(6C) Choice Models and Methodology

The "Nothing to Gain/Nothing to Lose" Effect - Similarity Judgments in Strategic, Risky and Intertemporal Choice

Leland, Jonathan (NSF)

Anomalies under uncertainty are commonly accounted for by weakening the independence axiom. Intertemporal choice anomalies are attributed to non-exponential discounting while irrationality in games results from "other-regarding" preferences. Each of these explanations is domain-dependent. This paper shows that anomalies across domains will all result from a decision process involving similarity judgments and, specifically from one implication of the model termed the "nothing to gain/nothing to lose" effect. It explains 4-fold risk preferences in risky choice, hyperbolicity in intertemporal choice, and makes a variety of novel predictions in games. Results confirming the game predictions are presented.

Choice Variability Versus Structural Inconsistency of Preferences

Regenwetter, Michel (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign); Davis-Stober, Clinton (University of Missouri at Columbia)

Rational choice theory makes the structural consistency assumption that every decision maker's binary strict preference among choice alternatives forms a strict weak order. Using new quantitative interdisciplinary methodologies we dissociate variability of choices from structural inconsistency of preferences. We show that laboratory choice behavior among stimuli of a classical "intransitivity" paradigm is, in fact, consistent with variable, but transitive, strict weak order preferences. We find that decision makers act in accordance with a restrictive mathematical model that, for the behavioral sciences, is extraordinarily parsimonious.

Verbatim and Gist Cues Produce Opposite Relations Between Risk Perception and Risk Taking: A Fuzzy-Trace Theory Approach

Pardo, Seth T. (Cornell University); Reyna, Valerie F. (Cornell University); Mills, Brit A. (Cornell University); Shreck, Erica (Cornell University); Estrada, Steven M. (Cornell University)

Fuzzy-trace theory predicts that analytical (verbatim) thinking produces positive (reflective) correlations between perceived risk and behavior and favors risk taking. Qualitative (gist) thinking elicits bottom-line (avoidant) attitudes toward risk producing negative (protective) correlations. Two verbatim and three gist measures were used to test predictions about these opposing relations by manipulating retrieval cues. Two gist principles (absolute, relative) were used to test whether finer-grained risk distinctions led to riskier behavior. Results confirmed our predictions. Verbatim measures correlated positively with behavior and intentions; gist measures negatively correlated; absolute-only endorsement correlated with the least risk and relative only with the most risk.

Online Experiments for Judgment and Decision Making

Horton, John (Harvard University); Zeckhauser, Richard (Harvard University); Chen, Daniel (University of Chicago)

Established online labor markets offer a promising venue for running experiments in judgment and decision making. Subjects from diverse populations can be recruited swiftly, and at modest expense. Moreover, subjects are not experiment-savvy. We discuss how to pay subjects, design online material, gain IRB approval, meet requirements for causal inference, and implement classic studies: paired surveys, real-effort tasks, and canonical games. We address possible threats to identification, including randomization failures, SUTVA violations and non-random attrition. Results from completed studies using online subjects are presented. "Sweet spot" research topics -- ideal for online experimentation -- are identified.

(7A) Consumer Behavior and Incentives*Disposal Biases: Why Sellers of Used Goods May Not Choose the Highest Bidder*

Isaac, Mathew S. (Kellogg, Northwestern University); Brough, Aaron R. (Kellogg, Northwestern University)

Sellers of used goods are often faced with a choice between multiple buyers. A common assumption is that rational sellers will base their decision on the buyers' willingness to pay and select the highest bidder. However, we identify a non-monetary source of utility that can influence the behavior of individuals who are considering product disposal. Specifically, we propose the existence of "post-transactional utility," wherein sellers derive value from the belief that following a transaction, buyers will utilize products in a manner consistent with the sellers' preferences. Three experiments demonstrate that decision-makers sacrifice financial gains in exchange for post-transactional utility.

Mental Accounting in the Context of Poverty

Hall, Crystal C. (University of Washington); Shafir, Eldar (Princeton University)

While the mental accounting literature has contributed to the understanding of consumer behavior, no work to date has examined these phenomena with respect to low-income consumers. Using adaptations from classic demonstrations of topical mental accounting, we show that low-income individuals do not reliably replicate findings regarding savings preference. When considering spending time to travel in order to save a certain amount of money, low-income participants do not consistently show a preference for saving on proportionally larger sums of money. We demonstrate this through both adapted versions of previously studied stimuli and through a novel, within-subjects design.

Private Payment versus Public Praise: Effects of reward type on energy conservation

Handgraaf, Michel (University of Amsterdam & CRED, Columbia University); Van Lidth de Jeude, Margriet (University of Amsterdam)

Financial rewards may have negative side-effects. These may be overcome if more socially relevant rewards are used. We did a field experiment in which we used monetary vs. non-material and private vs. public rewards to stimulate energy saving. We measured energy consumption for a total of 13 weeks. As expected, public rewards worked better than private ones and non-material rewards worked better than monetary rewards. Differences persisted for 8 weeks after we stopped our manipulations. These are important results: they add to theorizing about the effectiveness of rewards and show that focusing on privately earned monetary rewards may be counterproductive.

Will there be blood? Incentives and substitution effects in pro-social behavior

Lacetera, Nicola (Case Western Reserve University); Macis, Mario (University of Michigan); Slonim, Robert (University of Sydney)

We examine 14,029 Red Cross blood drives with many offering material incentives. Regressions indicate that offering incentives significantly increases donations while not affecting the proportion of bad quality donations. Higher valued items also resulted in greater donations. These findings are corroborated by a small-scale field experiment showing that offering \$5 and \$20 gift cards significantly increased donations while not increasing the proportion of bad quality donors. While our results contrast with Titmuss' (1971) concerns, the blood donation environment today may no longer be perceived as a purely non-market pro-social activity and so could be less susceptible to crowding effects.

(7B) Subjective Probability*A pairwise-contrast model of intuitive probabilistic inference*

Li, Ye (Center for Decision Research, University of Chicago); Bartels, Daniel M. (Center for Decision Research, University of Chicago); Wu, George (Center for Decision Research, University of Chicago)

In two studies, we develop and test a formal model of likelihood judgment using pairwise comparisons between prospects (e.g., "Are the chances of this event greater than alternative 1, than alternative 2...?"), rather than Support Theory's comparison between a prospect and an aggregate representation of alternatives (e.g., "Are the chances of this event greater than the chances of the rest of

the events?"). We find that our pairwise contrast model better accounts for behavior than Support Theory. In addition, we found that our model's advantage over competitors increases under conditions where intuition receives more weight in inference (e.g. time pressure).

Assessing Joint Probability Distributions with Isoprobability Contours

Abbas, Ali (University of Illinois); Budescu, David (Fordham University); Gu, Rola (University of Illinois); Marcus, Jamie (Fordham University); Krahan, Ibrahim (University of Illinois)

We propose a method to construct joint probability distributions using isoprobability contours: sets of points with the same joint cumulative probability. The approach reduces the joint probability assessment into a one-dimensional marginal probability assessment and some isoprobability contour assessments. We report the results of several experiments and simulations and discuss: (i) which contours to assess (trade-off between assessing the 10% contour which is longer but more difficult to reason about than a 90% contour); (ii) the number of contours to assess for a given accuracy, and (iii) the effects of learning on the monotonicity and repeatability of the contour assessments.

Perceiving Intentions Makes Streaks Seem Likely to Continue

Waytz, Adam (Harvard University); Caruso, Eugene (University of Chicago); Epley, Nicholas (University of Chicago)

Sometimes people believe a sequence of repeated events will continue (the "hot hand"), whereas other times they believe it will reverse (the "gambler's fallacy"). The current research identifies a critical cue, the perceived intentionality of the agent generating the streak, to explain these contradictory intuitions. Two studies demonstrate that people are more likely to predict that streaks will continue (reverse) in contexts involving agents perceived to be intentional (unintentional). A second set of studies demonstrate that the perception that streaks will continue is strongest among individuals who are most naturally attuned to the presence of intentions in agents more generally.

Unpacking Unpacking: When Greater Detail Reduces Perceived Likelihood

Redden, Joseph (U. of Minnesota); Frederick, Shane (Yale)

This research examines how the level of detail used to describe an event affects its perceived likelihood, particularly when all of the constituent subclasses are obvious and readily summoned. In a series of studies involving the evaluation of gambles and sure things, people preferred a gamble more when it was described as a simpler collapsed event because they perceived it to be more likely. Process evidence implicates processing fluency as a critical moderator of the unpacking effect and shows that it may influence the subjective likelihood of an event, even in cases where the probability can be easily calculated.

(7C) Intertemporal and Medical Choice

Three reasons why discounting doesn't work

Scholten, Marc (Instituto Superior de Psicologia Aplicada); Read, Daniel (Durham Business School / Yale University)

In discounting models of intertemporal choice, people assign discounted values independently to all options, and then compare these discounted values. In two choice studies, we identify three anomalies to discounting models: The time difference, or interval, between delayed outcomes sometimes counts more and sometimes less as a whole than if it were divided into shorter subintervals (superadditivity and subadditivity, respectively), and whether it counts more or less depends on the money difference involved (inseparability). To account for these anomalies, we propose a tradeoff model, in which people directly compare the options along the time attribute and the money attribute.

I want it now!: Why discount rates for losses show reverse frame and reverse magnitude effects

Hardisty, David J. (Columbia University); Appelt, Kirstin C. (Columbia University); Weber, Elke U. (Columbia University)

In 4 studies, 580 US residents chose between immediate and future gains and losses. While participants discounted small gains more than large ones and discounted potential delays (default is now) more than potential accelerations (default is later), their responses for losses reversed or eliminated these classic effects. This is explained through a three-factor discounting model including uncertainty, resource slack, and present bias. Critically, present bias (wanting things now, ceteris paribus) translates into higher discounting of gains but lower discounting of losses. Participants' thought listings confirmed the mediating role of present bias and revealed qualitatively different processes for evaluating future losses.

Burdening Patients with Doctors' Conflicts of Interest

Sah, Sunita (Carnegie Mellon University); Loewenstein, George (Carnegie Mellon University); Cain, Daylian M. (Yale School of Management)

Disclosure is often advocated as a potential solution to conflicts of interest. We show in two experiments that disclosure of a doctor's financial conflict of interest has contradictory effects that put the patient in an effective bind: Disclosure decreases trust in a doctor's advice whilst simultaneously increasing the perceived pressure to comply with the doctor's advice, in order to avoid

signaling distrust to the doctor. These two forces work in opposing directions and the stronger force determines whether the patient will reject the doctor's advice. Thus, disclosure can place a burden on those it was supposed to protect.

Are patients too trusting? The unintended consequences of continuity of care

Schwartz, Janet (Duke University); Luce, Mary Frances (Duke University); Ariely, Dan (Duke University)

The judgment and decision making literature is rich with evidence that unavoidable errors and providers' financial conflicts of interest present major obstacles to getting the best possible medical care. Second opinions are one of the most important, if not the only, tools to protect consumers from these pitfalls. Despite the advantages of second opinions, however, they are often underutilized. In a series of experiments we investigate the extent to which established relationships between patients and healthcare providers has the unintended consequence of driving people away from second opinions—often at the expense of their own financial and medical well-being.

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 23

(8A) Heuristics

Ignoring invalid information just fine: Evidence from a Consumer Reports Oops

Simonsohn, Uri (Wharton)

Can people voluntarily ignore information? The hindsight bias, debriefing paradigm, anchoring-and-adjustment, and false-consensus, among other literatures, suggest a big NOT. Here I analyze data from a natural experiment involuntarily performed by Consumer Reports® who retracted a safety ranking for infant carseats. I find that the market for carseats responded markedly to the new ranking when first released. More excitingly, I also find that it almost instantly returned to baseline upon its retraction. I discuss possible explanations for this lab vs. field discrepancy in behavior.

The (lack of) Downstream Consequences of Anchoring

Smith, Andrew R. (University of Iowa); Windschitl, Paul D. (University of Iowa)

Numerous experiments have demonstrated that anchors influence estimates. Few studies, however, have examined whether anchoring effects extend beyond the judgments made while considering the anchor value. In three experiments, participants evaluated photographs after exposure to high or low anchors. Participants also picked their favorite photograph and indicated how much they liked the photographs. We found robust anchoring effects in participants' photograph evaluations. However, these effects didn't extend to their choice of favorite photograph or to how much they liked the photographs. Anchors can produce robust effects, but these effects are limited to the judgments made where the anchors are encountered.

Simple heuristics in the ultimatum game

Hertwig, Ralph (University of Basel); Fischbacher, Urs (University of Konstanz); Bruhin, Adrian (University of Zürich)

Evidence at variance with maximization of self-interest in social games is typically explained in terms of social preferences models. They abandon the assumption of selfishness as the sole driver of behavior while retaining the rational choice framework, and entering psychological concepts such as inequality aversion into the utility function. As an alternative approach, we use the framework of fast and frugal decision trees. We demonstrate that they could describe—although not perfectly—people's choices in our environment of mini-ultimatum games. In addition, the trees give rise to response time predictions. Testing these predictions, we found evidence for the postulated processes.

On the role of recognition and magnitude-comparison in binary decision tasks

Schweickart, Oliver (University of Alberta); Brown, Norman R. (University of Alberta); Lee, Peter J. (University of Alberta)

This study examines the processes underlying binary decisions when only one object in a pair is recognized. In two experiments, participants were asked (a) to decide which of two countries has the higher population (per capita GDP), and (b) to estimate the population (per capita GDP) of each country. RTs displayed a classic symbolic distance effect (Banks, 1977): RTs were inversely related to the difference between the subjective population sizes (per capita GDPs) of the compared countries. These findings disconfirm predictions made by simple non-compensatory decision models and indicate that a magnitude-comparison process plays a central role in the task.

(8B) Consumer Behavior

Thought for Food: Top-down Processes Moderate Sensory-Specific Satiation

Huh, Young Eun (Carnegie Mellon University); Morewedge, Carey K. (Carnegie Mellon University); Vosgerau, Joachim (Carnegie Mellon University)

It has been shown that consumption of a food leads to a decrease in liking of that food without diminishing liking of foods not consumed (i.e., sensory-specific satiety). The present research tested whether top-down processes alone can engender sensory-specific satiation. Across five studies, we found that people who imagined eating a large amount of food subsequently consumed less of that food than people who imagined eating a small amount of food, imagined eating another food, or imagined simply handling the food. The results provide strong evidence that cognitive top-down processes are an important determinant of satiation.

Can Visual Images in Advertisements Curb Consumption?

Zhu, Meng (Carnegie Mellon University); Billeter, Darron M (Brigham Young University); Inman, Jeffrey J (University of Pittsburgh)

Contrary to the common belief that visual images in advertisements generate positive influences on consumer demand, we argue that visual images can decrease sales of the advertised product due to reduced consumption volume. Four studies demonstrate that adding visual images can increase perceived product effectiveness in advertisements and lead to lower usage rates of the featured products. We show that this negative impact of visual images on consumption is driven by heuristic processing and is attenuated by cognitive deliberation. Further, we identify boundary conditions and provide evidence that perceived product effectiveness mediates the effect of visual images on consumption.

Calorie Posting in New York City: The Effect of Point-of-Purchase Information on Food Choice

Wisdom, Jessica (Carnegie Mellon University); Downs, Julie (Carnegie Mellon University); Loewenstein, George (Carnegie Mellon University); Wansink, Brian (Cornell University)

To examine the impact of legislation requiring prominent calorie labeling in fast-food restaurants, we collected receipts and surveys from customers in New York, before and after menus were labeled. Some customers received a recommendation for daily or per-meal caloric intake prior to ordering. Labeling lowered consumption at one location, where baseline intake was especially high, but the others trended (non-significantly) towards increased consumption. Recommendations didn't reduce intake, but interacted with individual differences to bring outliers closer to mean consumption. Thus, providing calorie information in restaurants may lower intake for some, but does not appear to be a panacea for obesity.

Are Fast Choices Driven by Value or Visual Saliency of the Options?

Milosavljevic, Milica (California Institute of Technology); Navalpakkam, Vidhya (California Institute of Technology); Koch, Christof (California Institute of Technology); Rangel, Antonio (California Institute of Technology)

Imagine that you are in a hurry and have a few seconds to choose a food item. The available items vary both in subjective value - how much you like each - and in their visual saliency - brightness. How do the two factors affect your choice? Here, subjects made choices between pairs of food items with different subjective values while we manipulated visual saliency by changing the brightness of the items. The results indicate that visual saliency affects choices when the value of the two items is similar, but that value wins over when one of the options is highly preferred.

(8C) Metacognition

Inferring Preferences From Mental Behavior

Critcher, Clayton R. (Cornell University); Gilovich, Thomas (Cornell University)

Self-perception theory (Bem, 1972) posits that people understand their own preferences much as they understand others', by interpreting the meaning of their behavior in light of the context in which it occurs. Three experiments tested whether people also rely on a ubiquitous, but unobservable "behavior," their mindwandering, when making such inferences. Mindwandering to positive, concurrent events was assumed to reflect one's boredom with an ongoing activity, whereas mindwandering to negative or past events was seen as uninformative. Participants appeared to rely spontaneously on mindwandering as a cue to their own preferences, but not when preference-unrelated causes of mindwandering were highlighted.

When a choice is too easy: Meta-cognitive experiences of ease can increase choice deferral

Zhang, Charles Y. Z. (University of Michigan); Norbert Schwarz (University of Michigan)

Past research has shown that the feeling of difficulty increases the likelihood of choice deferral. The present study shows that choice tasks that are "too easy" make people feel that they didn't really have much of a choice and didn't engage in the deliberation that characterizes making a choice. Either of these impressions may motivate people to defer choice and search for additional alternatives. Two studies show that less people defer choice when making comparisons that involve slight trade-offs (rather than no trade-offs) and when the dominant nature of the best alternative has to be inferred (rather than explicitly labeled).

How Much Do I Know? When Abstraction Produces Overestimation

Alter, Adam L. (New York University); Oppenheimer, Daniel M. (Princeton University); Zemla, Jeffrey C. (Rice University)

An illusion of explanatory depth (IOED) occurs when people believe they understand a concept more deeply than they actually do. Researchers have demonstrated this bias in judgment in a number of domains, but few have considered why IOEDs occur in the

first place. We suggest that IOEDs occur because people adopt an inappropriately abstract construal style when they assess how well they understand concrete concepts. As this mechanism predicts, participants experienced diminished IOEDs when they were induced to adopt a concrete construal mindset across five experiments. We examine how these findings might explain a range of social and metacognitive biases.

Complicating Choice

Schrift, Rom Y. (Columbia University); Netzer, Oded (Columbia University); Kivetz, Ran (Columbia University)

A great deal of research in decision-making and social-cognition has explored decision-makers' attempts to simplify choices by bolstering their tentative choice candidate and/or denigrating the other alternatives. In the present research, we investigate a diametrically opposed process, whereby decision-makers complicate their decisions. We demonstrate that decision-makers overweigh unimportant product attributes, and reverse their preference ordering in a manner that detracts from the leading alternative and intensifies the conflict in choice. We show how complicating behavior, once triggered, could lead to choice reversals. The results from six studies support a unifying effort compatibility principle, which accommodates both simplifying and complicating behavior.

(9A) Choice under Uncertainty

Individual Differences in Strategic Variability during Risky Choice

Venkatraman, Vinod (Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University); Payne, John W. (Fuqua School of Business, Duke University); Bettman, James R. (Fuqua School of Business, Duke University); Luce, Mary Frances (Fuqua School of Business, Duke University); Huettel, Scott A. (Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University)

Adaptive decision making involves the use of multiple strategies that vary across individuals, and shift with context. Using complex mixed gambles, we demonstrate a bias towards simplifying choices that maximize the overall probability of winning over choices that are consistent with more traditional economic models. More importantly, we show that the extent of this bias can be exaggerated or attenuated using subtle variations in the decision context. Individual differences in bias towards the simplifying strategy or choices correlated positively with satisficing trait and negatively with sadness trait. Finally, using fMRI, we demonstrate distinct neural predictors of strategic variability across individuals.

Probability Matching in Choice under Uncertainty: Intuition versus Deliberation

Koehler, Derek J. (Psychology, Waterloo); James, Greta (Psychology, Waterloo)

Probability matching has been characterized as "dumb" (reflecting operations of heuristic judgment) and as "smart" (adaptive in environments in which outcomes may follow patterns). In choices with monetary stakes, we find (a) probability matching persists even when it is not possible to identify or exploit outcome patterns; (b) many "probability matchers" rate an alternative strategy (maximizing) as superior when it is described to them; and (c) probability matchers score lower on the cognitive reflection test than do maximizers. Probability matching is evidently an intuitive response that can be, but often is not, overridden by deliberate consideration of alternative choice strategies.

Loss aversion and the comparative nature of affective reactions

Rubaltelli, Enrico (University of Padova); Rumiati, Rino (University of Padova); Slovic, Paul (Decision Research)

In Study 1, people were presented with a sure gain [loss] of €100 versus a bet offering a .5 chance of gaining [losing] €200. In Study 2, people were presented with .98 chance to win [lose] €100 versus the same .5 bets. In both frames, there was a significant interaction for each dependent variable ($P < .03$). In JE, participants had more positive affective reactions toward the sure gain than toward the .5 bet and more negative affective reactions toward the sure loss than toward the bet ($P < .01$). In SE, the difference was not significant.

Graininess, Similarity and Decision Making

Chakravarti, Amitav (New York University); Fang, Christina (New York University); Shapira, Zur (New York University)

We explore the link between the graininess of one's mental model and judgments of similarity, as subjects are asked to detect change, and make investment decisions on new technologies. The graininess of one's mental model refers to the number of categories that one uses in judgment and decision making (Pettigrew, 1958). We hypothesized and show experimentally that the coarse-grained category structure is likely to lead to more similar judgment. As a result, they reacted less to change, and were less willing to invest in new technologies.

(9B) Dual Processes

People's Intuitions About Intuitive Insight and Intuitive Choice

Inbar, Yoel (Harvard University); Cone, Jeremy (Cornell University); Gilovich, Thomas (Cornell University)

How do people balance intuition and reason when making decisions? We report five studies indicating that features of the decision problem cue people to follow intuition or reason when making their choice. Features associated with rational processing incline people to decide on the basis of reason; those associated with intuitive processing incline people to decide intuitively. Thus, choices seen as objectively evaluable (Study 1), complex (Study 2), sequential (Studies 3 and 4) and precise (Study 5) elicit a preference for choosing rationally. This framework accurately predicts people's actual choices in variants of both the ratio-bias and ambiguity-aversion paradigms.

Mechanisms of Superior Judgment: Ironic Effects of Cognitive Control

Cokely, Edward T. (Max Planck Institute for Human Development)

How is cognitive control used to regulate and produce superior judgment and decision making? Theoretically, the leading framework (dual systems) indicates that cognitive control is used either for rule based processing (e.g., logic) or for monitoring and correcting error-prone intuitions. In three experiments, I examine some surprising judgments to reveal an alternative mode of cognitive control (i.e., early selection). Paradoxically, and in contrast to dual systems theory, controlled cognition was associated with a greater reliance on heuristics for judgments in stock profit and purchasing power estimation tasks. Modes of cognitive control, individual differences, and implications for theory will be discussed.

An Empirical Comparison of Intuitive versus Analytic Judgment Processes

Tennant, Raegan J. (Chicago Booth); Hastie, Reid (Chicago Booth)

Distinctions between intuitive versus analytic thought processes are central to judgment frameworks. Experimental comparisons between intuitive versus analytic, unreflective versus reasoned, and unconscious versus conscious judgments suggest reliable differences between processes and outcomes in these modes of thinking. The present research uses a multiple-cue judgment task to capture judgment policies when participants evaluate faces, consumer products, and other objects. Comparisons of four modes of thought are made with reference to cue utilization, reliability, and other properties of judgment policies. Our goal is to provide a systematic description of the similarities and differences between judgments rendered in different modes of thinking.

Reflecting on dilemmas: individual differences in judgments about difficult situations

Hardman, David (London Metropolitan University)

Two studies tested the hypothesis that reflective thinking is associated with normative responding on judgments and decisions. For Study 1, 346 UK students completed Frederick's (2005) Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) and several moral dilemma problems. In Study 2, 172 participants were recruited via online social networking sites and by written adverts in London Metropolitan University. Their responses on the ultimatum game were compared with their scores on the CRT, the SAT, and Lipkus et al's (2001) numeracy scale. The main finding was that highly reflective individuals were more normative on moral dilemmas but less normative on the economic dilemma.

(9C) Choice Set

The Rejectable Choice Set: How Seemingly Irrelevant No-Choice Options Affect Decisions

Parker, Jeffrey R. (Columbia University); Schrift, Rom Y. (Columbia University)

This article investigates how decision processes and preferences change when a no-choice option is added to the choice-set. We argue that even if such no-choice options are undesirable, their mere presence in the choice set may force decision-makers to determine not only which alternative is best, but also which are acceptable. Accordingly, this change in judgment criteria is shown to increase the importance of attributes that are (1) compatible with an evaluative judgment (i.e., enriched attributes), and (2) closer to decision-makers' minimum threshold requirements. We demonstrate that such change in preferences often lead to choice reversals and violations of regularity.

Pseudo-Inefficacy: When Awareness of Those We Cannot Help Demotivates Us From Aiding Those We Can Help

Slovic, Paul (Decision Research and University of Oregon); Vastfjall, Daniel (Decision Research); Peters, Ellen (Decision Research)

What motivates people to provide life-saving assistance to people in danger? Findings from two published and one new study document a curious tendency that has important implications for pro-social or humanitarian behavior. In situations where someone could provide money or clean water to aid people facing death from starvation or disease, awareness of others who would not be helped appears to inhibit action. People help others, in part, to make themselves feel good. We propose that knowledge of those "out of reach" triggers negative feelings that counter the good feelings from helping, thus demotivating action.

The cost of changing your mind: Reversed decisions increase regret

Kirkeboen, Geir (University of Oslo); Vasaasen, Erik (University of Oslo); Teigen, Karl Halvor (University of Oslo)

Many decisions involve a time interval between a decision is made and the outcome is revealed. In this pre-outcome period one can often change one's mind. In three studies we explored participants' regret in the process of making such reversible decisions. The

outcomes were designed such that it was always possible to imagine a more profitable outcome. In all three studies those who actually changed their decision reported markedly stronger post-outcome regret, also when they achieved better outcomes, than those who did not change their mind. Changing your mind seems to have a cost even for positive outcomes.

Comparison Process at Retrieval (CPR): A memory theoretic account of relative judgment
Fan, Jeni (University of Oklahoma); Thomas, Rick (University of Oklahoma)

We present a model of judgment, Comparison Process at Retrieval (CPR), developed from a memory-theoretic perspective. CPR postulates that the referent in comparative judgment is formed at the time of judgment through a cued-recall process. The model accommodates existing theories and findings that emphasize the effects of ecological structure on judgment. CPR predicts, however, that judgment can be dissociated from ecological structure due to memory retrieval dynamics operating at the time of judgment. We empirically verify some of the model's novel predictions and discuss the importance of merging memory theory with research in judgment and choice.

2009 SJDM Conference
POSTER TITLES LISTED BY SESSION
 (abstracts are available at www.sjdm.org)

Session #1 w/ Continental Breakfast (Sunday, 8:30- 10:30am, Hynes Convention Center, 3rd level, Ballrooms A, B, C; attached to Sheraton through walkway)

- (1) *Your feeling vs. mine: The cognitive meanings of emotion matter*
 Wang, Long (Northwestern University); Murnighan, J Keith (Northwestern University)
- (2) *Losing a dime with a satisfied mind: Positive affect accounts for age-related differences in sequential decision making*
 von Helversen, Bettina (University of Basel); Mata, Rui (Stanford University)
- (3) *The role of affect in predicting support for climate change initiatives*
 Hart, Philip S. (Cornell University); Stedman, Richard (Cornell University); McComas, Katherine (Cornell University)
- (4) *Money, pleasure and pain: How is risky choice affected by what is at stake?*
 Pachur, Thorsten (University of Basel, Cognitive and Decision Sciences); Hertwig, Ralph (University of Basel, Cognitive and Decision Sciences)
- (5) *Positive Affect, Intertemporal Choice, and Levels of Thinking: Increasing Consumers' Willingness to Wait*
 Pyone, Jin Seok (Cornell University); Isen, Alice M. (Cornell University)
- (6) *The Credit Card Effect on Consumption and Saving*
 Schneider, Mark (U Conn); Schneider, Jeffrey (Duke University)
- (7) *Social values and affective motivations for cooperation: The psychological costs of inequity*
 Dickert, Stephan (Max Planck Institute for Collective Goods, Bonn); Beckenkamp, Martin (Max Planck Institute for Collective Goods, Bonn)
- (8) *Lateralized Message Framing*
 McCormick, Michael (The University of North Carolina at Greensboro); McElroy, Todd (Appalachian State University); Seta, John J. (The University of North Carolina at Greensboro)
- (9) *Take the best or take the emotionally best? The role of affective information on non compensatory choice*
 Trujillo, Carlos A. (Universidad de los Andes, School of Management)
- (10) *Expanding Beyond the Foundations of Decision Making: Perceived Differences in the Value of Resources*
 Ramirez, Patrick A. (University of Texas at Arlington); Levine, Daniel S. (University of Texas at Arlington)
- (11) *Does Green Really Help Being Green? The Role of Color in Processing Fluency*
 Seo, Joon Yong (University of Utah)
- (12) *The Link Between Early Visual Processing and the Endowment Effect: Evidence from Event-Related Potentials (ERP)*
 Ashby, Nathaniel J. S. (University of Oregon); Dickert, Stephan (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods); McCollough, Andrew (University of Oregon); Vogel, Edward K. (University of Oregon)
- (13) *Don't say no, just drop the ball: Managing reputation and relationships amidst competing demands*
 Juillerat, Tina (University of North Carolina)
- (14) *Everybody Remain Calm: How Anxiety Makes All Advice Look Like Good Advice*
 Gino, Francesca (University of North Carolina); Wood, Alison (Wharton School); Schweitzer, Maurice (Wharton School)
- (15) *Will you regret making me nervous? How stressful job interviews impact applicant truthfulness.*
 Kay, Virginia (UNC Chapel Hill); Gino, Francesca (UNC Chapel Hill)
- (16) *To broaden, or not to broaden: That is the question*
 Easwar, Karthikeya (The Ohio State Univ)
- (17) *Mood Effects on Comparative Judgment*
 Smarandescu, Laura (Iowa State University); Laczniak, Russell (Iowa State University); Rose, Randall (University of South

Carolina)

(18) Organizational Neuroscience: Shaping the Decision Landscape

Becker, William J (University of Arizona); Cropanzano, Russell (University of Arizona)

(19) Is luck predictive of decision making?

Burns, Bruce D. (University of Sydney); So, Emily (University of Sydney)

(20) If it worked for me it will work for everybody: Egocentrism in evaluating techniques and treatments

Bruchmann, Kathryn I. G. (University of Iowa); Windschitl, Paul D. (University of Iowa); Lee, Seon (University of Iowa); McEvoy, Sean (Yale University School of Medicine)

(21) Prescriptive lay beliefs about the "how" of judgment and decision making

Huber, Michaela (University of Colorado, Boulder); Park, Bernadette (University of Colorado, Boulder); Van Boven, Leaf (University of Colorado, Boulder)

(22) Emotion and risk: Gambling bets vs. people bets

Connolly, Terry (U of Arizona); Ordonez, Lisa (U of Arizona); Kugler, Tamar (U of Arizona)

(23) Affect and motivational forces underlying charitable behavior: Psychophysiological data

Vastfjall, Daniel (Decision Research); Peters, Ellen (Decision Research); Slovic, Paul (Decision Research)

(24) The Scope of Time: Insensitivity to the Magnitude of Future (but not Past) Harms

Tennant, Raegan J. (Chicago Booth); Caruso, Eugene M. (Chicago Booth)

(25) The effects of observation and intervention on the judgment of causal and correlational relationships

Kelley, Amanda M. (US Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory); Athy, Jeremy R. (US Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory)

(26) Causal structure in quasi-realistic risky decision situations

Baer, Arlette S. (University of Fribourg, Department of Psychology); Huber, Odilo, W. (University of Fribourg, Department of Psychology); Huber, Oswald (University of Fribourg, Department of Psychology)

(27) Terrorism, dread risk, and bicycle accidents

Ayton, Peter (City University, London); Murray, Samantha (City University, London); Hampton, James (City University, London)

(28) Fear and Loathing in Hollywood

Rosoff, Heather (University of Southern California, CREATE); John, Richard (University of Southern California, Dept of Psychology)

(29) Difference in Effective Feedback to Improve Risk Understanding in Driving between Ages

Inaba, Midori (University of Electro-Communications); Tanaka, Kenji (University of Electro-Communications)

(30) The Boundaries of Loss Aversion in Decisions under Risk

Ert, Eyal (Harvard); Erev, Ido (Technion)

(31) Preference Reversal in Risky Choices under Time Pressure

Saqib, Najam (Ryerson University); Chan, Eugene (University of Toronto)

(32) Piecing together effort decisions: Results from a field experiment

Liu, Heidi (Harvard University); Goette, Lorenz (University of Geneva)

(33) Experience Trajectories: How are risk strategies different when doing well or poorly?

Decker, Nathaniel K. (University of South Florida); Schneider, Sandra L. (University of South Florida)

(34) Using virtual environments to tailor persuasive appeals: The role of gains and losses given prior decisions to seek or avoid risk

Christensen, John (University of Southern California); Miller, Lynn Carol (University of Southern California); Appleby, Paul Robert (University of Southern California); Read, Stephen J. (University of Southern California); Corsbie-Massay, Charisse (University of Southern California)

(35) The social values analysis of understanding self-other differences in decision making

Choi, YoonSun (Brandeis University); Stone, Eric R. (Wake Forest University)

(36) *The bracketing breakdown: When and how problem and outcome framing mediates risk tolerance*

Moher, Ester (University of Waterloo); Koehler, Derek J. (University of Waterloo)

(37) *Mood and Reward Sensitivity in Children, Adolescents, and Adults: A Fuzzy-Trace Theory Approach*

Estrada, Steven M. (Cornell University); Reyna, Valerie F. (Cornell University); Mills, Britain A. (UT Houston School of Public Health); Pardo, Seth T. (Cornell University)

(38) *The role of expertise in the risk assessment of dynamic weather information*

Fu, Wai-Tat (University of Illinois); Park, Heewoong (University of Illinois)

(39) *Actuarial Risk Assessment, Risk Communication and Involuntary Civil Commitment Decisions*

Scurich, Nicholas (University of Southern California)

(40) *How to Increase the Effectiveness of Health Risk Communication: Effects of Psychological Distance and Message Framing*

Lee, Yun (University of Iowa)

(41) *Longitudinal Effects of Media Messages on Risk Assessments of, Attitudes towards, and Behaviors Combating Climate Change*

Bristow, R. Evan (Miami University); Johnson, Joseph G. (Miami University)

(42) *Lay Perceptions of Energy Consumption*

Attari, Shahzeen Z. (Columbia University); DeKay, Michael L. (Ohio State University); Davidson, Cliff I. (Carnegie Mellon University); Bruine de Bruin, Wandi (Carnegie Mellon University)

(43) *Risk Preferences in Surrogate Decision Making*

Colby, Helen (Rutgers University); Chapman, Gretchen (Rutgers University)

(44) *Do the Disposition and House Money Effects Coexist? The differential impact of realized and unrealized gains and losses*

Yao, Songyao (Leeds University Business School); Duxbury, Darren (Leeds University Business School); Hudson, Robert (Newcastle University Business School); Kevin, Kevin (Leeds University Business School)

(45) *How Intermediate Options Reduce the Endowment Effect*

Paolacci, Gabriele (University of Venice); Burson, Katherine (University of Michigan)

(46) *Effect of Face-to-Face Interactions on Choice: The Role of Expressiveness*

Liu, Maggie Wenjing (University of Toronto)

(47) *A theory of self-control conflict: The pyrrhic motions of reason and passion*

Wollbrant, Conny (University of Gothenburg); Myrseth, Kristian (ESMT European School of Management and Technology)

(48) *Unintended consequences of fundraising tactics*

Chance, Zoe (Harvard Business School); Norton, Michael (Harvard Business School)

(49) *Context Theory: A Procedural Approach to Individual Choice*

Schneider, Mark (U Conn)

(50) *The Influence of Attitude Strength on Consideration Set Size: Strong Liking Results in Smaller Consideration Sets*

Sinha, Jayati (University of Iowa); Nayakankuppam, Dhananjay (University of Iowa); Priester, Joseph R. (University of southern California)

(51) *I am what I do, not what I have: The centrality of experiential purchases to the self-concept*

Carter, Travis J (The University of Chicago Booth School of Business); Gilovich, Thomas (Cornell University)

(52) *Can regulatory orientation explain when the "too much choice" effect occurs?*

Hoffrage, Ulrich (Université de Lausanne); Hafenbraedl, Sebastian (Université de Lausanne)

(53) *Does perceived competency affect consistency?*

Hafenbraedl, Sebastian (Université de Lausanne); Hoffrage, Ulrich (Université de Lausanne)

(54) *Consumer Choice Modeling via TOPSIS*

Bhatt, Suresh K. (University of Manitoba); Bhatnagar, Namita (University of Manitoba); Appadoo, S. S. (University of Manitoba)

(55) *Categorical Thinking and Individuals' Willingness to Pay for Combinations of Items in Different Price Tiers*

Brough, Aaron R. (Kellogg, Northwestern University); Chernev, Alexander (Kellogg, Northwestern University)

(56) The Illusion of InAccuracy: When Preferences for Process are Ignored

Amit, Adi (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem); Sagiv, Lilach (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

(57) The Effect of Choice Overload and Individual Differences on the Enjoyment of Decision-making

Susa, Kyle J. (University of Texas at El Paso); Morales, Robert (University of Texas at El Paso); Morera, Osvaldo (University of Texas at El Paso)

(58) False past experiences can shape current preferences

Wudarczywski, Amanda (University of Waterloo); Mantonakis, Antonia (Brock University); Clifasefi, Seema L. (University of Washington); Bernstein, Daniel M. (Kwantlen Polytechnic University); Loftus, Elizabeth F. (University of California, Irvine)

(59) Opportunity Cost Neglect and Consideration: The Role of Constraints

Spiller, Stephen A. (Duke University)

(60) The Effects of Regulatory Fit with a Goal and With a Goal-Object Benefit on Purchase Decisions

Brown, Vincent (University of London)

(61) Communicating statistics: The interpretation of common language effect sizes

Nolan, Kevin P. (Bowling Green State University); Dalal, Dev K. (Bowling Green State University); Brooks, Margaret E. (Bowling Green State University); Yankelevich, Maya (Bowling Green State University)

(62) Naturals and Strivers: Quantifying the Costs of Preferences and Beliefs About Sources of Achievement

Tsay, Chia-Jung (Harvard University); Banaji, Mahzarin (Harvard University)

(63) Is What You Feel What They See? The Relationship between Fluency and Identity Signaling

Matherly, Ted (University of Maryland); Pocheptsova, Anastasiya (University of Maryland)

(64) The Big Cost of Small Problems

Brigden, Neil (University of Alberta); Haubl, Gerald (University of Alberta)

(65) Does a larger coupon feel more valuable? How Medium Size Affects Perceived Value

Yang, Adelle (Shanghai Jiaotong University); Hsee, Christopher (University of Chicago Booth School of Business)

(66) Predicting inferences and confidence in inferences: Recognition heuristic vs. its new rival, mean-variance model

Simonyan, Yveta (London Business School); Goldstein, Daniel G. (London Business School)

(67) Subgoals Promote Monetary Savings Behavior

Colby, Helen (Rutgers University); Chapman, Gretchen (Rutgers University)

(68) Culture and Dynamic Decision Making: Testing a Model in Five Countries

Güss, C. Dominik (University of North Florida); Tuason, M. Teresa (University of North Florida); Desrosier, Rebecca (University of North Florida)

(69) Earthly sins and heavenly rewards: The effect of religious beliefs on end-of-life decisions

Ward, Adrian F. (Harvard University); Wegner, Daniel M. (Harvard University)

(70) Do East-Asians and Westerners Think Alike? Evidence from Probability Judgment

Wu, Shali (Chicago Booth); Wu, George (Chicago Booth); Keysar, Boaz (University of Chicago)

(71) Discussion of Shared and Unshared Information in Decision Making Groups: A Cultural Perspective

Feng, Y. N. (The University of Leeds); Bown, N. J. (The University of Leeds); Allinson, C. W. (The University of Leeds); Maule, A. J. (The University of Leeds)

(72) The Norm of Self-Sacrifice

Sachdeva, Sonya (Northwestern University); Iliev, Rumen (Northwestern University); Medin, Douglas (Northwestern University)

(73) Cheaters Never Win? Affective Consequences of Unethical Behavior

Nicole Ruedy (University of Pennsylvania); Maurice Schweitzer (University of Pennsylvania)

(74) When Cash Matters: The Effect of Fungibility on Honesty

Smith, Joshua (The Ohio State University); Nygren, Thomas (The Ohio State University)

(75) *Finding balance on the moral scale: The effect of forgiveness on dishonest behavior*

Ayal, Shahar (Duke University); Dan Ariely (Duke University)

(76) *Dishonest Deed, Clear Conscience: Self-Preservation through Moral Disengagement and Motivated Forgetting*

Shu, Lisa (Harvard University); Bazerman, Max (Harvard University)

(77) *Preferences for Equality vs. Efficiency*

Carabelli, Evan (University of Pennsylvania); Dana, Jason (University of Pennsylvania)

(78) *The Effect of Attribute Framing on Justice Judgments*

Gamliel, Eyal (Ruppin Academic Center); Peer, Eyal (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

(79) *Influences on the Ethical Reasoning of Tax Practitioners: Preliminary Results on Profile, Context and Socialisation*

Doyle, Elaine (Kemmy Business School, University of Limerick); Frecknall Hughes, Jane (The Open University Business School); Summers, Barbara (Leeds University Business School)

(80) *The Repugnance Effect: Money and Moral Transgressions*

Atanasov, Pavel (University of Pennsylvania); Jayawickreme, Eranda (University of Pennsylvania)

(81) *Cheap saints or blatant sinners? The cost of lying for (almost) nothing*

Shalvi, Shaul (University of Amsterdam); Handgraaf, Michel J. J. (University of Amsterdam); de Dreu, Carsten K.W. (University of Amsterdam)

(82) *Telling tales: The effect of narrative creation on decision-making with data*

Krumme, Coco (MIT)

(83) *Cascades Under Identical Information Endowment and Localized Communication: An Experimental Study*

Mak, Vincent (Cambridge); Zwick, Rami (University of California, Riverside)

(84) *The Effects of Mastery on Subjective Utility*

Scopelliti, Irene (Bocconi University); Loewenstein, George (Carnegie Mellon University)

(85) *Sex Differences in the Effects of Anger on Financial Risk-Taking*

Litvak, Paul M. (Carnegie Mellon University); Lerner, Jennifer S. (Harvard University)

(86) *It's more money that I have, but I have to go one more: Risky decision making in: 'Deal or No Deal'*

Laroque, Ninekema (University of North Florida); Desrosier, Rebecca (University of North Florida); Güss, C. Dominik (University of North Florida)

(87) *Effects of Identity on Surgical Risk-Taking: Attitudes, Risk Perceptions and Intentions*

Pardo, Seth T. (Cornell University); Reyna, Valerie F. (Cornell University)

(88) *Understanding How Mental Accounting Guides Choices Between Work and Home*

Paddock, E. Layne (Singapore Management University); Rothbard, Nancy (University of Pennsylvania)

(89) *The Influence of Goals on Dynamic Decision Making*

Weinhardt, Justin (Ohio University); Vancouver, Jeff (Ohio University); Gonzalez Vallejo, Claudia (Ohio University); Harman, Jason (Ohio University)

(90) *When Small Steps Become a Big Leap: Illusory Goal Progress in Sequential Choice*

Chernev, Alexander (Northwestern University); Bonezzi, Andrea (Northwestern University)

(91) *Thinking of others' behavior makes you more generous: The imaginary peer effect*

Wang, Yitong (University of California, Irvine); Keller, L. Robin (University of California, Irvine)

(92) *Executive functions at work: The impact of Individual Differences in Cognitive Control on Managerial Decision-Making*

Laureiro Martinez, Daniella (Bocconi University); Brusoni, Stefano (Bocconi University); Canessa, Nicola (San Raffaele University); Cappa, Stefano (San Raffaele University); Zollo, Maurizio (Bocconi University); Alemanno, Federica

(93) *The Effect of Group Deliberation on the Endowment Effect*

Blumenthal, Jeremy A. (Syracuse University College of Law)

(94) Social Acceptance Reduces Egocentric Perception of Fairness in Resource Allocation

Zhang, Liqing (Peking University); Baumeister, Roy (Florida State University)

(95) Punishment of Groups for the Actions of Group Members

Sorenson, Clare M. (The Ohio State University)

(96) Resisting the Temptation to Retaliate: Self-Control in Overcoming Barriers to Cooperation

Sheldon, Oliver J (University of Chicago); Fishbach, Ayelet (University of Chicago)

(97) Escalation of commitment and valuation

Ting, Hsuchi (University of Maryland, College Park); Wallsten, Thomas (University of Maryland, College Park)

(98) Clutch performance and clutch illusion

Barkan, Rachel (Glazer School of Business, Ben-Gurion University); Solomonov, Yosef (Glazer School of Business, Ben-Gurion University); Ariely, Dan (Fuqua School of Business, Duke University)

(99) We-intentions: Explanatory models

Mari, Silvia (University of Milano-Bicocca); Capozza, Dora (University of Padova); Bagozzi, Richard P. (University of Michigan)

(100) Political Decision Making

McCormick, Michael (The University of North Carolina at Greensboro); Seta, John J. (The University of North Carolina at Greensboro); McElroy, Todd (Appalachian State University)

(101) You are What We Eat: Normative Influences on Individual Eating Behavior

Hunger, Jeffrey M. (California State University-Fullerton); Howland, Maryhope (University of Minnesota); Mann, Traci L. (University of Minnesota)

(102) Individual Differences and Susceptibility to Context Effects in an Organizational Recruitment Setting

Diab, Dalia L. (Bowling Green State University); Alexander, Katherine N. (Bowling Green State University); Daniels, Michael A. (Bowling Green State University); Pui, Shuang-Yueh (Bowling Green State University); Brooks, Margaret E. (Bowling Green State University)

(103) Effects of Imperfect Information and Risk on Job Choice Behavior of Indecisives and Maximizers

Daniels, Michael A. (Bowling Green State University); Pui, Shuang-Yueh (Bowling Green State University); Diab, Dalia L. (Bowling Green State University); Alexander, Katherine N. (Bowling Green State University); Brooks, Margaret E. (Bowling Green State University)

(104) The Effect of Multiple Views and Perspective Taking on Social Tuning

Skorinko, Jeanine (WPI); DiGiovanni, Craig (WPI); Whitchurch, Erin (University of Virginia); Sinclair, Stacey (University of Virginia)

(105) Me and You vs. The World: The Effects of Affiliative Motivation and Group Membership on Social Tuning

Spear, Sarah (WPI); Selkow, Maia (St. Olaf's College); Skorinko, Jeanine (WPI); Lun, Janetta (University of Maryland); Sinclair, Stacey (Princeton University)

(106) Information distortion in self-other decision making

Polman, Evan (Cornell University)

(107) Querying the Group Mind: Applying Query Theory to Group Discussions

Smith, Juliana A. (Columbia University); Weber, Elke U. (Columbia University)

(108) Influence of Social Norms and Transition Zones on Decision Making in Dyads

Mukherjee, Moumita (University of South Florida); Decker, Nathaniel K. (University of South Florida); Schneider, Sandra L. (University of South Florida)

(109) Social Influence Processes in Group Decision Errors

Tindale, R. Scott (Loyola University Chicago); Starkel, Rebecca (Loyola University Chicago); Jacobs, Elizabeth (Loyola University Chicago)

(110) Reasoning: Good decisions or justifiable decisions?

Mercier, Hugo (University of Pennsylvania)

(111) Take This Advice And Shove It: When And Why We Discount Advice

Gino, Francesca (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill); Moore, Don (Carnegie Mellon University)

(112) Expertise, Confidence, Cheap Talk and Persuasion

Sah, Sunita (Carnegie Mellon University); Moore, Don (Carnegie Mellon University); MacCoun, Robert (University of California, Berkeley)

(113) Two to Tango: The Effect of Collaborative Experience and Disagreement on Individual and Joint Estimates

Minson, Julia A. (Stanford University); Liberman, Varda (IDC, Herzliya, Israel); Ross, Lee (Stanford University)

(114) Multiple Biases: Plausibility and evidence for independent and additive effects

Babad, Elisha (Hebrew University of Jerusalem); Peer, Eyal (Hebrew University of Jerusalem); Benayoun, Yehonatan (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

(115) Group process decision making in informal groups

Kozlowski, Cathy (University of Phoenix)

(116) Modeling College Withdrawal Decisions

Pleskac, Timothy J. (Michigan State University); Keeney, Jessica (Michigan State University); Merritt, Stephanie M. (University of Missouri - St. Louis); Schmitt, Neal (Michigan State University); Oswald, Frederick L. (Rice University)

(117) Using very inaccurate experts to improve performance

Sutherland, Steven (Southern Illinois University at Carbondale); Young, Michael (Southern Illinois University at Carbondale)

(118) The Decision Making Styles Inventory: Analysis of factor structure and factorial invariance

White, Rebecca (University of Chicago); Nygren, Thomas (Ohio State University)

(119) My Loss Versus Your Gain: The Effects of Attribution and Individual Differences

Rim, Hye Bin (Ohio State University); Nygren, Thomas E. (Ohio State University)

(120) Time Perception and Strength of Handedness

Westfall, Jonathan E. (Columbia University); Jasper, J.D. (The University of Toledo)

(121) Leadership Decision Making

Lerner, Jennifer S. (Harvard University); Inbar, Yoel (Harvard University); Teplitz, Paul (Harvard University); Kustoff, Jessica J. (Harvard University); Litvak, Paul M. (Carnegie Mellon)

(122) The Sunk Cost Fallacy and Decision Making Styles

Fernandez, Norma P. (University of Texas at El Paso); Morera, Osvaldo F. (University of Texas at El Paso); Guillen-Gomez, Laura (University of Texas at El Paso)

(123) An Examination of Real-World Predictions from Experience or Description

Lester, Houston F. (Auburn University); Cullen, Kristin L. (Auburn University); Franco-Watkins, Ana M. (Auburn University); Svyantek, Daniel J. (Auburn University)

(124) For the love of the game: Motivation for pathological gambling

Fortune, Erica E. (UGA); Goodie, Adam S. (UGA)

Session #2 with Cash Bar (Sunday, 5:00 - 7:00pm, Hynes Convention Center, 3rd level, Ballrooms A, B, C; attached to Sheraton through walkway)

(1) The Misery-is-not-Miserly Effect in Intertemporal Choice

Gandhi, Viral J. (Harvard University); Lerner, Jennifer S. (Harvard University); Weber, Elke U. (Columbia University)

(2) Neural and behavioral correlates of value for lone anticipated rewards exhibit steeper delay discounting than binary preferences predict

Monterosso, John (University of Southern California); Luo, Shan (University of Southern California); Ainslie, George (Coatesville VA Medical Center)

(3) Predicting Health-Related Risk Behaviors with Delay Discounting and Time Perspective Measures

Daugherty, James R. (Kansas State University); Brase, Gary L. (Kansas State University)

(4) *Leveraging a theory of slack: How resource scarcity affects borrowing behavior*

Shah, Anuj K. (Princeton University); Shafir, Eldar (Princeton University); Mullainathan, Sendhil (Harvard University)

(5) *When waiting increases weapon efficacy: A video game to study delay discounting*

Young, Michael (Southern Illinois U. at Carbondale); Webb, Tara (Southern Illinois U. at Carbondale); Jacobs, Eric (Southern Illinois U. at Carbondale)

(6) *Owing it to yourself: Testing a duty-based argument for retirement saving*

Bryan, Christopher J. (Stanford University); Ersner-Hershfield, Hal (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University); Ross, Lee (Stanford University)

(7) *Do individual differences in working memory affect delay discounting decisions?*

Acuff, Roy (Auburn University); Franco-Watkins, Ana (Auburn University); Mattson, Richard (Auburn University)

(8) *The Long View: Measuring discount rates at large delays and across domains*

Thompson, Katherine J. (Columbia University); Hardisty, David J. (Columbia University); Weber, Elke U. (Columbia University)

(9) *Instant Wins versus Sweepstakes: Attitudes toward Delayed Promotions*

Laurent, Gilles (HEC); Prokopec, Sonja (ESSEC); Onculer, Ayse (ESSEC)

(10) *Temporal Focalism*

Chan, Steven (New York University); Kruger, Justin (New York University)

(11) *Ambiguity Aversion in Risk and Delay*

Weber, Bethany (Iowa State University); Tan, Wah Pheow (Temasek Polytechnic)

(12) *Is Time Money? Decision making across time and money*

Sussman, Abigail B. (Princeton University); Shafir, Eldar B. (Princeton University)

(13) *Everyday time travel: The effect of tense on judgment*

Kane, Joanne (Princeton University); Van Boven, Leaf (University of Colorado, Boulder); McGraw, A. Peter (University of Colorado, Boulder)

(14) *Temporal Distance and Intentions toward Socially (Un)Desirable Behaviors*

Choi, Soe Yoon (Rutgers University); Park, Hee Sun (Michigan State University)

(15) *Educating drivers on the time saving bias reduces likelihood of speeding*

Peer, Eyal (Hebrew University of Jerusalem); Gamliel, Eyal (Ruppin Academic Center); Babad, Elisha (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

(16) *It's the Thought that Will Count: Future Behavior is Seen as More Intentional than Past Behavior*

Burns, Zachary C. (Chicago Booth); Bartels, Daniel M. (Chicago Booth); Caruso, Eugene M. (Chicago Booth)

(17) *The Effect of Age in Decision Making*

Qian, Jing (Columbia University); Johnson, Eric (Columbia University); Weber, Elke (Columbia University)

(18) *The rules of aging: Aging favors rule-based processing in categorization and multiple-cue judgment*

Mata, Rui (Stanford University); von Helversen, Bettina (University of Basel); Karlsson, Linnea (Max Planck Institute Human Development)

(19) *Optimistic Predictions in a Gambler's Fallacy Task: Comparing Children and Adults*

Bossard, Elaine A. (University of Iowa); Levin, Irwin P. (University of Iowa); Hart, Stephanie S. (University of Houston - Clear Lake)

(20) *Cognitive adaptations for resource search: Explaining hot hands and fallacious gamblers*

Wilke, Andreas (Department of Psychology, Clarkson University); Barrett, H. Clark (UCLA Anthropology); Todd, Peter M. (Cognitive Science Program, Indiana University)

(21) *Examining Adolescent Sexual Risk Taking from a Decision Making Perspective*

Young, Diana L. (University of Georgia); Goodie, Adam S. (University of Georgia)

(22) *Exploring possible connections between adolescents' epistemological understandings, argumentation and decision making skills*

Iordanou, Kalypso (University of Cyprus); Constantinou, Constantinos (University of Cyprus)

(23) *Deep rationality, behavioral economics, and mating decisions*

Kenrick, Douglas T. (Arizona State University); Li, Yexin Jessica (Arizona State University); Li, Norman P. (Singapore Management University); Sundie, Jill M. (University of Houston & University of Texas at San Antonio)

(24) *Sequential decision mechanisms in human mate choice*

Todd, Peter M. (Indiana University); Beckage, Nicole (Indiana University)

(25) *How humans cognitively manage too much mate choice*

Lenton, Alison P. (University of Edinburgh); Francesconi, Marco (University of Essex)

(26) *Let's get serious: Communicating commitment in romantic relationships*

Ackerman, Joshua M. (Massachusetts Institute of Technology); Griskevicius, Vladas (University of Minnesota); Li, Norman P. (Singapore Management University)

(27) *Humans copy social information in mate choice decisions*

Place, Skyler S (Indiana University); Todd, Peter M (Indiana University); Penke, Lars (University of Edinburgh); Asendorpf, Jens B (Humbolt University of Berlin)

(28) *Exploring the influence of pictographic representations of statistical information*

Hulsey, Lukas (Wichita State University); Shaffer, Victoria A. (Wichita State University)

(29) *Are Pictures the Voice of Numbers in a Medical Decision Making Task?*

Kelades, Joshua (Acadia University); McLeod, Peter J. (Acadia University); Mehta, Rick (Acadia University)

(30) *Effect of false positive screening results and psychosocial factors on compliance with repeat lung cancer screening*

Byrne, Margaret (University of Miami); Llabre, Maria (University of Miami); Weissfeld, Joel (University of Pittsburgh); Roberts, Mark (University of Pittsburgh)

(31) *The impact of expertise level in judgment analysis: A comparison between Fast and Frugal and Logistic Regression models*

Kerimi, Neda (Stockholm University); Backlund, Lars (Karolinska Institute); Skaner, Ylva (Karolinska Institute); Strender, Lars-Erik (Karolinska Institute); Montgomery, Henry (Stockholm University)

(32) *The Effect of Testimonials in Patient Decision Aids: The Role of Numeracy, Literacy and Decision Making Style*

Shaffer, Victoria A. (Wichita State University); Templin, Sara (University of Georgia); Hulsey, Lukas (Wichita State University); Barr, Amanda (Wichita State University)

(33) *Predicting Clinical Outcomes the Fast and Frugal Way*

Jenny, Mirjam (University of Basel); Pachur, Thorsten (University of Basel)

(34) *Laypeople's Views on Decision Making in the Health Professions*

de Oliveira, Stephanie (The Ohio State University); Arkes, Hal (The Ohio State University)

(35) *Accuracy of Various Algorithms for Diagnosing from a Disease by Finding Sensitivity Matrix*

Hamm, Robert M. (University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center); Golmoradi, Kiamars R. (University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center); Wolfe, Timothy A. (University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center); Magrill, Talia B. (University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center); Papa, Frank J. (University of North Texas College of Osteopathic Medicine)

(36) *A Natural History Model to Estimate the Potential Impact of Human Papillomavirus Vaccination to Reduce Cervical Cancer Disparities between US Females*

Sanon, Myrlene (i3 Innovus); Taylor, Douglas (i3 Innovus); Kruzikas, Denise (GlaxoSmithKline); Pawar, Vivek (i3 Innovus); Gilmore, Kristen (i3 Innovus); Weinstein, Milton

(37) *Integrating Context in Clinical Thinking: Themes and Categories Activated During the Patient Encounter*

Devantier, Sarah L. (the University of Western Ontario); Minda, John Paul (the University of Western Ontario); Haddara, Wael (the Schulich School of Medicine & Dentistry); Goldszmidt, Mark (the Schulich School of Medicine & Dentistry)

(38) *Pictures Speak Louder than Numbers: On Communicating Risks to Non-Native Language Speakers*

Garcia-Retamero, Rocio (University of Granada); Dhami, Mandeep K. (University of Cambridge); Galesic, Mirta (Max Planck Institute for Human Development)

(39) *One decision at a time or the whole path at once? When the way information is provided affects prostate cancer decision making*

Gavaruzzi, Teresa (DPSS, University of Padova); Zikmund-Fisher, Brian (VA; Division General Internal Medicine; CBDSM, Ann Arbor, MI); Ubel, Peter (VA; Division General Internal Medicine; CBDSM, Ann Arbor, MI); Lotto, Lorella (DPSS, University of Padova); Fagerlin, Angela (VA; Division General Internal Medicine; CBDSM, Ann Arbor, MI)

(40) *A Memory Theoretic Account of Information Search: Effects of Base Rates and Sampling Biases*

Lange, Nick D. (University of Oklahoma); Thomas, Rick P. (University of Oklahoma); Dougherty, Michael R. (University of Maryland)

(41) *An Examination of Individual Differences in Working Memory Capacity Effects on the Encoding and Retrieval of Information under Cognitive Load*

Montano, Michael J. (Auburn University); Franco-Watkins, Ana M. (Auburn University)

(42) *An Examination of Individual Differences in Working Memory Capacity Effects on the Encoding and Retrieval of Information under Cognitive Load*

Montano, Michael J. (Auburn University); Franco-Watkins, Ana M. (Auburn University)

(43) *The ecological rationality of betting on speed of retrieval in memory-based decision making*

Gaissmaier, Wolfgang (Max-Planck-Institute for Human Development); Schooler, Lael J. (Max-Planck-Institute for Human Development); Marewski, Julian N. (Max-Planck-Institute for Human Development)

(44) *The Relations Among the Iowa Gambling Task, Real-World Decision Outcomes and Working Memory*

Furl, Brent (Wake Forest University); Jennings, Janine M. (Wake Forest University); Stone, Eric R. (Wake Forest University)

(45) *Optimal Foraging in Semantic Memory*

Hills, Thomas (University of Basel); Todd, Peter (Indiana University); Jones, Michael (Indiana University)

(46) *Experience-based decisions and paired distinctiveness of rare events*

Haberstroh, Susanne (University of Osnabrück, Germany); Oeberst, Aileen (University of Osnabrück, Germany)

(47) *The Roar of the Crowd: Narrative Richness and Hindsight Bias*

Kausel, Edgar E. (University of Arizona); Connolly, Terry (University of Arizona); Birk, Sam (University of Arizona)

(48) *Of Lines and Bounds: The Role of Casuistry and Case-Based Reasoning in Optimizing and Non-Optimizing Decision Frameworks*

Searing, Elizabeth A.M. (Georgia State University)

(49) *Multiple aspiration levels in decision under risk*

Diecidue, Enrico (INSEAD)

(50) *Risk Auctions: Novel Mechanisms for Eliciting Risk Aversion Coefficients and the Impact of Probability vs. Money Framing*

Olivola, Christopher Y. (University College London); Wang, Stephanie W. (California Institute of Technology)

(51) *Revisiting the Gains-Loss Separability Assumption in Prospect Theory*

Por, Han-Hui (Fordham University); Budescu, David V. (Fordham University)

(52) *Levels of Theory-of-Mind Reasoning in Competitive Games*

Goodie, Adam S. (University of Georgia); Doshi, Prashant (University of Georgia); Young, Diana L. (University of Georgia)

(53) *Visual Attention In Mixed Gambles: Process Data and Choice Behavior*

Jarnebrant, Peter (Columbia Business School); Johnson, Eric J. (Columbia Business School)

(54) *Predecisional Distortion in Multiple Domains of Risky Choice*

Miller, Seth A. (The Ohio State University); DeKay, Michael L. (The Ohio State University)

(55) *A Computational Model to Incorporate Non-commensurate Choice Options*

Koop, Greg J. (Miami University); Bristow, R. Evan (Miami University); Thomas, Robin D. (Miami University); Johnson, Joseph G. (Miami University)

(56) *Impact of evidence format on judgments of probability and verdict: Accounting for the "Wells Effect"*

Shoots-Reinhard, Brittany (The Ohio State University); Arkes, Hal (The Ohio State University); Mayes, Ryan (The Ohio State University)

(57) *Soundness conditions for prescriptive decision analysis*

Wallace, Richard J. (University College Cork); Ashikhmin, Ilya (Institute for Systems Analysis)

(58) *Decision Analysis by Proxy for the Rational Terrorist*

John, Richard (University of Southern California, Dept of Psychology); Rosoff, Heather (University of Southern California, CREATE)

(59) *Response time methodology for testing between stochastic models of decision making*

Fific, Mario (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Rieskamp, Jörg (University of Basel)

(60) *Selfish Social Connectors, Their Decisions to Bridge Social Actors and Build Network Connections*

Anik, Lalin (Harvard Business School); Norton, Michael I. (Harvard Business School)

(61) *Imagining a Crowd Within*

Yeomans, Mike (University of Chicago); Soll, Jack (Duke University); Koehler, Derek (University of Waterloo)

(62) *Comparing estimation strategies in real-world environments*

Woike, Jan Kristian (University of Lausanne); Hertwig, Ralph (University of Basle); Hoffrage, Ulrich (University of Lausanne)

(63) *Do we underestimate the validity of linear expert models?*

Kaufmann, Esther (University of Mannheim); Wittmann, Werner W. (University of Mannheim)

(64) *Improving Estimation Accuracy through Sequential Adjustment*

Luan, Shenghua (Singapore Management University)

(65) *Modeling Decision Making and Cognitive Performance in the Dynamic Stock-Flow Task*

Ghaffarzadegan, Navid (University at Albany - SUNY); Vakili, Keyvan (Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto)

(66) *Descriptions, Experiences, and Memories: The Effects of Presentation and Representation on Choice*

Koop, Gregory (Miami University); Johnson, Joseph G. (Miami University)

(67) *Modeling Threshold Learning with Incomplete Feedback*

Ghaffarzadegan, Navid (University at Albany (SUNY)); Stewart, Thomas R. (University at Albany (SUNY))

(68) *The 'side-effect' effect, intentionality judgments, and motivated cognition*

Fernandez-Duque, Diego (Villanova U.); del Rio, Victoria (Villanova U.); Kurti, Allison (Villanova U.); Hughes, Matthew (Villanova U.); Todd, Allison (Villanova U.)

(69) *Forming Consistent Stories During Decision Making by Reinterpreting or Discounting Evidence: An Agent-Based Model*

Chen, Lydia L. (University of Michigan)

(70) *The Complexities of Selective Information Exposure*

Scherer, A.M. (University of Iowa); Windschitl, P.D. (University of Iowa); Smith, A.R. (University of Iowa); Rose, J.P. (University of Iowa)

(71) *Relational Accounting and Social Motives in Negotiation*

Bottom, William (Washington University); Mislin, Alexandra (University at Buffalo, State University of New York); Boumgarden, Peter (Washington University)

(72) *I am not angry with you, I am disappointed: The interpersonal effects of anger and disappointment in bargaining*

Lelieveld, Gert-Jan (Leiden University); Van Dijk, Eric (Leiden University); Van Beest, Ilja (Leiden University); Van Kleef, Gerben A. (University of Amsterdam); Steinel, Wolfgang (Leiden University)

(73) *Can Nervous Nelly Negotiate? How Anxiety Causes Negotiators to Exit Early and Make Steep Concessions*

Wood, Alison (Wharton); Schweitzer, Maurice (Wharton)

(74) *Is emphasizing losses (vs. gains) better in negotiations with multiple issues?*

Appelt, Kirstin C. (Columbia University); Higgins, E. Tory (Columbia University)

(75) *Gamer Show Experiences in Non-cooperative Bargaining*

Szanto, Richard (Corvinus University of Budapest)

(76) *You'd better think?! The influences of breaks and social motivation on negotiation behavior and outcomes*
Harinck, Fieke (Leiden University); De Dreu, Carsten K.W. (University of Amsterdam)

(77) *Strategic negotiation behaviors, self-inference, and the perception of negotiation outcomes*
Swift, Samuel A. (Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University)

(78) *Distinct neural correlates for the processing of magnitude, probability and uncertainty of potential monetary gains and losses*
Canessa, Nicola (Universita' Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Milan, Italy); Chierchia, Gabriele (Universita' Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Milan, Italy); Motterlini, Matteo (Universita' Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Milan, Italy); Baud-Bovy, Gabriel (Universita' Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Milan, Italy); Cappa, Stefano (Universita' Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Milan, Italy)

(79) *An fMRI Study of Ecological Rationality: Group Size, Kinship, Group Composition and Risky Choice*
Wang, X.T. (University of South Dakota); Zheng, Hongming (Chinese Academy of Sciences); Zhu, Liqi (Chinese Academy of Sciences)

(80) *Individual Differences in Social Comparison and Decision Making*
Corser, Ryan (University of Toledo); Jasper, J.D. (University of Toledo); Rose, Jason (University of Toledo)

(81) *Policy Bundling to Overcome Loss Aversion: A Method for Improving Legislative Outcomes*
Milkman, Katherine L. (Wharton); Mazza, Mary Carol (Harvard Business School); Shu, Lisa L. (Harvard Business School); Tsay, Chia-Jung (Harvard Business School); Bazerman, Max H. (Harvard Business School)

(82) *Biases Present in State Standard Setting Methods*
Templin, Sara (University of Alabama)

(83) *Axing the Taxman: The Psychology of Tax Aversion*
Sussman, Abigail B. (Princeton University); Olivola, Christopher Y. (University College London)

(84) *Likelihood Judgment and Other Regarding Behavior*
Peterson, Nathaniel (Carnegie Mellon University); Weber, Roberto (Carnegie Mellon University)

(85) *Time Horizons in Interdependent Security*
Hardisty, David (Columbia University); Kunreuther, Howard (University of Pennsylvania); Krantz, David (Columbia University); Arora, Poonam (Columbia University)

(86) *The joint effect of description and experience*
Erev, Ido (Technion); Ert, Eyal (Harvard)

(87) *On the decision to explore*
Weiss, Kinnert (Technion); Erev, Ido (Technion)

(88) *Just How Comparative Are Comparative Judgments?*
Radzevick, Joseph R. (Carnegie Mellon University); Moore, Don A. (Carnegie Mellon University)

(89) *Out of Sight, Out of Mind: On the Irrational Side of Egocentrism in Social Comparisons*
Chan, Steven (New York University); Chambers, John R. (University of Florida); Kruger, Justin (New York University)

(90) *Nonselective Optimism and Pessimism among Professional Traders and Stock Market Analysts*
Klar, Yechiel (Tel Aviv University); Pollack, Yael (Tel Aviv University)

(91) *The Role of Mental Representation in Experienced-based Choice*
Camilieri, Adrian R. (UNSW); Newell, Ben R. (UNSW)

(92) *One man's trash is another man's treasure: Context dependency in decision making under risk*
Ungemach, Christoph (University of Warwick); Stewart, Neil (University of Warwick)

(93) *Misperception of randomness decreases prediction accuracy*
Scheibehenne, Benjamin (Indiana University); Wilke, Andreas (Konrad Lorenz Institut); Todd, Peter M. (Indiana University)

(94) *Conditions leading to biases in favor of self-selected hypotheses*
Whitman, Jennifer C. (University of British Columbia); Woodward, Todd S. (University of British Columbia)

- (95) *Testing Different Accounts of Insensitivity to Answer Diagnosticity*
Rusconi, Patrice (University of Milan-Bicocca); McKenzie, Craig R. M. (University of California, San Diego)
- (96) *Deconfounding recognition and recall in random sequence generation*
Heyman, James (University of St. Thomas); Zelubowski, James (University of St. Thomas)
- (97) *Not the base rate, but the imbalanced structure that matters*
Hattori, Masasi (Ritsumeikan University); Nishida, Yutaka (Osaka University)
- (98) *Strategies for Co-variation judgments*
Gilkey, Justin M. (Bowling Green State University); Anderson, Richard B. (Bowling Green State University)
- (99) *Assessing Joint Distributions via Isoprobability Contours*
Marcus, James C. (Fordham University); Budescu, David V. (Fordham University); Abbas, Ali A. (University of Illinois)
- (100) *Encounter frequency in the small number range*
Obrecht, Natalie A. (Rutgers University); Chapman, Gretchen B. (Rutgers University)
- (101) *Subjective Integration of Probabilistic Information from Description and from Experience*
Shlom, Yaron (University of Maryland)
- (102) *Do subjects maximize gain in search? Comparison of visual and nonvisual sequential decision making tasks*
Pedersini, Riccardo (Harvard Medical School & Brigham and Women's Hospital); Morvan, Camille (New York University); Maloney, Laurence T. (New York University); Horowitz, Todd S. (Harvard Medical School & Brigham and Women's Hospital); Wolfe, Jeremy M. (Harvard Medical School & Brigham and Women's Hospital)
- (103) *Probability weighting in risky choice: Affect and probability format*
Suter, Renata (University of Basel); Pachur, Thorsten (University of Basel); Hertwig, Ralph (University of Basel)
- (104) *Curiosity killed the cat, but what did it do to dissonance? Seeking counterfactual information*
Summerville, Amy (Miami University)
- (105) *Regret in interpersonal and self contexts: US-Japan comparison*
Komiya, Asuka (Kyoto University); Watabe, Motoki (Waseda University); Miyamoto, Yuri (University of Wisconsin Madison); Kusumi, Takashi (Kyoto University)
- (106) *Modeling foregone payoffs in a sequential choice task*
Frey, Renato (University of Basel); Rieskamp, Jörg (University of Basel)
- (107) *The role of feedback-induced anticipated regret in avoiding subsequent risks*
Burson, Katherine A. (University of Michigan); Larrick, Richard P. (Duke University); Stornelli, Jason A. (University of Michigan); Witmer, Megan E. (University of Michigan)
- (108) *I choose certainty for me and uncertainty for you: the role of responsibility aversion in self/other framing*
Leonhardt, James (University of California, Irvine)
- (109) *Looking Forward to Not Looking Back: The Role of Anticipated Regret in Work-family Conflict*
Reb, Jochen (Singapore Management University); Bagger, Jessica (Sacramento State University)
- (110) *Egocentric predictions about other people's emotional states: When we don't project our own emotional experiences to others.*
Kudo, Eriko (Tokyo Woman's Christian University)
- (111) *Continuous vs. binary: On the compensatory strategies of judgments*
Zhao, Jiaying (Princeton University); Oppenheimer, Daniel (Princeton University)
- (112) *My preference may not be my decision: Post-decisional dissonance and framing*
Corbin, Jonathan (Appalachian State University); McElroy, Todd (Appalachian State University); Smith, Stephanie (Appalachian State University)
- (113) *Parsing the cognitive stream: Partitioning of events as a factor in judgments under uncertainty*
Brase, Gary L. (Kansas State University)

(114) *Misleading communication and biased evaluation of probabilities: The case of the ratio bias*

Macchi, Laura (University of Milan); Bagassi, Maria (University of Milan); Passerini, Gabriella (University of Milan); D'Addario, Marco (University of Milan); Sala, Valentina (University of Milan)

(115) *Effects of Competition and Uncertain Evaluation on Performance*

Hartzler, Beth (Bowling Green State University); Anderson, Richard (Bowling Green State University)

(116) *Detecting varieties of cheating: An evolutionary algorithm or deliberate relevance seeking*

Ayal, Shahar (Duke University); Klar, Yechiel (Tel Aviv University)

(117) *Elements of Trust: Cost, benefit, and backward induction*

Evans, Anthony (Brown University); Joachim Krueger (Brown University)

(118) *Does competition foster trust? The role of tournament incentives*

Keck, Steffen (INSEAD, Decision Science Area); Karelaia, Natalia (INSEAD, Decision Science Area)

(119) *Influences of Personality and Situation on Behavior in Economic Games*

Hoffmann, Mareike (University of Erfurt); Rockenbach, Bettina (University of Erfurt); Betsch, Tilmann (University of Erfurt)

(120) *More Pain Less Gain: Social Preferences in the Allocation of Bads*

Davis, Alexander (Carnegie Mellon University); Miller, John (Carnegie Mellon University); Weber, Roberto (Carnegie Mellon University)

(121) *The effects of flood experience, perceptions and trust on flood protection purchase*

Soane, Emma (London School of Economics); Schubert, Iljana (London School of Economics); Challenor, Peter (University of Southampton); Lunn, Rebecca (University of Strathclyde); Narendran, Sunitha (Kingston University); Pollard, Simon. Cranfield University

(122) *Disclosure drive: Understanding when and why people disclose private information*

John, Leslie (Carnegie Mellon University); Loewenstein, George (Carnegie Mellon University); Acquisti, Alessandro (Carnegie Mellon University)

2009 SJDM Conference
POSTER ABSTRACTS LISTED BY SESSION
(abstracts are available at www.sjdm.org)

Session #1 w/ Continental Breakfast (Sunday, 8:30- 10:30am, Hynes Convention Center, 3rd level, Ballrooms A, B, C; attached to Sheraton through walkway)

(1) Your feeling vs. mine: The cognitive meanings of emotion matter

Wang, Long (Northwestern University); Murnighan, J Keith (Northwestern University)

Emotion and cognition are typically viewed as two entities that separately influence each other (Schwarz & Clore, 1996). We argue that people actually have cognitive meanings embedded in their emotions. Thus, rather than separately influencing cognitive processes (Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; Forgas, 1995), emotion is actually intertwined with cognition. A set of three studies investigated how different meanings of the same type of emotion can affect people's decision making. Our results showed that not only the emotion itself, but also its meanings had an impact on participants' preferences and confidence for their next decision task.

(2) Losing a dime with a satisfied mind: Positive affect accounts for age-related differences in sequential decision making
von Helversen, Bettina (University of Basel); Mata, Rui (Stanford University)

Many choices are made sequentially: choosing Jobs or partners we need to decide to take or reject an option without knowing what the future would bring. In this paper we investigated age effects in a sequential choice task. Older adults performed worse than younger adults, but were equally satisfied and reported even more positive affect. The differences in performance seemed to be due to older adults searching less before accepting a comparatively good offer than younger adults. However, this age effect was mediated by positive mood suggesting that in sequential choice increased positive affect may negatively affect performance.

(3) The role of affect in predicting support for climate change initiatives

Hart, Philip S. (Cornell University); Stedman, Richard (Cornell University); McComas, Katherine (Cornell University)

In response to global climate change, universities have initiated climate change action plans to reduce their carbon footprint. Some plans include projects that may impact surrounding communities. This study uses a mail survey of 2,000 residents near a major New York university to determine how affective responses to climate change, renewable energy, and proposed projects influence community support for project implementation. We focus on the effects of valence and discrete emotions, finding that both play a significant role in predicting community support for the proposed policies.

(4) Money, pleasure and pain: How is risky choice affected by what is at stake?

Pachur, Thorsten (University of Basel, Cognitive and Decision Sciences); Hertwig, Ralph (University of Basel, Cognitive and Decision Sciences)

Participants showed systematic within-individual preference reversals between monetary and non-monetary (e.g., side effects) lottery problems. Fitting prospect theory to both types of choices resulted in a more pronounced weighting function for nonmonetary outcomes, as has previously been suggested. However, two heuristics that ignore probabilities (minimax and the affect heuristic) predicted choices among non-monetary options as well as prospect theory. Evidence from a process tracing experiment also supports probability neglect rather than integration of distorted probabilities and outcomes. Finally, we find no evidence that the difference in people's choices is due to the stronger affect elicited by the non-monetary outcomes.

(5) Positive Affect, Intertemporal Choice, and Levels of Thinking: Increasing Consumers' Willingness to Wait

Pyone, Jin Seok (Cornell University); Isen, Alice M. (Cornell University)

Six studies examined the influence of induced positive affect on consumers' willingness to wait for rewards. Two studies showed that participants in positive affect were more likely than those in neutral affect to choose a mail-in rebate for a larger amount of money over a smaller instant rebate, but only when the reward differences were moderate (not small). Two showed that positive-affect participants do not discount the value of delayed (versus immediate) outcomes as much as controls do (i.e., they show less "present bias"). And two studies examined possible cognitive processes underlying this effect.

(6) The Credit Card Effect on Consumption and Saving

Schneider, Mark (U Conn); Schneider, Jeffrey (Duke University)

There is no explicit economic theory of payment mechanism. Classical economics implicitly assumes that "how you pay" should not affect "how much you pay." In this paper I argue, using theory and evidence from both classical and behavioral economics, that credit cards can have a marked effect on consumption and saving, relative to other payment instruments such as cash or

check. I conclude that the growth in the use of credit cards should be considered as part of the explanation for the recent U.S. consumption boom and the related two-decade decline in the U.S. personal saving rate.

(7) Social values and affective motivations for cooperation: The psychological costs of inequity

Dickert, Stephan (Max Planck Institute for Collective Goods, Bonn); Beckenkamp, Martin (Max Planck Institute for Collective Goods, Bonn)

Research on economic decisions has documented that rational and strategic considerations do not fully explain people's choice behaviour. Emotional reactions to unfair offers are an integral part of perceptions of fairness and constitute part of the psychological costs of inequity. We investigated the roles of social value orientation and anticipated emotions in people's willingness to cooperate in a prisoner's dilemma game. Participants' choices were predicted by their social value orientation, their belief about their partner's choice and anticipated happiness over an equal split of the payoffs. Participants with pro-social (vs. pro-self) value orientations reported greater psychological costs of inequity.

(8) Lateralized Message Framing

McCormick, Michael (The University of North Carolina at Greensboro); McElroy, Todd (Appalachian State University); Seta, John J. (The University of North Carolina at Greensboro)

While research has shown that the left hemisphere is more sensitive to positive information and the right hemisphere is more sensitive to negative information, the extent to which relative hemispheric activation affects the persuasiveness of framed health messages remains unclear. As predicted, when participants were presented with a sunscreen vignette, activation of the left hemisphere resulted in relatively higher behavioral intentions for positively framed messages, while activation of the right hemisphere resulted in marginally higher behavioral intentions for negatively framed messages. These results are discussed in terms of prevention/detection behaviors and the valence hypothesis of hemispheric activation.

(9) Take the best or take the emotionally best? The role of affective information on non compensatory choice

Trujillo, Carlos A. (Universidad de los Andes, School of Management)

Integral affect can be consonant or dissonant with cognitive information of decision targets. This research explores how people solve this cognitive/affective dissonance. Using non compensatory models: Take the best (TTB), Take the emotionally best (TEEB) and combinations of these, it is shown that both TTB and TTEB are good predictors of binary choices, if information and affect are consonant. When there is cognitive/affective dissonance or when decisions are complex, TTEB and a combined model, where TTEB precedes TTB, better predict participant's choices. The combined model (TTEB-TTB) achieves higher discrimination of decision alternatives than the purely affective model (TTEB).

(10) Expanding Beyond the Foundations of Decision Making: Perceived Differences in the Value of Resources

Ramirez, Patrick A. (University of Texas at Arlington); Levine, Daniel S. (University of Texas at Arlington)

A study used 45 volunteers to examine how affect contributes to perceived value of resources. Traditionally, decision researchers assume all resources have the same value. We tested that assumption by comparing responses on two analogous sunk-cost tasks in a within-participant design. One task simulated maintenance of a business; the other simulated maintenance of a pet. A significant difference was found between the tasks on affective self-report. No difference was found on the time participants invest; this may be a ceiling effect because there were only 200 trials. Currently we are testing whether more trials would lead to an investment difference.

(11) Does Green Really Help Being Green? The Role of Color in Processing Fluency

Seo, Joon Yong (University of Utah)

This research examines the role that color plays in the subjective ease with which stimuli can be processed and demonstrates that judgments of the target information are partly based on the conceptual relatedness between the target information and background color. Experiment 1 shows that a green (vs. yellow) background results in more favorable evaluations of recycling tips. Experiment 2 demonstrates that this effect is driven by processing fluency and that the fluency experience is largely affective in nature. Experiment 3 rules out a regulatory fit account and shows that enhanced processing fluency influences attitudes toward the natural environment.

(12) The Link Between Early Visual Processing and the Endowment Effect: Evidence from Event-Related Potentials (ERP)

Ashby, Nathaniel J. S. (University of Oregon); Dickert, Stephan (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods); McCollough, Andrew (University of Oregon); Vogel, Edward K. (University of Oregon)

A growing body of research suggests that there are strong links between early visual attention, working memory, and later assessments of value. We hypothesize that early visual encoding, storage, and processing of consumer good images is predictive of later monetary valuations of those items. We explore the link between early visual working memory using an established

component known as the contra-lateral delay activity (CDA) with the endowment effect using EEG event-related potentials (ERP). Our results support a model in which early visual processing is modulated by one's reference point (e.g., buyer or seller) and predictive of the WTA/WTP disparity.

(13) Don't say no, just drop the ball: Managing reputation and relationships amidst competing demands
Juillerat, Tina (University of North Carolina)

We are asked for help frequently, often find it difficult to say no, and thus agree to provide help in many undesirable situations. Two experiments examined whether targets of help requests can decline them without hurting their reputations and relationships, as well as how such costs may vary as a function of alternative response strategies and target characteristics. Results indicated that declining to help is often harmful to reputation and relationships. In contrast, initially agreeing to help but then failing to deliver is less harmful to one's image in many situations, particularly when targets have high status or unique expertise.

(14) Everybody Remain Calm: How Anxiety Makes All Advice Look Like Good Advice
Gino, Francesca (University of North Carolina); Wood, Alison (Wharton School); Schweitzer, Maurice (Wharton School)

Is any advice good advice? Across two experiments, we demonstrated that incidental anxiety reduces individuals' ability to discriminate between poor and good advice. We found that people who felt incidental anxiety experienced less self-efficacy and, as a result, were more receptive to advice than were people in a neutral emotional state. Furthermore, people who felt incidental anxiety were more accurate in their judgments than were people in a neutral state when the advice was of good quality. But when the advice was of poor quality, people who felt incidental anxiety were less accurate than were people in a neutral state.

(15) Will you regret making me nervous? How stressful job interviews impact applicant truthfulness.
Kay, Virginia (UNC Chapel Hill); Gino, Francesca (UNC Chapel Hill)

To understand how stressful job interviews affect applicant truthfulness, we are exploring whether job candidates in anxiety-inducing interviews misrepresent their qualifications or whether they provide accurate information to the hiring organization. Participants in our laboratory study receive a description of the job for which they are applying before they undergo either a high- or baseline-anxiety interview. We are testing how interview condition relates to truthfulness by examining (a) decisions to cheat on an assessment of job qualifications outlined in the vacancy notice and (b) decisions to submit a personality assessment skewed towards the description of an ideal candidate.

(16) To broaden, or not to broaden: That is the question
Easwar, Karthikeya (The Ohio State Univ)

Many goals are broken down into smaller, more actionable subgoals. These goal hierarchies impact both the behavioral and affective aspects of goal attainment. Broadening of scope from subordinate to superordinate goals can affect the perception of and affective reactions to failure and success. In an initial study, it is hypothesized that those who fail at a subgoal will use scope broadening to minimize the affective impact of failure, while those who succeed will have no need for this defense mechanism. A second study examines the positive affect reducing effect that forced scope expansion has on those who experience goal success.

(17) Mood Effects on Comparative Judgment
Smarandescu, Laura (Iowa State University); Lacznik, Russell (Iowa State University); Rose, Randall (University of South Carolina)

This research investigates the processes that explain the influence of affect on comparative and non-comparative judgment by comparing the predictions made by the two affective models: mood congruence and affect-as-information model. We find that when presented with a comparative frame individuals scoring high on advertising skepticism were more likely to correct for the perceived effect of the mood on attitudes toward the brand, in line with the affect-as-information model. In contrast, the brand attitudes of individuals scoring low on advertising skepticism followed the direction of the mood induced, consistent with the mood congruence model.

(18) Organizational Neuroscience: Shaping the Decision Landscape
Becker, William J (University of Arizona); Cropanzano, Russell (University of Arizona)

This presentation explores how neuroscience is likely to influence decision making and organizational behavior. We argue that there are two fundamental applications of neuroscience to decision theory. The first, and most obvious, seeks to understand neural mechanisms behind decision making itself. The second, and more subtle, explores how neural processing shapes the decision making landscape. We contend at least three important neural substrates (emotion, moral reasoning, and mirror neurons) play unique roles in these processes. We also address a number of deeper, meta-theoretical questions arising out of neuroscience

and conclude that neuroscience offers powerful new tools that complement traditional research.

(19) Is luck predictive of decision making?

Burns, Bruce D. (University of Sydney); So, Emily (University of Sydney)

People often cite luck post hoc as a factor behind decisions but is luck predictive of decisions? We manipulated how lucky people felt by presenting them with a series of trials for which counterfactuals could be easily generated that reversed their success or failure. We compared these to participants given the same trials and patterns of success or failure, but for which counterfactuals were harder to generate. We found that the counterfactual manipulation increased how lucky people felt and their decisions about different future tasks. An understanding of luck may help explain differences in decision making between individuals and over time.

(20) If it worked for me it will work for everybody: Egocentrism in evaluating techniques and treatments

Bruchmann, Kathryn I. G. (University of Iowa); Windschitl, Paul D. (University of Iowa); Lee, Seon (University of Iowa); McEvoy, Sean (Yale University School of Medicine)

Participants received bogus feedback about their performances and a co-participant's performances on two rounds of a visual discrimination task. During the second round, a quirky audio clip was played. Participants were led to believe that their own performance had improved (or worsened), while their co-participant's performance did the exact opposite. Results showed that when recommending using the audio clip (or not) to peers completing a similar task, participants behaved egocentrically, weighting their own experience more heavily than the counter-information regarding their co-participant. Follow-up studies manipulating the magnitude of the score change and perceived difficulty of the task showed similar results.

(21) Prescriptive lay beliefs about the "how" of judgment and decision making

Huber, Michaela (University of Colorado, Boulder); Park, Bernadette (University of Colorado, Boulder); Van Boven, Leaf (University of Colorado, Boulder)

We present a new theoretical framework that systematically integrates variables that are known to moderate heuristic or systematic processing by proposing a common psychological mechanism. This framework proposes that people have prescriptive lay beliefs about how they think they should make decisions. The underlying psychological mechanism for many moderating variables suggests that people reason about prescriptive lay beliefs and they subsequently correct their judgments and decisions accordingly. Two studies show that people have different prescriptive lay beliefs depending on the decision domain (charitable giving versus romantic relationships) and that prescriptive lay beliefs influence the decision outcome.

(22) Emotion and risk: Gambling bets vs. people bets

Connolly, Terry (U of Arizona); Ordonez, Lisa (U of Arizona); Kugler, Tamar (U of Arizona)

We examined the effect of induced fear and induced anger on risk-taking in different decision tasks. Participants chose between either lotteries (Experiment 1) or strategies in a risky two-person decision (Experiment 2), both with substantial real-money outcomes. Fearful participants were more risk-averse than angry participants in Experiment 1, but less risk-averse in Experiment 2. Different negative emotions had different effects on risk-taking, and the direction of this effect is reversed for lottery risk and interactive risk. Uncertainty generated by the actions of another player thus appears to be treated quite differently from uncertainty generated by impersonal randomizing devices.

(23) Affect and motivational forces underlying charitable behavior: Psychophysiological data

Vastfjall, Daniel (Decision Research); Peters, Ellen (Decision Research); Slovic, Paul (Decision Research)

One hundred seven undergraduates made real donations to one, two or eight identified victims. Physiological measures (facial EMG indexing positive/negative affect and EDA indexing arousal) were measured for each type of victim. We find that donations decrease linearly with increasing number of victims. A similar main effect was obtained for Facial EMG activity indexing positive affect, where activity decreases linearly with increasing number of victims.

(24) The Scope of Time: Insensitivity to the Magnitude of Future (but not Past) Harms

Tennant, Raegan J. (Chicago Booth); Caruso, Eugene M. (Chicago Booth)

People's affective reactions can be more extreme for future events than for past ones (Van Boven & Ashworth, 2007), and such affective reactions often influence moral judgments (Haidt, 2001). Furthermore, research on scope sensitivity demonstrates that people are less sensitive to magnitudes for affect-rich (compared to affect-poor) stimuli (Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004). The present research shows that people are relatively less sensitive to the scope of immoral behavior when its consequences are in the future rather than the past. This finding suggests that future violations of moral rules may be judged harshly regardless of the magnitude of the consequences.

(25) The effects of observation and intervention on the judgment of causal and correlational relationships

Kelley, Amanda M. (US Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory); Athy, Jeremy R. (US Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory)

Causal judgment has been suggested as a two-stage process; heuristic stage and analytic stage. However, it is unclear how people integrate conflicting correlational and causal information. The present study evaluated detection and judgment of correlational and causal relationships using observation and intervention tasks. The results suggest that participants accurately detected correlational relationships. Observation task characteristics predicted final judgments better than intervention task characteristics. These results show that participants' causal judgments reflected the objective sample correlations in the observation tasks rather than the probabilities in the intervention tasks suggesting that people are more sensitive to objective correlations than underlying causal probabilities.

(26) Causal structure in quasi-realistic risky decision situations

Baer, Arlette S. (University of Fribourg, Department of Psychology); Huber, Odilo, W. (University of Fribourg, Department of Psychology); Huber, Oswald (University of Fribourg, Department of Psychology)

In quasi-realistic risky decisions, the mental representation of the alternatives is an elementary component of the decision process. We assume that alternatives are represented in form of a simple Mental Causal Model that contains at least an alternative and outcome, connected by a causal relation. The initial representation may be elaborated during the decision process by incorporating additional outcomes, Risk defusing operators or probabilities. We are interested in how different risky causal structures (positive or negative consequences risky) affect information search. 54 subjects decided in three scenarios. In each scenario, both alternatives had one of the different causal structures.

(27) Terrorism, dread risk, and bicycle accidents

Ayton, Peter (City University, London); Murray, Samantha (City University, London); Hampton, James (City University, London)

Su et al (2009) claim, contrary to Gigerenzer (2004; 2006), that car travel did not increase following the 9/11 attacks; moreover fatal traffic accidents only increased in the North East of the USA along with alcohol- or drug-related citations issued in connection with these accidents. Consequently these authors argue that involuntary stress, not volitional decisions mediated by dread risk, explains the increased traffic fatalities. We investigated the effects of the 2005 London tube bombings: underground travel decreased, simultaneously bicycle travel and bicycle accidents increased. We attribute this to dread risk; apparently some Londoners switched from underground travel to less-safe bicycles.

(28) Fear and Loathing in Hollywood

Rosoff, Heather (University of Southern California, CREATE); John, Richard (University of Southern California, Dept of Psychology)

We report on two studies of emotional, cognitive, and projected behavioral responses to a vivid, nearby terrorist attack. In study 1, we used a 2x2 repeated functional measurement design with four separate vignettes describing different dirty bomb attacks on well known locations in the Los Angeles area. In study 2 we investigated the effects of government response and public reaction following a terrorist attack on a passenger airplane using a shoulder fired missile (MANPAD). A 3X3 independent groups functional measurement design in which subjects read a vignette describing a terrorist MANPAD attack on an airplane in flight near LAX.

(29) Difference in Effective Feedback to Improve Risk Understanding in Driving between Ages

Inaba, Midori (University of Electro-Communications); Tanaka, Kenji (University of Electro-Communications)

This study examined effects of feedback techniques to improve the understanding the risks in driving for the elderly using a driving simulator. We compared data before and after the feedback of the risks in their own driving. For the feedback, video reviews of driving from the objective perspective were employed as well as explanation by numerical values and experiences of collision. Results indicated the difference in effective feedback techniques between ages. Along with the previous data, more emotional technique to show the risks may be effective for the risk understanding for the elderly drivers compared to the young drivers.

(30) The Boundaries of Loss Aversion in Decisions under Risk

Ert, Eyal (Harvard); Erev, Ido (Technion)

We review the experimental research of loss aversion in decisions under risk to clarify the mixed evidence associated with this assertion. While some studies suggested no evidence for loss aversion in one-shot choices among mixed gambles, other studies supported loss aversion. The apparent contradiction between the different studies is evaluated with new experiments. We find that the effect of losses increases when the experiment is long and boring (includes no feedback), the payoff magnitude is high,

and when the safer option is framed as the status quo. Theoretical implications are discussed.

(31) Preference Reversal in Risky Choices under Time Pressure

Saqib, Najam (Ryerson University); Chan, Eugene (University of Toronto)

We examine the possibility that, under time pressure, risk-seeking individuals adopt risk-averse behaviours whereas risk-averse individuals adopt risk-seeking ones. In Study 1, individuals with positive (negative) affect were risk-seeking (risk-averse) under no time pressure, but adopted risk-averse (risk-seeking) behaviours under time pressure. In Studies 2 and 3, we demonstrate with a real-life wagering task that the salience of negative information mediates the preference reversal. In Study 4, promotion- (prevention-) focused consumers preferred prevention- (promotion-) framed brands under time pressure. The four studies demonstrate that consequences of time pressure on risky choices in everyday decision-making.

(32) Piecing together effort decisions: Results from a field experiment

Liu, Heidi (Harvard University); Goette, Lorenz (University of Geneva)

This study examines reference-dependent preferences in labor supply as a function of previous earnings. Subjects participated in a two-day task totaling 6 hours, for which they were paid a piece rate. On the first day, subjects were guaranteed a minimum earning; the next day, they were paid a straight piece rate. We hypothesize that day 1's daily minimum affects the reference earnings on day 2. In addition, we measure subjects' risk aversion levels. We vary daily minimum wage and piece-rate in a 2x2 factorial design and test predictions from models of intertemporal substitution of labor and of reference-dependent labor supply.

(33) Experience Trajectories: How are risk strategies different when doing well or poorly?

Decker, Nathaniel K. (University of South Florida); Schneider, Sandra L. (University of South Florida)

Our previous research used simplified agent-based simulations to examine decision strategies for making a series of 36 two-outcome lottery decisions. In this presentation, we use these simulations to capture the exact decision context for each participant and then to analyze actual decisions to see which strategies best match participants' behavior. Participants were in one of three trajectory conditions: those who gain money over time, lose money over time, or vacillate about the same expected value. We investigated whether people's decision strategies focused on contingencies associated with the experience of winning/losing trial-by-trial or on changes in current wealth over time.

(34) Using virtual environments to tailor persuasive appeals: The role of gains and losses given prior decisions to seek or avoid risk

Christensen, John (University of Southern California); Miller, Lynn Carol (University of Southern California); Appleby, Paul Robert (University of Southern California); Read, Stephen J. (University of Southern California); Corsbie-Massay, Charisse (University of Southern California)

Reducing risky sexual decision-making is crucial in curbing HIV infection among men who have sex with men (MSM). However, it is unclear what message frames (i.e., gain, loss, none) should be incorporated into HIV-prevention behavioral interventions. In two studies, using an interactive virtual environment in which MSM made sexual decisions, we found that the most persuasive message frame for optimizing intentions to avoid real-life risk was dependent upon the choice (i.e., risky versus safe) made by the user immediately prior to receiving the persuasive appeal. Thus, tailoring framed messages to the user's choices provides a novel approach to risk reduction.

(35) The social values analysis of understanding self-other differences in decision making

Choi, YoonSun (Brandeis University); Stone, Eric R. (Wake Forest University)

Stone and Allgaier's (2008) social values analysis states that decisions for others often differ from decisions for oneself because the predominant value in a situation plays a greater role in decisions for others than for the self. We tested this account by manipulating perceived risk and convenience levels in public health scenarios and examined decisions for the self, decisions for others, and predictions of others' decisions. As predicted, we found that convenience matters less for decisions for others than for decisions for the self and predictions of others' decisions. In contrast, risk had no differential effect on the decision conditions.

(36) The bracketing breakdown: When and how problem and outcome framing mediates risk tolerance

Moher, Ester (University of Waterloo); Koehler, Derek J. (University of Waterloo)

Previous research has shown that broad bracketing of decision problems enhances risk tolerance. Such bracketing manipulations typically confound bracketing of presented decision problems with bracketing of their outcomes. Using variations of the Gneezy & Potters (1997) task, we show that for repeated identical decisions, it is the broad problem framing rather than the outcome framing that enhances risk tolerance. For nonidentical decisions, by contrast, it is outcome framing rather than problem framing that influences risk tolerance. These results suggest that bracketing may attenuate loss aversion prospectively in the case of

identical decisions but retrospectively in the case of nonidentical decisions.

(37) Mood and Reward Sensitivity in Children, Adolescents, and Adults: A Fuzzy-Trace Theory Approach

Estrada, Steven M. (Cornell University); Reyna, Valerie F. (Cornell University); Mills, Britain A. (UT Houston School of Public Health); Pardo, Seth T. (Cornell University)

Recent theories propose that adolescents demonstrate increased sensitivity to reward (relative to children and adults), producing risk-taking. However, under controlled conditions of choice between sure and gamble options in both gain and loss frames, risk-taking declined with age. As reward increased, children took more risks, but adolescents and adults took fewer risks. Gender differences were observed only for children; males were more risk seeking. In addition, positive mood increased gist-based intuition for all groups, whereas negative mood increased verbatim-based analysis.

(38) The role of expertise in the risk assessment of dynamic weather information

Fu, Wai-Tat (University of Illinois); Park, Heewoong (University of Illinois)

Novice and expert pilots participated in an experiment designed to understand risk assessments in dynamic environments. Results showed that experts made more “no-go” decisions than novices. Novices made more “go” decisions than experts only when inconsistencies were found between machine- and human-generated as well as specific and general reports. Time-based lag-sequential analysis showed that experts would more likely spend more time on a few “key” reports and their decisions influenced by these reports; but novices tended to spend equal amount of time among the reports, and their decisions were found to be more influenced by recency of the information acquired.

(39) Actuarial Risk Assessment, Risk Communication and Involuntary Civil Commitment Decisions

Scurich, Nicholas (University of Southern California)

Research on how actuarial risk assessment results are to be communicated and what effect they have on decision makers has received scarce empirical attention. Using a 2X3 factorial design, this experiment found that decision-makers are sensitive to differential risk probabilities, but that the decision for commitment largely depends on how the risk probability is framed. A derivative of Support Theory (Tversky & Koehler, 1994) is used to explain this violation of extensionality. Contrary to public opinion surveys, analyses of base rate assumptions indicate that decisions makers do not have unrealistic perceptions of mental disorder and violence.

(40) How to Increase the Effectiveness of Health Risk Communication: Effects of Psychological Distance and Message Framing

Lee, Yun (University of Iowa)

What types of appeals are effective to increase the persuasiveness of loss- versus gain-framed health messages? Two experiments address this question by examining the influence of psychological distance on evaluations of loss- versus gain-framed health messages. The results reveal that when the message is loss-framed, participants with high (vs. low) perceived risk prefer how-laden appeals -- an effect that is driven by the negative consequences anticipated from increased uncertainty -- than why-laden appeals. When the message is gain-framed, however, why-laden messages become more appealing for participants with low (vs. high) perceived risk -- an effect that is driven by the positive consequences anticipated from decreased uncertainty.

(41) Longitudinal Effects of Media Messages on Risk Assessments of, Attitudes towards, and Behaviors Combating Climate Change

Bristow, R. Evan (Miami University); Johnson, Joseph G. (Miami University)

Many judgments and decisions in real-world circumstances involve high degrees of risk and uncertainty. Climate change has the potential to affect life worldwide, yet the nature and degree of these effects remains uncertain. Eighty-four participants indicated their attitudes and perceptions in regard to climate change, as well as their propensity to engage in “green” behaviors. These measures were taken both before and after watching videos either supportive or skeptical of climate change. We found significant pre-post differences in our measures, and an interaction with video stance; however, only the effects on attitudes of the skeptical video remained after two weeks.

(42) Lay Perceptions of Energy Consumption

Attari, Shahzeen Z. (Columbia University); DeKay, Michael L. (Ohio State University); Davidson, Cliff I. (Carnegie Mellon University); Bruine de Bruin, Wandl (Carnegie Mellon University)

In a national online survey, 505 participants rated their perceived energy consumption for household, transportation, and recycling behaviors. When asked for the most effective thing they could do to conserve energy, most participants mentioned curtailment rather than efficiency, in contrast to experts’ recommendations. Participants underestimated energy use by a factor of 2.75, with more accurate perceptions among those with pro-environmental attitudes and higher numeracy. Participants also overestimated consumption for low-energy behaviors and underestimated consumption for high-energy behaviors. Behaviors

were rated easy to implement, suggesting behavior change is possible if people learn which behaviors are effective.

(43) Risk Preferences in Surrogate Decision Making

Colby, Helen (Rutgers University); Chapman, Gretchen (Rutgers University)

191 Rutgers University undergraduates read one of three versions of a scenario in which they had to invest an inheritance for themselves, their half-sister, or their grandmother. Subjects then had to make 12 choices between low-risk low-return investments and high-risk high-return investments with four levels of variance and three levels of mean return difference. Subjects were significantly more risk averse when investing for their half sister or grandmother than when investing for themselves. This contradicts previous findings in other domains.

(44) Do the Disposition and House Money Effects Coexist? The differential impact of realized and unrealized gains and losses

Yao, Songyao (Leeds University Business School); Duxbury, Darren (Leeds University Business School); Hudson, Robert (Newcastle University Business School); Kevin, Kevin (Leeds University Business School)

Using data from a stock brokerage, we investigate the impact of prior outcomes on risk taking behavior. We find evidence of the disposition and house money effects contemporaneously coexisting in a single stock market and that a substantial proportion of investors simultaneously exhibit both types of behavior. In differentiating the two effects it is important to distinguish between prior outcomes along two dimensions: whether they relate to unrealized or realized outcomes and whether they have been assessed at the individual stock or the aggregate portfolio level. We also find that the house money effect mediates the disposition effect.

(45) How Intermediate Options Reduce the Endowment Effect

Paolacci, Gabriele (University of Venice); Burson, Katherine (University of Michigan)

Research has shown that the endowment effect is reduced when the tradeoffs between the endowment and an alternative are small. We show that the endowment effect can also be reduced for options with large tradeoffs by presenting an intermediate option. We induce a reference-point shift by merely presenting an intermediate option to participants. Whether or not participants trade their endowment for this intermediate option, their likelihood of accepting the large tradeoff is significantly increased by its presence. We suggest that the intermediate option is mentally adopted, thereby shifting the reference point toward the more extreme option and increasing its attractiveness.

(46) Effect of Face-to-Face Interactions on Choice: The Role of Expressiveness

Liu, Maggie Wenjing (University of Toronto)

This paper examines the role of facial expressiveness on consumer choices in face-to-face versus other types of interactions. Four experiments (three lab experiments and one field study) showed that consumers were more likely to comply with requests under face-to-face interactions than other forms of interactions due to anticipated facial feedback. The basic effect of the paper can be moderated with situational factors such as attention-to-face, the expressiveness, timeliness, and consistency of facial expressions. The paper also showed that anticipated facial feedback, rather than real facial feedback, is the driver of the effect of face-to-face interactions on consumer choices.

(47) A theory of self-control conflict: The pyrrhic motions of reason and passion

Wollbrant, Conny (University of Gothenburg); Myrseth, Kristian (ESMT European School of Management and Technology)

We model self-control conflict as a struggle between an agent and a conflicting visceral influence. Our model examines the joint role of three factors in determining goal pursuit in the face of temptation: (1) goal payoff, (2) temptation strength, and (3) willpower. Our model predicts that the agent's effort in resisting temptation initially rises with the strength of temptation, reaching a maximum, and eventually drops to zero. If the agent underestimates the influence on behavior of anticipated temptation, she will exaggerate the expected value of trying to resist temptation and, therefore, forego pre-commitment when she would have benefited from it.

(48) Unintended consequences of fundraising tactics

Chance, Zoe (Harvard Business School); Norton, Michael (Harvard Business School)

Fundraisers employ various methods to increase donations, commonly using matching funds, seed money, and thank you gifts. Field experiments have shown that matching funds and seed money do increase donations during the time of the fund drive. But few studies have examined the long-term results of any fundraising tactics. In our laboratory experiments, we study the impact in future periods of using seed money, matching funds, and thank you gifts to increase giving in the present period, finding that certain levels of all these commonly used "sweeteners" can decrease giving in the long term.

(49) Context Theory: A Procedural Approach to Individual Choice
Schneider, Mark (U Conn)

We develop a choice-based framework called context theory, which draws from the literatures on dual-system models, procedural models, and similarity relations. Our framework introduces two decision algorithms: The context-outcome heuristic chooses based on similarity relations over contexts and outcomes. The choice-simplicity heuristic selects the option that simplifies the decision process. We identify when each heuristic is likely to be used, and we characterize the corresponding boundary conditions on rational behavior. Context theory explains notable anomalies for decisions under risk, over time, and between products. The evidence suggests that human choices are often based more on similarity judgments than optimization principles.

(50) The Influence of Attitude Strength on Consideration Set Size: Strong Liking Results in Smaller Consideration Sets
Sinha, Jayati (University of Iowa); Nayakankuppam, Dhananjay (University of Iowa); Priester, Joseph R. (University of southern California)

This paper hypothesizes and finds support for the notion that attitude strength guides consideration set inclusion and choice by influencing consideration set size. Three experiments provide support for the idea. In first study participants in the high elaboration-likelihood conditions report smaller consideration set sizes than those in the low-elaboration likelihood condition. The second study provides further evidence that strongly liked alternatives are more likely to be associated with smaller consideration sets than weakly liked alternatives. Third study provides support for the search truncation idea i.e., the attitude strength associated with a retrieved alternative serves as a signal for search truncation.

(51) I am what I do, not what I have: The centrality of experiential purchases to the self-concept
Carter, Travis J (The University of Chicago Booth School of Business); Gilovich, Thomas (Cornell University)

The present research explores one reason why experiential purchases tend to be more satisfying than material possessions (Van Boven & Gilovich, 2003). With support from three studies, we argue that, because experiences persist primarily as memories, they become more a part of our selves than possessions. They are less easily undone or mentally exchanged, as doing so would involve deleting a part of the self. Compared with possessions, people see their experiential purchases as closer to their self-concept, and as a bigger part of their life narrative. These identity concerns mediated the difference in satisfaction between material and experiential purchases.

(52) Can regulatory orientation explain when the “too much choice” effect occurs?
Hoffrage, Ulrich (Université de Lausanne); Hafenbraedl, Sebastian (Université de Lausanne)

According to Higgins (1997), regulatory orientation (promotion focus: ensure hits vs. prevention focus: ensure correct rejections), and manner of engagement in a task, together determine regulatory fit. In this experiment, participants chose from large choice-sets, which implies a manner of engagement that is more compatible with a promotion than with a prevention focus. As a consequence, when faced with large choice sets, people with a prevention focus should experience low regulatory fit. We tested whether such low regulatory fit leads to lower level of engagement and task-enjoyment and therefore to more choice deferral and less satisfaction.

(53) Does perceived competency affect consistency?
Hafenbraedl, Sebastian (Université de Lausanne); Hoffrage, Ulrich (Université de Lausanne)

If someone acts rationally and has consistent preferences then (s)he tends to perceive him/herself as being competent. We wondered whether the causal direction can be reversed: Does high self-perception of competence lead to rational behavior and consistent preferences? In two studies, we manipulated perceived competence in a music rating task. In Study 1, we operationalized consistency of preferences as the proportion of intransitivities, and in Study 2, as the retest reliability of elicited preferences. To the extent that it is important for people like managers or consumers to be transitive and consistent, our results have practical implications.

(54) Consumer Choice Modeling via TOPSIS
Bhatt, Suresh K. (University of Manitoba); Bhatnagar, Namita (University of Manitoba); Appadoo, S. S. (University of Manitoba)

Multi-attribute decision-making models are often employed for assessing consumer brand preferences. We empirically contrast Hwang and Yoon's (1981) Technique for Order Performance by Similarity to Ideal Solution methodology from the field of decision sciences and Fishbein's (1963) Multi-Attribute Attitude Model (MAAM) that is widely used in marketing. MAAM assesses brand preferences by combining attribute belief ratings with their importance weights. With TOPSIS, attribute belief ratings are used for calculating brand valuations based on distances from positive and negative ideal solutions. Rank reversals via the two techniques are observed. The advantages of TOPSIS over other brand choice models are then discussed.

(55) Categorical Thinking and Individuals' Willingness to Pay for Combinations of Items in Different Price Tiers
Brough, Aaron R. (Kellogg, Northwestern University); Chernev, Alexander (Kellogg, Northwestern University)

In this research, we examine how individuals evaluate options in different price tiers, focusing on their willingness-to-pay for combinations of such options. Results from three experiments across multiple product categories show that, counter to conventional wisdom, individuals systematically underestimate the value of a combination of products from different price tiers, such that adding an attractive but low-priced item to a high-priced one tends to decrease rather than increase willingness-to-pay for the combination. We attribute the subtraction bias to individuals' tendency to categorize items in terms of expensiveness prior to articulating their willingness-to-pay.

(56) The Illusion of InAccuracy: When Preferences for Process are Ignored
Amit, Adi (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem); Sagiv, Lilach (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

Rational decision-makers are expected to choose the alternative that best matches their preferences based on relevant attributes. We suggest that preferences on attributes are merely one type of preferences - for content. We introduce another type - preferences for process, which refers to preferences of how to approach and perform the decision task (i.e., saving effort; maximizing utility; systematic or intuitive base). These preferences are affected by both contextual and personal factors. Taking process-preferences into account redefines optimal decisions as decisions that meet preferences for both content and process preferences, and may help explain the rationale behind seemingly irrational decisions.

(57) The Effect of Choice Overload and Individual Differences on the Enjoyment of Decision-making
Susa, Kyle J. (University of Texas at El Paso); Morales, Robert (University of Texas at El Paso); Morera, Osvaldo (University of Texas at El Paso)

The current study investigated how individual differences moderate the enjoyment of decision-making when people are offered a limited vs. expanded array of choices. Specifically, participants selected one chocolate from an array size of either 6, 10, or 14 options, and subsequently rated how much they enjoyed the experience. Results indicated that increased scores on intuitive decision making (Nygren, 2000) enjoy the selection process, regardless of array size. An interaction between Need for Cognition (Cacioppo, Petty & Kao, 1984) and array size was also found. Need for Cognition is associated with greater enjoyment when there are limited choices.

(58) False past experiences can shape current preferences
Wudarzewski, Amanda (University of Waterloo); Mantonakis, Antonia (Brock University); Clifasefi, Seema L. (University of Washington); Bernstein, Daniel M. (Kwantlen Polytechnic University); Loftus, Elizabeth F. (University of California, Irvine)

Past research has shown that utility can be derived from the anticipation, experience, or the recollection of an event (Elster and Lowenstein 1992). Our present work showed that a positive and a negative false suggestion about a white wine drinking episode, can lead individuals to have a false memory about that experience, which results in a increase (or decrease) in reported preference for the suggested drink. Moreover, a false suggestion that one disliked white wine led to behavioural changes in consumption in line with the false belief. Thus, we propose a fourth source of utility, utility derived from false memory.

(59) Opportunity Cost Neglect and Consideration: The Role of Constraints
Spiller, Stephen A. (Duke University)

Whether or not individuals consider their opportunity costs is an important question. Individuals who neglect their opportunity costs are sensitive only to their outlay costs, whereas those who consider their opportunity costs are sensitive to their foregone alternatives. Recent research suggests that consumers neglect their opportunity costs altogether when making purchases. The present research demonstrates that individuals do consider their opportunity costs when faced with salient constraints, be they real liquidity constraints or constrained mental accounts. I posit that accessible planned expenditures and earmarked resources contribute to opportunity cost consideration and that their effects are amplified by constraints.

(60) The Effects of Regulatory Fit with a Goal and With a Goal-Object Benefit on Purchase Decisions
Brown, Vincent (University of London)

Regulatory fit with a goal is synonymous with the importance of the goal to an individual. The theory is silent on the interrelationship between fit with a benefit received from an object that helps in the achievement of the goal, and fit with the goal. It is plausible that if the level of benefit provided by the object is not high enough relative to a reference level, an individual may no longer desire the object even though fit may still be experienced with the goal. This paper will present the results of an investigation into this phenomenon on purchase behaviour.

(61) Communicating statistics: The interpretation of common language effect sizes

Nolan, Kevin P. (Bowling Green State University); Dalal, Dev K. (Bowling Green State University); Brooks, Margaret E. (Bowling Green State University); Yankelevich, Maya (Bowling Green State University)

The common language effect size indicator (CLES) and the binomial effect size display (BESD) are designed to simplify statistical information by using more accessible language and presentation than the Pearson Correlation coefficient (r); however, little is known about how information presentation actually affects perceptions of effect size. Consumer products were described in scenarios that manipulated effect size indicator and magnitude. Participants indicated how easy it was to understand the product information, how effective they thought the product was, and amount they would pay for the product. Findings shed light on how effect size presentation influences understanding and perception of value.

(62) Naturals and Strivers: Quantifying the Costs of Preferences and Beliefs About Sources of Achievement

Tsay, Chia-Jung (Harvard University); Banaji, Mahzarin (Harvard University)

In considering talent, what do we privilege, innate skill or hard work? In our previous work on the judgment of talent, we demonstrate a dissociation between an explicit endorsement of hard work ("strivers") and the actual preference for innate talent ("naturals"), or a mismatch between expected and actual levels of performance, depending on the apparent source of achievement. In our current work, through conjoint analysis, we quantified the costs of the naturalness bias and showed that experts were more willing to trade off better-qualified individuals in favor of the natural performer.

(63) Is What You Feel What They See? The Relationship between Fluency and Identity Signaling

Matherly, Ted (University of Maryland); Pocheptsova, Anastasiya (University of Maryland)

People frequently use products to express their identity and infer identities of others. In this paper, building on the body of research on subjective experiences, we propose that people will use feelings of ease or difficulty of information processing when choosing products to signal their identity, as well as to infer identity signaling motives in others. Across a series of studies we find that low fluency choices are seen as more effective signals of identity, compared to high fluency choices. This connection between fluency and identity signaling was observed across impression management and group affiliation motives.

(64) The Big Cost of Small Problems

Brigden, Neil (University of Alberta); Haubl, Gerald (University of Alberta)

As products age, many go through a state of reduced functionality where they still work, but exhibit limitations that impair user experience. The user must decide whether to repair the product or put up with reduced functionality. Our experiments demonstrate that relatively less severe problems can ironically lead to greater losses in productivity and/or enjoyment over time. This counter-intuitive relationship between problem magnitude and quality of experience exists because consumers tend to repair major problems immediately, but allow more minor problems to persist. We examine psychological mechanisms underlying consumers' failure to repair minor problems that should normatively be repaired.

(65) Does a larger coupon feel more valuable? How Medium Size Affects Perceived Value

Yang, Adelle (Shanghai Jiaotong University); Hsee, Christopher (University of Chicago Booth School of Business)

The present research hypothesizes larger coupons to be more valuable and less likely to be redeemed, controlling for their objective value. A series of studies support this hypothesis and also show that a large-sized ten dollar coupon combined with a small-sized five dollar coupon is less likely to be spent than a small-sized ten dollar coupon combined with a large-sized ten dollar coupon. This research yields theoretical implication on the relationship between physical size and perception of value and practical implication on coupon design.

(66) Predicting inferences and confidence in inferences: Recognition heuristic vs. its new rival, mean-variance model

Simonyan, Yvetta (London Business School); Goldstein, Daniel G. (London Business School)

This research investigates whether a new model, mean-variance model, gaining insight into information beyond recognition, can be proposed as an alternative to simple recognition-based heuristics. It looks at what people believe about recognized vs. unrecognized objects and how these objects are perceived in terms of mean and variance of objects' criterion, expressed as belief distributions and captured by point estimates and confidence intervals, when information about the criterion is not immediately accessible. Are inference predictions made using binary and continuous measures of recognition more accurate than predictions made by the mean-variance model, using the afore-mentioned mean and variance data?

(67) Subgoals Promote Monetary Savings Behavior

Colby, Helen (Rutgers University); Chapman, Gretchen (Rutgers University)

367 undergraduates read four scenarios in which they were planning to go out to dinner with friends, and were also saving for a new item (Wii, iPod, cruise, shoes). We manipulated whether the scenario contained a specific weekly savings subgoal, or only a whole-item savings goal. Subjects rated their likelihood of forgoing dinner in favor of saving on a 0-100% scale. Saving the money should allow subjects to close a mental account in the subgoal scenarios, making saving more appealing. The presence of a subgoal did significantly increase the likelihood of forgoing dinner in all scenarios (all $p < .01$).

(68) Culture and Dynamic Decision Making: Testing a Model in Five Countries

Güss, C. Dominik (University of North Florida); Tuason, M. Teresa (University of North Florida); Desrosier, Rebecca (University of North Florida)

Research on dynamic decision making (DDM) using microworlds has often focused on individual differences such as intelligence to explain performance. Cross-cultural studies on decision making have often focused on describing differences rather than explaining them. We tested a model postulating that cultural values influence DDM strategies which in turn influence performance controlling for intelligence. Participants were 535 students in Brazil, India, Germany, Philippines, and the United States. They had to protect cities from fires and prevent goods from perishing in two microworlds. Fit indexes show reasonable fit of the theoretical models. Results highlight the influence of culture on DDM.

(69) Earthly sins and heavenly rewards: The effect of religious beliefs on end-of-life decisions

Ward, Adrian F. (Harvard University); Wegner, Daniel M. (Harvard University)

Is it better to be in a hospital bed or on streets of gold? Religious beliefs provide the faithful with two opposing decisional stances regarding this question: one rooted in official church dogma (that is, a moral stance), the other in an emphasis on the value of an afterlife (that is, a heavenly rewards stance). Two studies show that these decisional stances affect religious people's end-of-life decisions in different ways; the moral stance leads to greater endorsement of life-prolonging measures, whereas the heavenly rewards stance leads to a marked willingness to exchange one's present life for the life to come.

(70) Do East-Asians and Westerners Think Alike? Evidence from Probability Judgment

Wu, Shali (Chicago Booth); Wu, George (Chicago Booth); Keysar, Boaz (University of Chicago)

This research challenges Griffin & Tversky's (1992) claim that people universally under-use weight and over-use strength information when making judgments. I argue that weight information often functions as context, and hence the process of evaluating evidence will be culturally influenced. The findings from Bayesian probability judgments on Americans and Chinese participants show that in the control condition Americans under-use the base-rate, while Chinese do not. In the experimental condition, however, when the base rate is made focal, Americans perform much better while Chinese are unaffected. This shows Americans under-use the base rate information only when it functions as background information.

(71) Discussion of Shared and Unshared Information in Decision Making Groups: A Cultural Perspective

Feng, Y. N. (The University of Leeds); Bown, N. J. (The University of Leeds); Allinson, C. W. (The University of Leeds); Maule, A. J. (The University of Leeds)

The impact of culture on the information sharing process in decision-making groups was examined. Four-person British and Chinese groups decided which of two hypothetical candidates would be recruited for a lecturer position. Some of the information about each candidate was provided to all group members (shared information), whereas the remainder was randomly divided (unshared information). Although no significant difference was found in the total amount of unshared information exchange, the way in which unshared information was exchanged was different-Chinese participants were more likely to use an indirect way of communication while British participants used a more direct way.

(72) The Norm of Self-Sacrifice

Sachdeva, Sonya (Northwestern University); Iliev, Rumen (Northwestern University); Medin, Douglas (Northwestern University)

Sacrificing personal benefit in order to help a larger group is a key characteristic of moral behavior. However, large sacrifices such as sacrificing oneself may be seen as an even greater moral act particularly in some cultures where the norm of self-sacrifice is highly salient. In this field experiment, we found that rural Indians were more approving of self-sacrifice than urban Indians or Americans. More importantly, self-sacrifice was only acceptable for noble causes and in mundane cases, weak sacrifices were preferred demonstrating the symbolic nature of self-sacrifice. Urban Indians and Americans always thought that self-sacrifice was worse than other forms of sacrifice.

(73) Cheaters Never Win? Affective Consequences of Unethical Behavior

Nicole Ruedy (University of Pennsylvania); Maurice Schweitzer (University of Pennsylvania)

Affective responses play an important role in ethical decision making. Generally, unethical decisions have been associated with negative affective responses, such as guilt, shame, and anxiety, which are thought to deter future unethical behavior. In contrast, the relationship between positive affect and unethical behavior has been largely overlooked. In this work, we suggest that under certain circumstances, unethical behavior can produce psychological rewards. In two laboratory studies, we show that participants demonstrated a positive (and no negative) affective response after an ethical violation. Our results suggest that the relationship of positive affect and unethical behavior merits further attention.

(74) When Cash Matters: The Effect of Fungibility on Honesty

Smith, Joshua (The Ohio State University); Nygren, Thomas (The Ohio State University)

This study sought to explore the effects of fungibility on honesty. Subjects completed a short arithmetic test and were offered incentives based upon performance, with each group receiving a reward of different fungibility. It was hypothesized that an inverse relationship would be found between fungibility and cheating.

(75) Finding balance on the moral scale: The effect of forgiveness on dishonest behavior

Ayal, Shahar (Duke University); Dan Arieli (Duke University)

People face ethical choices on a daily basis. In some cases, they know that if they succumb to dishonest behavior, forgiveness may be available to them. Do the expectation of being forgiven and forgiveness itself influence an individual's likelihood to engage in unethical behavior? This paper addresses this question by examining the effects of self reflection on individuals' dishonest behavior. Across three studies, we find that when individuals expect to be forgiven for their unethical acts, they are more likely to behave dishonestly before rather than after reflection on their own sins, and this effect was diminished with time.

(76) Dishonest Deed, Clear Conscience: Self-Preservation through Moral Disengagement and Motivated Forgetting

Shu, Lisa (Harvard University); Bazerman, Max (Harvard University)

Using hypothetical scenarios (Studies 1 and 2) and real tasks involving the opportunity to cheat (Studies 3 and 4), we find that dishonest behavior increased moral disengagement and motivated forgetting of moral rules. Such changes did not occur in the case of honest behavior or consideration of the behavior of others. In addition, increasing moral saliency by having participants read or sign an honor code significantly reduced or eliminated unethical behavior. While dishonest behavior motivated moral leniency and led to strategic forgetting of moral rules, honest behavior motivated moral stringency and diligent recollection of moral rules.

(77) Preferences for Equality vs. Efficiency

Carabelli, Evan (University of Pennsylvania); Dana, Jason (University of Pennsylvania)

At the heart of fair distributions, e.g. of taxes, healthcare and education, lies a tradeoff between equality and efficiency. Experimental participants divided a good (money) among two anonymous others by allocating them tokens with varying exchange rates over ten repeated choices. Participants strongly favored equality, with a small minority willing to give all tokens to one person even when that person could exchange the tokens for 16 times as much money. This led to a much smaller mean payment among participants than efficient distribution (\$8 vs. \$13) but also created less variance in the payments (sd = \$3.66 vs. \$7).

(78) The Effect of Attribute Framing on Justice Judgments

Gamliel, Eyal (Ruppin Academic Center); Peer, Eyal (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

Past research examined people's justice judgments regarding resource allocation situations using positive manner (e.g., deliver good to some) and neglected the complementary negative manner (withhold good from the others). This study shows that presenting resource allocation situations in a positive manner resulted in more favorable justice judgments regarding non-egalitarian allocation principles (merit, tenure, need) relative to presenting the same situations in a negative manner. Such attribute framing effect was not found regarding the equality principle. Consistent findings were found regarding organizations allocating positions, equipment, duties and health care resources. Implications for policy, research and the public are discussed.

(79) Influences on the Ethical Reasoning of Tax Practitioners: Preliminary Results on Profile, Context and Socialisation

Doyle, Elaine (Kemmy Business School, University of Limerick); Frecknall Hughes, Jane (The Open University Business School); Summers, Barbara (Leeds University Business School)

Dilemmas involving tax issues were identified as posing the most difficult ethical/moral problems by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, but there is little research on how tax dilemmas are approached. We investigate this, using a research instrument based on the defining issues test (DIT) to compare practitioners and lay-people. We find that practitioners are not different from lay-people in a social context. In the tax context, moral reasoning is affected for practitioners only, indicating that training/socialisation are likely drivers of behaviour. Preliminary analysis finds a potential difference between

public and private sector practitioners which supports this view.

(80) The Repugnance Effect: Money and Moral Transgressions

Atanarov, Pavel (University of Pennsylvania); Jayawickreme, Eranda (University of Pennsylvania)

We present evidence for a "repugnance effect" for transgressions committed in the presence of monetary incentives of various sizes. This effect follows an inverted V pattern. Specifically, we found that transgressions committed in the presence of a small monetary incentive were seen as significantly more offensive than transgressions committed without a monetary incentive or in the presence of a large incentive. This pattern was observed in both student (Study 1) and multinational (Study 2) samples. Study 3 suggested a role for moral emotions (specifically disgust) in this effect.

(81) Cheap saints or blatant sinners? The cost of lying for (almost) nothing

Shalvi, Shaul (University of Amsterdam); Handgraaf, Michel J. J. (University of Amsterdam); de Dreu, Carsten K.W. (University of Amsterdam)

To maintain an honest self-concept people avoid lying to the maximum extent possible. Employing an anonymous die under cup paradigm, we instructed participants to report the outcome of a private die throw, giving them an option to lie to increase payoff. By providing participants with alternatives to throwing the die we manipulated the number of options that were available to increase payoff. Results of two experiments show that people are willing to lie for a substantive gain, but refrain from entering a situation if they know they would have to choose between lying blatantly and lying for a minimal amount.

(82) Telling tales: The effect of narrative creation on decision-making with data

Krumme, Coco (MIT)

Stories can serve to frame inquiry and to aid recollection of unconnected events. At the same time, a good story has been known to get in the way of "changing one's mind" about a decision. The present research considers the role of narrative in bolstering the apparent connectedness of independent events: here, in the context of financial decisions. The results of two stock-selection and investing experiments show that when information is linked with a narrative explanation, investors make poorer decisions, and are less likely to change their pattern of behavior based on new information, compared to a narrative-free case.

(83) Cascades Under Identical Information Endowment and Localized Communication: An Experimental Study

Mak, Vincent (Cambridge); Zwick, Rami (University of California, Riverside)

We design an experiment to study a new type of herding that arises out of a model of word-of-mouth communication, with which agents have imperfect information about other agents' history of play and all agents are identically informed a priori (i.e. there are no independently generated private signals). Using a "chain" network of four subjects as our unit of observation, we create theoretically predicted cascades under all experimental conditions. Both occurrence of cascades and strategic sophistication increase as the game proceeds, while inefficient cascades appear consistently throughout the experiment.

(84) The Effects of Mastery on Subjective Utility

Scopelliti, Irene (Bocconi University); Loewenstein, George (Carnegie Mellon University)

The pleasure derived from mastery of a task is an important motive driving human behavior. Although it was treated by Bentham as an ingredient of utility, mastery has not played a role in current models of decision making. This paper presents results of an experiment that examines the impact of mastery on persistence at, and enjoyment of, an activity. We find that people spend more time on, and enjoy more, activities they master than activities they do not master, even if the low mastery task yields higher monetary payoffs.

(85) Sex Differences in the Effects of Anger on Financial Risk-Taking

Litvak, Paul M. (Carnegie Mellon University); Lerner, Jennifer S. (Harvard University)

Prior research finds that incidental anger leads people to perceive less risk (for review, see Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). The present experiments examined the hypothesis that the effects of anger on actual risk taking would differ for males and anger. Risk taking was measured by the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (Lejuez et al., 2002). Results support the hypothesis. Specifically, anger increases the risk-taking of men, but decreases the risk-taking of women. These results were not driven by any differences in the magnitude of self-reported anger experience. Rather, it appears that males and females differ in how anger impacts risk-taking behavior.

(86) It's more money that I have, but I have to go one more: Risky decision making in: 'Deal or No Deal'

Laroque, Ninekema (University of North Florida); Desrosier, Rebecca (University of North Florida); Güss, C. Dominik (University of North Florida)

Extending laboratory research, risky decision making was investigated in the show “Deal or No Deal” focusing on a process analysis and on individual difference variables. Video tapes of the show were analyzed qualitatively and quantitatively. Results showed illusion of control and anxiety as determinants of risky decisions, as well as social influences primarily by the family on the decisions made. Following previous research on sex differences in risky decisions, men and women differed in several decision characteristics, such as time. Results highlight social influences and individual differences in risky financial decisions made under time pressure in a public context.

(87) Effects of Identity on Surgical Risk-Taking: Attitudes, Risk Perceptions and Intentions

Pardo, Seth T. (Cornell University); Reyna, Valerie F. (Cornell University)

This study tested whether attitudes, intentions, identity, and risk perceptions determined surgical risk taking. Decision vignettes were identical except for reason for surgery. Choice options presented equal decision outcome probabilities across two framing conditions (gain, loss). Results showed that although two identity factors (feminine self-concept and transgender identity) predicted risk-aversion for both surgical decision vignettes, intentions to pursue body modification surgery predicted increased risk-taking in the transsexual vignette only. Thus, respondents sufficiently motivated to have body modification surgeries demonstrated greater willingness to take risks. Motivation may be a stronger predictor of surgical risks than attitudes, identity, or risk perceptions.

(88) Understanding How Mental Accounting Guides Choices Between Work and Home

Paddock, E. Layne (Singapore Management University); Rothbard, Nancy (University of Pennsylvania)

We introduce a measure of mental accounting (MA) of time and money in both work and home domains based on Soman (2001). In a sample of nearly 400 employees working in various jobs across industries, we explore how individuals’ use of MA at work and home relates to two sets of individual differences: work-family (e.g., identification with roles, preferences for work-life segmentation) and cognitive (e.g., cognitive overload, cognitive complexity). In a second sample of 114 employees we investigate individuals’ use of MA to guide their time allocation choices and how MA relates to self- and other-rated home and work attitudes.

(89) The Influence of Goals on Dynamic Decision Making

Weinhardt, Justin (Ohio University); Vancouver, Jeff (Ohio University); Gonzalez Vallejo, Claudia (Ohio University); Harman, Jason (Ohio University)

Using a controlled laboratory experiment, we replicated and extended the findings from a number of field studies investigating the lack of intertemporal substitution in labor (Camerer et al., 1997). Our results are in accordance with previous field studies showing that individuals who use income goals work less when they are making more money and work more when they are making less money. The current study also found that time goals result in more optimal behavior and informing individuals about the amount of time they spend working increases the probability of optimally intertemporally substituting their labor.

(90) When Small Steps Become a Big Leap: Illusory Goal Progress in Sequential Choice

Chernev, Alexander (Northwestern University); Bonezzi, Andrea (Northwestern University)

Actions toward a goal are often influenced by the way people monitor their progress toward the goal. This research shows that individuals can adopt two different strategies to monitor goal-progress. Specifically, they might either focus on the degree to which a particular decision contributes to advancing toward an active goal (degree-of-progress evaluation), or on whether a particular decision is consistent with an active goal (consistency evaluation). Across three studies, we show that when evaluating a sequence of actions, consumers focused on goal-consistency are likely to overestimate goal-progress relative to consumers focused on degree-of-progress evaluations.

(91) Thinking of others’ behavior makes you more generous: The imaginary peer effect

Wang, Yitong (University of California, Irvine); Keller, L. Robin (University of California, Irvine)

We examine how thinking of other people’s charitable behavior affects people’s willingness to donate to charity. We found that asking subjects to think about “How much your friend is willing to donate” or “Is your friend willing to donate?” will increase the amount they finally donate. We propose that thinking about a friend’s charitable behavior will trigger donors to put more weight on a higher level of construal of donation as good for the society, rather than a lower construal level - giving up some money, which will lead people to donate more. Alternative explanations are also discussed and tested.

(92) Executive functions at work: The impact of Individual Differences in Cognitive Control on Managerial Decision-Making

Laureiro Martinez, Daniella (Bocconi University); Brusoni, Stefano (Bocconi University); Canessa, Nicola (San Raffaele University); Cappa, Stefano (San Raffaele University); Zollo, Maurizio (Bocconi University); Alemanno, Federica

A major source of errors in managerial decision-making is that individuals tend to respond to stimuli in a homogeneous way, failing to adapt their cognitive and behavioral patterns to the context. In this paper, we show how differences in individuals' executive functions -such as sustained attention, working-memory, and planning and generativity- influence adaptive managerial decision-making. We argue that managers' cognitive control might be fundamental for effective decision-making and consequently an important determinant of the organizational ability to learn and adapt to environmental changes. We derive managerial implications and suggest alternatives that education programs could follow to enhance managers' cognitive control.

(93) The Effect of Group Deliberation on the Endowment Effect

Blumenthal, Jeremy A. (Syracuse University College of Law)

The "endowment effect" (EE) has been documented repeatedly at the individual level: individuals demand a significantly higher price to sell a good than they offer to buy it if they do not own it. However, only one previous study examines the EE at the group level, despite implications ranging from attorney-client and international negotiation to land use decisions to legislative and corporate decision-making. Questions: (1) Does group deliberation affect individual demonstration of the EE? (2) Do groups exhibit the EE? Findings: (1) deliberation exacerbates individual demonstration of the EE; (2) groups exhibit the effect. Implications are addressed.

(94) Social Acceptance Reduces Egocentric Perception of Fairness in Resource Allocation

Zhang, Liqing (Peking University); Baumeister, Roy (Florida State University)

In two experiments, social acceptance or rejection was manipulated by feedback after participants took part in a group discussion. All participants were then asked to distribute fairly a fixed amount of money between themselves and an anonymous individual out of their group. In Experiment 1, the compensation was provided because participants endured some noise in a reaction time game. In Experiment 2, participants were asked to divide a reward because they and another person completed a task together. In both experiments, social acceptance reduced the amount of money that participants, especially male participants, allocated to themselves.

(95) Punishment of Groups for the Actions of Group Members

Sorenson, Clare M. (The Ohio State University)

In some situations (e.g. school, military), an entire group of people may be penalized for the actions of a subset. In three studies, we demonstrate that participants are willing to punish a group for the actions of one member, that such punishment was insensitive to between-subjects variation in the magnitude of the violation, and that punishment was sensitive to within-subjects variation in the magnitude of the violation and the number of violators. On average, punishment of an entire group was similar to that of punishment of an individual, but group punishment displayed more variability

(96) Resisting the Temptation to Retaliate: Self-Control in Overcoming Barriers to Cooperation

Sheldon, Oliver J (University of Chicago); Fishbach, Ayelet (University of Chicago)

This article provides a self-control analysis of mixed-motive interactions, including 2-person social dilemmas and bargaining encounters. We propose that mixed-motive interactions pose a self-control conflict between pursuing immediate benefits through competition and pursuing long-term benefits through cooperation. As such, anticipating high (vs. low) barriers to successful outcomes triggers counteractive self-control operations that increase cooperation, so long as people believe that by doing so they can influence others to reciprocate.

(97) Escalation of commitment and valuation

Ting, Hsuchi (University of Maryland, College Park); Wallsten, Thomas (University of Maryland, College Park)

Research on escalation of commitment has focused primarily on individuals' reluctances to withdraw from a course of action in the past. However, escalation could also come from failure to evaluate the alternatives to the committed course of action. Our results showed that individuals attribute more value to the chosen course as they get closer to it, and simultaneously devalue the alternative. The value difference captures the individuals' tendencies to escalate in their chosen course of action. The pattern provides a new interpretation for escalation when multiple outcomes are presented.

(98) Clutch performance and clutch illusion

Barkan, Rachel (Glazer School of Business, Ben-Gurion University); Solomonov, Yosef (Glazer School of Business, Ben-Gurion University); Ariely, Dan (Fuqua School of Business, Duke University)

Acute stress, pressure and overload generally lead to decreased performance. Exceptional individuals however seem to thrive under pressure and exhibit extraordinary ability that wins critical situations. In business, politics or sports, these stars are admired and heavily rewarded for their unique talent. We examine the case of basketball, where clutch players are believed to determine the fate of close and critical games. Two studies show that although clutch players make more points at clutch moments, their

assumed special talent is an illusion driven by expectations. A third study shows that basketball experts fall for the illusion they help create.

(99) We-intentions: Explanatory models

Mari, Silvia (University of Milano-Bicocca); Capozza, Dora (University of Padova); Bagozzi, Richard P. (University of Michigan)

This longitudinal study (T1: N = 481; T2: N = 300) examined the role of identification, when considering behavior involving joint intentions (Toumela, 1995). The behavior was contributing, together with other family members, in maintaining a positive family budget. To explain processes, we tested with SEM (LISREL 8) alternative models: planned behavior theory (Ajzen, 1991); goal-directed behavior model (MGB, Bagozzi & Lee, 2002). MGB had the greatest explanatory and predictive power. A second-order factor of identification influenced we-intentions. Behavior was affected by a general second-order factor of intentionality representing individual and shared intentions to act in favor of the ingroup.

(100) Political Decision Making

McCormick, Michael (The University of North Carolina at Greensboro); Seta, John J. (The University of North Carolina at Greensboro); McElroy, Todd (Appalachian State University)

Participants in the current study were given a political orientation scale, the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire, and either a gain or loss framed message regarding the prevention behavior of sunscreen use. Based on theorizing by Jost, and Janoff-Bulman, it was expected but not shown that liberals would have a promotion focus and conservatives would have a prevention focus. The results did show, however, that moderates were more influenced by the message frame than those at either end of the political spectrum. These findings are discussed in terms of regulatory focus, liberal vs. conservative ideology, and moderate vs. extreme political orientation.

(101) You are What We Eat: Normative Influences on Individual Eating Behavior

Hunger, Jeffrey M. (California State University-Fullerton); Howland, Maryhope (University of Minnesota); Mann, Traci L. (University of Minnesota)

Eating habits have been found to be strongly influenced by group norms, but there is a need for psychological research into the development and stability of such norms among close friends. Using a laboratory design, we first instilled an eating norm (i.e., eating vegetables) in an existing group of friends (T1), and then separated the friends to see if the norm persisted when eating alone (T2). The presence of a norm predicted eating in the group setting (T1) but did not predict eating while alone (T2), indicating no norm persistence. Implications for the promotion of healthy eating choices is discussed.

(102) Individual Differences and Susceptibility to Context Effects in an Organizational Recruitment Setting

Diab, Dalia L. (Bowling Green State University); Alexander, Katherine N. (Bowling Green State University); Daniels, Michael A. (Bowling Green State University); Pui, Shuang-Yueh (Bowling Green State University); Brooks, Margaret E. (Bowling Green State University)

Little research has looked at the influence of individual differences on susceptibility to context effects. A recent study showed that the choice deferral of indecisive people was not affected by the presence of risk (Patalano & Wengrovitz, 2007). The main purpose of the current study was to extend this line of research by investigating whether indecisives might be more resistant to several commonly-studied context effects than decisives. We looked at the effects of indecisiveness and other individual differences on decision behavior in an organizational recruitment setting. Results inform research on individual differences in decision making.

(103) Effects of Imperfect Information and Risk on Job Choice Behavior of Indecisives and Maximizers

Daniels, Michael A. (Bowling Green State University); Pui, Shuang-Yueh (Bowling Green State University); Diab, Dalia L. (Bowling Green State University); Alexander, Katherine N. (Bowling Green State University); Brooks, Margaret E. (Bowling Green State University)

This experiment investigated effects of imperfect (i.e., missing and negative) information and risk of lost opportunity on job choice. Indecisiveness and maximizing tendency were examined as moderators of these relationships. Job descriptions containing imperfect information were presented one-at-a-time; participants could either select or reject the job, or they could defer the decision until they had cycled through the remaining options. Half of the participants were told a limited number of positions were available, so those deferring decision on an option risked losing the opportunity to choose that job. This study extends our understanding of how individual differences affect decision-making behavior.

(104) The Effect of Multiple Views and Perspective Taking on Social Tuning

Skorinko, Jeanine (WPI); DiGiovanni, Craig (WPI); Whitchurch, Erin (University of Virginia); Sinclair, Stacey (University of Virginia)

This experiment investigated whether perspective taking and a target's viewpoint influenced social tuning. Ninety-five undergraduates learned that the experimenter held egalitarian views (via an "Eracism" tshirt), but that the experimenter either expected them to be similar (egalitarian) or different (prejudiced). Participants then unscrambled either neutral sentences or sentences that primed them to perspective take. Results showed a significant interaction between the expected viewpoint and perspective taking. Perspective-takers were more likely to align their judgments and tune towards the experimenter's verbalized expectation (both egalitarian and prejudiced expectations) than non-perspective-takers.

(105) Me and You vs. The World: The Effects of Affiliative Motivation and Group Membership on Social Tuning

Spear, Sarah (WPI); Selkow, Maia (St. Olaf's College); Skorinko, Jeanine (WPI); Lun, Janetta (University of Maryland); Sinclair, Stacey (Princeton University)

This experiment investigated whether affiliative motivation and group membership influenced social tuning. Seventy-nine participants believed they would interact with a partner who was part of their in-group or out-group (groups membership manipulation) for either five minutes or thirty minutes (affiliative motivation condition). A significant interaction between affiliative motivation and group membership emerged. Those with an in-group partner aligned their judgments and tuned more in the high affiliative motivation than low affiliative motivation condition. No tuning occurred with out-group members, regardless of affiliative motivation. Thus, group membership and affiliative motivation are important to judgments, interpersonal decisions, and social tuning.

(106) Information distortion in self-other decision making

Polman, Evan (Cornell University)

In both organizational and social arenas, individuals make decisions for themselves and for other individuals. But research in decision making has provided little input into how these decisions are psychologically different. In this paper, I find that the extent and ilk of information distortion varies according to whether individuals make their own decisions or others' decisions. In particular, individuals who choose for their own behalves demonstrate more postdecisional distortion (i.e., cognitive dissonance), yet less predecisional distortion than individuals who choose for others' behalves. These findings suggest an irony of self-other decision making: it produces both more and less information distortion.

(107) Querying the Group Mind: Applying Query Theory to Group Discussions

Smith, Juliana A. (Columbia University); Weber, Elke U. (Columbia University)

Query Theory assumes decision makers construct preferences by consulting memory for thoughts about choice alternatives. Using accelerate vs. delay discounting scenarios, we extended this explanation to the "group mind". Discounting in delay was (positively) predicted by the number of "now" thoughts, while discounting in acceleration was (negatively) predicted by the number of "later" thoughts. Thoughts for the default option predicted choice, even though thought frequency did not differ between conditions, pointing to an attentional effect. For individual decisions, "now" and "later" thoughts clustered in different orders for the two conditions, a result (not surprisingly) not found for the group discussions.

(108) Influence of Social Norms and Transition Zones on Decision Making in Dyads

Mukherjee, Moumita (University of South Florida); Decker, Nathaniel K. (University of South Florida); Schneider, Sandra L. (University of South Florida)

Our previous work on two-outcome lottery decisions has demonstrated that dyads working together tend to be more risk averse than individuals working alone. In this presentation, we summarize qualitative analyses of participants' responses to questions regarding (a) perceived quality of decisions made, (b) which lotteries were hardest to agree on, and (c) how decisions would have been different if working alone. Response coding suggests that individuals within dyads may be more risk averse due to social norms related to perceived responsibility for another's well-being and experienced conflict in gain-loss transition zones.

(109) Social Influence Processes in Group Decision Errors

Tindale, R. Scott (Loyola University Chicago); Starkel, Rebecca (Loyola University Chicago); Jacobs, Elizabeth (Loyola University Chicago)

We studied the role of social influence in group decision situations where individual decision heuristics were prevalent. Using conjunctive fallacy and base rate fallacy problems, we provided participants with responses from two other supposed participants. The responses were either both normatively correct, both normatively incorrect, or one of each, and were accompanied by brief rationales consistent with the responses or not. We found improved judgments only when both advisers were correct. Thus, it appears that the main type of influence was conformity to others positions with little if any informational influence or learning.

(110) Reasoning: Good decisions or justifiable decisions?

Mercier, Hugo (University of Pennsylvania)

According to dual process theories, the mind can be divided into intuitions which are generally efficient but prone to systematic mistakes and reasoning which allows us to correct for these mistakes. It has been shown however that reasoning in fact often causes these mistakes by driving people towards decisions that are easy to justify. This supports the argumentative theory of reasoning according to which finding arguments is the very function of reasoning. This framework can account for many other findings in decision making as well as in reasoning, social psychology, moral psychology and developmental psychology.

(111) Take This Advice And Shove It: When And Why We Discount Advice

Gino, Francesca (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill); Moore, Don (Carnegie Mellon University)

A series of studies examined the role of various factors in moderating people's willingness to use advice, demonstrating that normatively irrelevant factors, such as an advice recipient's incidental emotions or an advisor's attractiveness, influence how heavily individuals weigh advice. For instance, in studies using estimation tasks, we found that incidental emotions (which are unrelated to the task at hand) can either increase or decrease advice taking when the emotions are misattributed. In related research, we consider factors such as egoism, self-serving biases, anchoring and differential information as potential mechanisms explaining egocentric advice discounting which has been documented by multiple researchers.

(112) Expertise, Confidence, Cheap Talk and Persuasion

Sah, Sunita (Carnegie Mellon University); Moore, Don (Carnegie Mellon University); MacCoun, Robert (University of California, Berkeley)

Factors influencing the persuasiveness and credibility of advice are of great interest to those who wish to influence the actions and decisions of others. In this presentation, we explore the effect of advisors' confidence and self-proclaimed expertise on the persuasiveness of their advice. In a new paradigm using factual claims, we found that with accuracy held constant, high confidence was more persuasive than low confidence. The claimed title of 'expert' was similarly influential. In other words, "cheap talk" claims of expertise and confidence can increase one's influence over others. Conditions where confidence helps or hinders credibility and persuasiveness are discussed.

(113) Two to Tango: The Effect of Collaborative Experience and Disagreement on Individual and Joint Estimates

Minson, Julia A. (Stanford University); Liberman, Varda (IDC, Herzliya, Israel); Ross, Lee (Stanford University)

Three studies explored the failure of dyad partners to fully benefit from each other's input in a multi-round estimation task. Neither long-term partnership experience nor laboratory manipulations focused on collaboration eliminated this phenomenon. The requirement to reach agreement increased the dyad members' mean accuracy, on both joint and subsequent individual estimates. Underweighting of partner input was greatest in cases of high disagreement. Study 1 demonstrated that the more partners disagreed, the more they saw their partner's assessments as biased and flawed. Studies 2 & 3 showed greater disagreement to be associated with greater improvement in accuracy and smaller final errors.

(114) Multiple Biases: Plausibility and evidence for independent and additive effects

Babad, Elisha (Hebrew University of Jerusalem); Peer, Eyal (Hebrew University of Jerusalem); Benayoun, Yehonatan (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

In a given social situation, it is conceptually plausible that multiple biases would concurrently influence people's judgments and decision making. This study analyzed experiments where viewers judged a politician interviewed by a nonverbally friendly or hostile interviewer. A meta-analysis of several replications demonstrated the existence of two independent biases: Media bias (viewers rated the interviewee more favorably when the interviewer's NV behavior was friendlier); and a Halo effect (viewers rated the interviewee as a function of the degree of their personal liking of him). Regression analyses indicated that these two biases operated independently and additively on viewers' judgments.

(115) Group process decision making in informal groups

Kozlowski, Cathy (University of Phoenix)

This research examines group decision making process in small groups when the rules for making a decision is not fully established. Many non-profit organizations and small business often meet in small informal committees. Yet, many groups may not establish its rules for group decision making whether the group will vote determining basic majority or unanimous vote. As a result my research has found that these groups will often automatically assume the vote is unanimous consent and will drift towards the risky swift, distort information from its dissenters and will make stereotypes about certain group members.

(116) Modeling College Withdrawal Decisions

Pleskac, Timothy J. (Michigan State University); Keeney, Jessica (Michigan State University); Merritt, Stephanie M. (University of Missouri - St. Louis); Schmitt, Neal (Michigan State University); Oswald, Frederick L. (Rice University)

College students' withdrawal decisions have a direct impact on the health of universities. The present study integrates theories of employee turnover from organizational psychology and signal detection theory from cognitive psychology to model the withdrawal decision. The model posits that precipitating events or shocks lead students to consider evidence whether to withdraw from the university. If the evidence surpasses a criterion then the student decides to withdraw. The model was used to identify shocks students were sensitive to and to test hypotheses about the underlying decision process. The theoretical implications of this model and macro-level phenomena it predicts are evaluated.

(117) Using very inaccurate experts to improve performance

Sutherland, Steven (Southern Illinois University at Carbondale); Young, Michael (Southern Illinois University at Carbondale)

Previous research has explored several factors that influence when expert advice is requested and used. In the present research, we further explored the effects of the experienced accuracy of the expert and the cost of advice. Support was shown for an expected value approach to requesting advice, though participants performed sub-optimally. We failed to find support for an adherence to sunk cost, as the cost of advice did not affect the utilization of advice. We found that participants request advice from very inaccurate experts, use the advice to rule out an option, and subsequently improve their own accuracy.

(118) The Decision Making Styles Inventory: Analysis of factor structure and factorial invariance

White, Rebecca (University of Chicago); Nygren, Thomas (Ohio State University)

The Decision Making Styles Inventory is designed to assess three distinct self-reported decision making propensities. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses on several large data sets indicated that these styles have been robustly identified and validated as an Analytical style, an Intuitive style, and a Regret-based style. Further, these three 15-item scales are only marginally pairwise correlated, suggesting they reflect relatively independent psychological latent variables. The factorial invariance of the inventory was investigated with samples of undergraduate students and adult non-students. Individual differences in the endorsement of these three decision styles can be reliably differentiated by the Decision Making Styles Inventory.

(119) My Loss Versus Your Gain: The Effects of Attribution and Individual Differences

Rim, Hye Bin (Ohio State University); Nygren, Thomas E. (Ohio State University)

In competition, the outcome is a relative concept rather than an absolute concept. That is, my loss (gain) can also be seen as a rival's gain (loss). The present study examines preferences for the outcomes of competition when the outcomes are framed differently. The results of a scenario-based experiment show that preferences are influenced by causal attribution (self vs. other) and ego defense. However, maximizers were found to be more likely to prefer a rival's loss rather than a gain for themselves, and a rival's gain to their loss than were non-maximizers, regardless of who deserved the gain or loss.

(120) Time Perception and Strength of Handedness

Westfall, Jonathan E. (Columbia University); Jasper, J.D. (The University of Toledo)

Objective measures of time (i.e., 1 month, 3 years) rarely correlate with subjective judgments of time (i.e., near, distant). We investigated the relationship between strength of handedness and subjective judgments of time. Mixed-handers, individuals who tend to use both hands for a variety of tasks, preferred increasing sequences of income more so than strong-handers. They also displayed lower discounting rates and judged a date 3 years in the future as closer. We discuss possible neurological implications and propose that mixed-handers may have greater interhemispheric interaction, giving them a different view on tasks involving time perception.

(121) Leadership Decision Making

Lerner, Jennifer S. (Harvard University); Inbar, Yoel (Harvard University); Teplitz, Paul (Harvard University); Kustoff, Jessica J. (Harvard University); Litvak, Paul M. (Carnegie Mellon)

As part of a multi-year assessment of leadership decision making, we compared the performance of elite leaders ($n = 79$) to the performance of control subjects (two comparison samples: $n = 94$, $n = 360$). All members of the elite sample were verified as currently holding an executive-level position in government and/or industry. Results revealed that, compared to the control samples, the elite leaders: (a) took more risks in the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (Lejeuz et al., 2002); (b) were more resistant to the sunk cost bias; and (c) were better calibrated regarding the accuracy of their estimates.

(122) The Sunk Cost Fallacy and Decision Making Styles

Fernandez, Norma P. (University of Texas at El Paso); Morera, Osvaldo F. (University of Texas at El Paso); Guillen-Gomez, Laura (University of Texas at El Paso)

The decision to continue with a present course of action should be influenced by future benefits, instead of previous costs. However, research has shown that past investments strongly influence decision making and is known as the Sunk Cost Fallacy. The present study examined the relationship between individuals' decision making styles and the extent to which they fall prey to the Sunk Cost Fallacy. Participants evaluated 8 scenarios, where investments amount, manner in which a decision was made, and decision maker's identity were manipulated. Our findings indicate that individual differences of decision making styles are related to the sunk cost effect.

(123) An Examination of Real-World Predictions from Experience or Description

Lester, Houston F. (Auburn University); Cullen, Kristin L. (Auburn University); Franco-Watkins, Ana M. (Auburn University); Svyantek, Daniel J. (Auburn University)

Previous research has demonstrated a distinction between decisions based on experience (DFE) and description (DFD). We applied the DFE/DFD paradigm to examine real-world decisions (i.e., predictions in first-round basketball tournament games). After completing training on the probabilities associated with game outcomes using either a DFD or DFE structure, participants predicted the outcome of each game and rated their confidence (immediately and 1-2 weeks later). Preliminary results revealed that training did not affect overall accuracy or confidence; however, we examined whether individual differences in previous experience, knowledge, and personality variables play a role in decision making.

(124) For the love of the game: Motivation for pathological gambling

Fortune, Erica E. (UGA); Goodie, Adam S. (UGA)

Participants completed the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS) and the Diagnostic Interview for Gambling Severity (DIGS) as well as the BIS/BAS behavioral motivation scale. Significant correlations between the BAS fun component and the DIGS ($r = .23, p < .05$) and SOGS ($r = .38, p < .001$) suggest that the enjoyment of gambling may be sufficient to motivate pathological gamblers even in the absence of financial rewards. In Study 2, direct evidence about the interactive influence of monetary and fun-based motivations for gambling was sought through simultaneous administration of the BIS/BAS and the Gambling Motivation Scale. Results are discussed.

Session #2 with Cash Bar (Sunday, 5:00 - 7:00pm, Hynes Convention Center, 3rd level, Ballrooms A, B, C; attached to Sheraton through walkway)

(1) The Misery-is-not-Miserly Effect in Intertemporal Choice

Gandhi, Viral J. (Harvard University); Lerner, Jennifer S. (Harvard University); Weber, Elke U. (Columbia University)

Misery is not miserly: Incidental sadness increases the amount of money decision makers pay to acquire a commodity, even when decision makers are unaware of it (Lerner, Small & Loewenstein, 2004). Does incidental sadness also make decision makers willing to pay a premium for acquiring goods now versus later? We examined this in an experiment that primed incidental emotion, and then presented a choice set for eliciting discount rates (real financial consequences), modeled on Kirby, Petry and Bickel (1999). Results revealed a 92% higher discount rate for sad subjects -- a large and costly difference about which decision makers were unaware.

(2) Neural and behavioral correlates of value for lone anticipated rewards exhibit steeper delay discounting than binary preferences predict

Monterosso, John (University of Southern California); Luo, Shan (University of Southern California); Ainslie, George (Coatesville VA Medical Center)

Several theories of self-control (e.g., self-signaling, intertemporal bargaining) imply intertemporal decisions can be more farsighted than would be predicted by incentive value of rewards outside a decision context. We examined this hypothesis using behavior and functional neuroimaging. For each participant, immediate and delayed monetary amounts with equivalent decision-utility were established. Next, rewards comprising indifference pairs were presented individually as potential prizes in an fMRI reaction time task. RT was faster and activity in brain regions associated with value was greater for immediate relative to the equally preferred delayed money. Intertemporal decisions are farsighted relative to incentive values of individual rewards.

(3) Predicting Health-Related Risk Behaviors with Delay Discounting and Time Perspective Measures

Daugherty, James R. (Kansas State University); Brase, Gary L. (Kansas State University)

This study compared a measure of temporal discounting with measures of time perspective to examine concurrent, discriminate, and incremental validity when predicting health-related risk behaviors. Participants (N = 467) completed the Money-Choice Questionnaire (MCQ), Consideration of Future Consequences Scale (CFCS), Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory (ZTPI), and a survey of health behaviors. All three measures were useful at uniquely predicting different health-related risk behaviors; however, our results suggest that some measures, particularly the ZTPI Future scale, were more successful than others. Together, the results suggest that temporal discounting and time perspective are related, yet non-redundant constructions.

(4) Leveraging a theory of slack: How resource scarcity affects borrowing behavior

Shah, Anuj K. (Princeton University); Shafir, Eldar (Princeton University); Mullainathan, Sendhil (Harvard University)

We explore the effects of resource slack and scarcity on borrowing, savings, and performance. Specifically, we examine how resource slack and scarcity influence borrowing behavior, sensitivity to interest rates, and accrual of monetary rewards. We find that participants with low slack are often insensitive to interest rates, and therefore borrow to their own detriment in stark contrast to high-slack participants. Notably, low-slack participants performed best when the option to borrow was unavailable. We consider several explanations for the observed patterns and discuss implications for the study of behavior under resource scarcity in general, and under poverty in particular.

(5) When waiting increases weapon efficacy: A video game to study delay discounting

Young, Michael (Southern Illinois U. at Carbondale); Webb, Tara (Southern Illinois U. at Carbondale); Jacobs, Eric (Southern Illinois U. at Carbondale)

In studies of delay discounting, participants must make a series of pairwise comparisons to evaluate sooner smaller versus larger later outcomes. In our game, players decide when to fire a weapon that produces increased damage the longer one waits. Our players showed sensitivity to the manipulated benefits of waiting that were not predicted by a paper-and-pencil discounting task. Furthermore, smokers showed greater sensitivity to the payoffs and evidenced more movement in the game environment, but smokers were not more impulsive in either the game or the conventional task indicating a possible shift in the college smoking population.

(6) Owing it to yourself: Testing a duty-based argument for retirement saving

Bryan, Christopher J. (Stanford University); Ersner-Hershfield, Hal (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University); Ross, Lee (Stanford University)

People often fail to save enough for retirement. Past research has found individual differences in the way people think of their future selves: either as extensions of their present selves or as different people altogether. For the latter group, saving for retirement can feel like giving money to another person. For such people, appeals to a sense of "duty" to one's future self--a self that is dependent on the present self, much as one's children or aging parents are--can be more effective at motivating people to save than conventional messages that appeal to a sense of self-interest.

(7) Do individual differences in working memory affect delay discounting decisions?

Acuff, Roy (Auburn University); Franco-Watkins, Ana (Auburn University); Mattson, Richard (Auburn University)

Previous research has demonstrated a link between working memory and impulsive decision making in brain-damaged patients and substance-abuse addicts. However, this link is less clear when typical participants are used. We examined whether individual differences in working memory affects decision making in an undergraduate sample. Forty-eight participants completed a delay discounting task in presence and absence of a demanding cognitive load task (a generation task). Consistent with previous results, we found that participants are more intransitive under cognitive load; but not more impulsive. Further, no relationship was observed between individual differences in working memory and decision making.

(8) The Long View: Measuring discount rates at large delays and across domains

Thompson, Katherine J. (Columbia University); Hardisty, David J. (Columbia University); Weber, Elke U. (Columbia University)

235 US residents answered hypothetical questions about monetary (money now vs. money later) and environmental (money now vs. improved air quality later) gains at short (1-year) and long (10-, 50-year) delays. A novel, adaptive method of measuring temporal discount rates was tested against two common methods, matching and titration. The adaptive method, multiple-staircase, uses principles of psychometric measurement techniques to zero in on indifference points. This method yielded lower variance in discount rates for long monetary timescales and all environmental timescales. It also caused participants less confusion and, most importantly, better predicted consequential intertemporal choices in another task.

(9) Instant Wins versus Sweepstakes: Attitudes toward Delayed Promotions

Laurent, Gilles (HEC); Prokopec, Sonja (ESSEC); Onculer, Ayse (ESSEC)

Retailers frequently use sales promotion tools as a part of their marketing effort. The current study investigates the impact of time preferences on attitudes towards sales promotion tools. Results from a ranking experiment shows that the most attractive reward structure is a hedonic prize to be obtained in the future. The least preferred option is immediately-resolved lotteries involving utilitarian prizes. These results can be explained by non-stationary risk attitudes, time preferences and affective responses (such as savoring and hope).

(10) Temporal Focalism

Chan, Steven (New York University); Kruger, Justin (New York University)

A focalism effect based on comparing time has not been previously demonstrated. This research shows the effect of comparing judged frequency of both common and rare activities performed currently (undergrad) versus in the past (high school). For example, when asked to compare high school to now, participants were more likely to indicate that they procrastinated (common) more and watched foreign language films (rare) less in high school than now. A second group asked to compare in the reverse order, now to high school, showed a similar overestimation for common and underestimation for rare activities.

(11) Ambiguity Aversion in Risk and Delay

Weber, Bethany (Iowa State University); Tan, Wah Pheow (Temasek Polytechnic)

Researchers have noted several parallels between biases of risky choice and those of intertemporal choice. The present experiment investigates whether ambiguity aversion can also be found in the domain of intertemporal choice. We examined subjects for both the traditional Ellsberg paradox, and an intertemporal version of the paradox using delays to the receipt of a package. We found that subjects displayed the Ellsberg paradox for both the risky and intertemporal versions of the paradox, demonstrating that decision makers are ambiguity-averse in both the domains of delay and risk. This finding suggests another similarity between risky and intertemporal choice.

(12) Is Time Money? Decision making across time and money

Sussman, Abigail B. (Princeton University); Shafir, Eldar B. (Princeton University)

Time is a highly immutable resource, making decisions about its allocation crucial. People can experience greater or lesser time scarcity, much as they do with money. While most mental accounting research is about money, individuals constantly decide how to spend their time as well. Recent studies have shown that contexts of monetary scarcity may alter the mental accounting of money (Hall, 2008). We examine the effects of time scarcity on the mental accounting of time, and consider these relative to the mental accounting of money. Some of the implications of scarcity versus slack in time versus money are discussed.

(13) Everyday time travel: The effect of tense on judgment

Kane, Joanne (Princeton University); Van Boven, Leaf (University of Colorado, Boulder); McGraw, A. Peter (University of Colorado, Boulder)

Results from six experiments support the hypothesis that mental simulation in the past tense is, and feels, more constrained by reality than mental simulation in the future tense. Participants reported that it is easier to think about future events than past events, that thinking about the future feels more imaginative and creative than thinking about the past, and that mental simulations of future events are more stereotypical or prototypical than mental simulations of past events. Discussion centers on the expansion of social psychological theories of judgment over time.

(14) Temporal Distance and Intentions toward Socially (Un)Desirable Behaviors

Choi, Soe Yoon (Rutgers University); Park, Hee Sun (Michigan State University)

People generally judge their future actions in a desirable and positive way. Based on Construal Level Theory, we hypothesized that people's intentions of blood donation will increase whereas the intentions of littering will decrease over temporal distance. Further analysis investigated whether previous experiences had main effects on intentions as a function of confirming morality when donating blood or justifying immorality when littering in an urgent situation. The results showed an increasing intention of blood donation over time. Both behavioral intentions were higher over temporal distance for people who had had those previous experiences.

(15) Educating drivers on the time saving bias reduces likelihood of speeding

Peer, Eyal (Hebrew University of Jerusalem); Gamliel, Eyal (Ruppin Academic Center); Babad, Elisha (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

According to the time saving bias, drivers overestimate the time they can be gained by increasing from high speeds. Participants were presented with a situation in which they are running late for an appointment and asked to indicate the likelihood they will choose to speed in order to save time. When the real time gain was made explicitly available to participants, drivers indicated lower speeds as their personal preference in such situations and were less likely to choose to exceed the maximum speed limit.

This suggests that educating drivers on the time saving bias may reduce likelihood to speed.

(16) It's the Thought that Will Count: Future Behavior is Seen as More Intentional than Past Behavior
Burns, Zachary C. (Chicago Booth); Bartels, Daniel M. (Chicago Booth); Caruso, Eugene M. (Chicago Booth)

People tend to reason differently about past and future events. Because knowledge about outcomes is relatively more certain for past events than future ones, but knowledge about intentions is relatively uncertain in both cases, we predict that beliefs about an actor's intentions will be more prominent when explaining future behavior than past. We find evidence that intentions carry more weight in assessments of future behaviors that are both positive (donations to charity) and negative (misreporting of taxes). The results suggest that attributions of an actor's intentions are heavily influenced by the mere temporal location of the behavior itself.

(17) The Effect of Age in Decision Making
Qian, Jing (Columbia University); Johnson, Eric (Columbia University); Weber, Elke (Columbia University)

Younger and older adults make decisions differently. Our research uses the Columbia Decision Inventory/web (CDI/web) to measure four important decision indices: loss aversion, asymmetry in inter-temporal choice, effect of framing and effect of anchoring. We found age differences in the decision making domains of asymmetry in temporal discounting, framing and anchoring. We also tested our older and younger participants on a series of cognitive tasks using the Columbia CREATE Web-Based Neuropsychological Tests (CCWNT) in order to establish how fluid intelligence factors (such as working memory, processing speed), and crystallized intelligence factors (such as vocabulary) influence decision making characteristics.

(18) The rules of aging: Aging favors rule-based processing in categorization and multiple-cue judgment
Mata, Rui (Stanford University); von Helversen, Bettina (University of Basel); Karlsson, Linnea (Max Planck Institute Human Development)

We investigated age differences in similarity-based vs. rule-based processes in a task that can be considered either a categorization task or a multiple-cue judgment task depending on the nature of the criterion (binary vs. continuous). Computational modeling suggested that in the binary task the majority of younger adults were best described by an exemplar model while in the continuous task a rule-based model did best. In contrast, the majority of older adults relied on rule-based processes regardless of task condition. We conclude that "rules rule" with advanced age in both categorization and multiple-cue judgment tasks.

(19) Optimistic Predictions in a Gambler's Fallacy Task: Comparing Children and Adults
Bossard, Elaine A. (University of Iowa); Levin, Irwin P. (University of Iowa); Hart, Stephanie S. (University of Houston - Clear Lake)

A gambler's fallacy task was designed for use by both children (aged 8-9) and adults (their parents). Beans of two different colors were drawn from a container. On different trials different colors were designated as "winning." Participants were rewarded both for guessing which color would be drawn and for drawing the winning color. Children were more optimistic than adults in predicting that the winning color would be drawn and were more apt to exhibit the gambler's fallacy of predicting the end of a string of losing trials. Results will be discussed in terms of developmental differences in decision processes.

(20) Cognitive adaptations for resource search: Explaining hot hands and fallacious gamblers
Wilke, Andreas (Department of Psychology, Clarkson University); Barrett, H. Clark (UCLA Anthropology); Todd, Peter M. (Cognitive Science Program, Indiana University)

Wilke & Barrett (2009) proposed that the "hot hand" phenomenon, expecting that streaks will continue, is not a reasoning fallacy as commonly suggested, but rather reflects an evolved psychological assumption that items in the world come in clumps. In computerized experiments, American undergraduates and Shuar hunter-horticulturalists predicted hits and misses in foraging for fruits, coin tosses, and several other kinds of resources whose distributions were generated randomly. The results suggested that a hot hand expectation of clumps is our evolved psychological default, though this can be reduced (though not eliminated) by experience with genuinely independent random phenomena like coin tosses.

(21) Examining Adolescent Sexual Risk Taking from a Decision Making Perspective
Young, Diana L. (University of Georgia); Goodie, Adam S. (University of Georgia)

There is growing interest in the understanding and prevention of risky adolescent sexual behaviors. Although scales exist that assess adolescent risk perceptions in various behaviors from a decision making perspective (e.g., Benthin, Slovic, & Severson, 1993; Gullone, Moore, Moss, & Boyd, 2000), most do not address adolescents' perceptions of consequences associated with sexual behaviors that are considered precursors to sexual intercourse, such as flirting, especially recent, technologically-driven precursor behaviors such as "sexting." The present research examines risk perception and perceived risk attitude regarding

behaviors such as these from a decision making perspective.

(22) Exploring Possible Connections between Adolescents' Epistemological Understandings, Argumentation and Decision Making Skills

Jordanou, Kalypso (University of Cyprus); Constantinou, Constantinos (University of Cyprus)

The present study examined (a) whether there is a relation between epistemological awareness and decision making skills, and, (b) whether engagement in argumentation activities support the development of decision making skills. In addition, we investigated the effectiveness of an intervention that aims to help students develop optimization as a strategy for choosing among alternative solutions. Sixteen adolescents participated in an intervention which includes argumentation activities as well as activities for practicing the optimization strategy over 16 sessions, while fifteen others, served as a control condition, engaged in activities regarding the optimization strategy but not in argumentation activities.

(23) Deep rationality, behavioral economics, and mating decisions

Kenrick, Douglas T. (Arizona State University); Li, Yexin Jessica (Arizona State University); Li, Norman P. (Singapore Management University); Sundie, Jill M. (University of Houston & University of Texas at San Antonio)

From an evolutionary perspective, people make decisions according to principles that seem irrational at a superficial level, but are rational at a deeper level -- using domain-specific decision-rules that, on average, would have resulted in fitness benefits. We present several studies suggesting that traditional psychological functions governing risk aversion, discounting future benefits, and budget allocations to multiple goods vary as a function of decision-maker's motives and individual differences linked to evolved life-history strategies. For example, activating mating motives reverses standard loss aversion in males (but not in females), and men and women differ predictably in appraising social luxuries and necessities.

(24) Sequential decision mechanisms in human mate choice

Todd, Peter M. (Indiana University); Beckage, Nicole (Indiana University)

Choosing appropriate mates from the sequential stream of possible partners encountered over time is a challenging adaptive problem. But getting data on mate search is also challenging because of the long time-scales involved. Speed-dating provides an accelerated microcosm of mate search behavior. Here we use such data to assess search heuristics including fixed threshold models and adjustable aspiration level mechanisms that respond to previous experiences of success or failure on the mating market. We find that initial thresholds related to own attractiveness combined with experience-based threshold adjustment can account for most of the offers made during speed-dating.

(25) How humans cognitively manage too much mate choice

Lenton, Alison P. (University of Edinburgh); Francesconi, Marco (University of Essex)

This presentation reports the results of a new study investigating the impact of "too much choice" on the choice behaviour of speed daters. We found that choosers facing an increasing number of speed dating options paid more attention to attributes that are quickly and easily assessed (e.g., age and body-size) and less attention to those requiring time to elicit and evaluate (e.g., occupational status and educational attainment). Speed daters use choice heuristics when faced with an increasing number of potential mates, thus demonstrating that how people choose mates sits squarely in the domain of general human cognition.

(26) Let's get serious: Communicating commitment in romantic relationships

Ackerman, Joshua M. (Massachusetts Institute of Technology); Griskevicius, Vladas (University of Minnesota); Li, Norman P. (Singapore Management University)

The first time people say "I love you" in romantic relationships, they express both their feelings and a commitment to future behavior. Applying an evolutionary-economics perspective, we predict that men and women have different inherent reference points modulating the potential gains and losses they incur from initially confessing love. These gains and losses also bias affective responses to these confessions. In 4 studies, we show that, although women are more associated with the concept of love, men tend to confess love first and to respond more positively to confessions, but only prior to the onset of sexual activity in relationships.

(27) Humans copy social information in mate choice decisions

Place, Skyler S (Indiana University); Todd, Peter M (Indiana University); Penke, Lars (University of Edinburgh); Asendorpf, Jens B (Humboldt University of Berlin)

Humans, like many species, face the challenging adaptive decision problem of finding a mate. When searching for a mate, one must gather information to determine the value of potential partners. By focusing on individuals that have been previously chosen by others, one's selection of mates can be influenced by another's successful search in a phenomenon known as mate copying. We show mate copying in humans with a novel methodology that closely mimics behavioral studies with non-human animals. After

viewing instances of real mating interest in video recordings of speed-dates, both male and female participants show mate copying effects.

(28) Exploring the influence of pictographic representations of statistical information

Hulsey, Lukas (Wichita State University); Shaffer, Victoria A. (Wichita State University)

Participants made a hypothetical treatment choice for angina. Statistical information regarding the effectiveness of two possible treatment options was provided in either a text-based or pictographic format. Those who received the pictograph were more likely to choose the more effective, more invasive procedure. Two potential explanations for this were tested. Those in the pictograph condition were predicted to rate effectiveness information as more important and invasiveness as less important in their decision. Additionally, better recall of the correct gist representation of the statistic (bypass is more effective than angioplasty) was predicted for those who received the pictograph.

(29) Are Pictures the Voice of Numbers in a Medical Decision Making Task?

Kelades, Joshua (Acadia University); McLeod, Peter J. (Acadia University); Mehta, Rick (Acadia University)

Assessed whether pictographs and/or quizzes would decrease reliance on personal testimonials in a medical decision making task. Participants read a scenario describing a patient's symptoms, two treatment options, and their success rates. This was followed by testimonials for each treatment. Participants then stated which treatment they preferred and rated their confidence. Independent variables were: whether success rates were illustrated with pictographs or described only as text, and whether participants were quizzed specifically on success rates. Reliance on testimonials decreased after viewing pictographs, but decisions were not influenced by quizzes. Interestingly, the order in which IVs were administered differentially impacted confidence.

(30) Effect of false positive screening results and psychosocial factors on compliance with repeat lung cancer screening

Byrne, Margaret (University of Miami); Llabre, Maria (University of Miami); Weissfeld, Joel (University of Pittsburgh); Roberts, Mark (University of Pittsburgh)

We explored whether false positive screening results and psychosocial characteristics affect compliance with repeat lung cancer screening. 400 individuals in a screening efficacy study completed 4 surveys, prior to and following screening; and were supposed to complete a 1-year follow up lung scan. We used a structural equation modeling regression framework. Higher anxiety at baseline is associated with lower compliance with repeat screening, whereas greater increases in anxiety after screening lead to increased compliance. The influence of screening result, demographic variables, and social support on compliance appear to be mediated by anxiety, as they showed no significant direct effects.

(31) The impact of expertise level in judgment analysis: A comparison between Fast and Frugal and Logistic Regression models

Kerimi, Neda (Stockholm University); Backlund, Lars (Karolinska Institute); Skaner, Ylva (Karolinska Institute); Strender, Lars-Erik (Karolinska Institute); Montgomery, Henry (Stockholm University)

We cross validated three logistic regression models with different cue inclusion methods with two Fast & Frugal (F&F) models in terms of fit and prediction as the dependent variable and expertise level as the independent variable. Results showed that there were no differences in fit and prediction depending on expertise level in the f&f models. In the LR models, however, the fit and prediction differed depending on expertise level. This indicates that regression models are better at capturing and representing decision behavior of different expertise levels.

(32) The Effect of Testimonials in Patient Decision Aids: The Role of Numeracy, Literacy and Decision Making Style

Shaffer, Victoria A. (Wichita State University); Templin, Sara (University of Georgia); Hulsey, Lukas (Wichita State University); Barr, Amanda (Wichita State University)

200 women made a hypothetical choice between two treatments for early stage breast cancer: lumpectomy with radiation and mastectomy. Participants viewed one of two DVDs about the treatments. One DVD included only statistical information; the other included both statistical information and patient testimonials. There was no main effect of testimonials on treatment choice; however, there were significant interactions between condition (statistics only and statistics + testimonials) and participant education and income. In addition, participants choosing mastectomy were more confident than those choosing lumpectomy; confidence was also significantly impacted by a condition x treatment choice interaction.

(33) Predicting Clinical Outcomes the Fast and Frugal Way

Jenny, Mirjam (University of Basel); Pachur, Thorsten (University of Basel)

Clinical diagnoses are often inferior to those of actuarial (e.g., linear) models. Simple, noncompensatory heuristics can outperform such compensatory models out-of-sample. We compare (i) fast and frugal decision trees (FFTs) with (ii) clinicians' diagnoses and (iii) logistic regression in two clinical domains. (1) Predictions of psychoticism vs. neuroticism (using data by

Meehl, 1954). (2) predictions of depression (using longitudinal data of the “Dresden Predictor Study”). Our analysis show, that, concerning predictive accuracy, FFTs can outperform logistic regression and clinician’s diagnoses. Therefore, using simple decision heuristics should be considered in clinical settings.

(34) Laypeople’s Views on Decision Making in the Health Professions

de Oliveira, Stephanie (The Ohio State University); Arkes, Hal (The Ohio State University)

We investigated laypeople’s views of actuarial judgment (AJ) and clinical judgment (CJ) as used in the health professions. Eighty-two participants assigned to either medical or psychology cases, read both easy and difficult diagnosis scenarios, rating the appropriateness of and comfort with using AJ and CJ in each. AJ was rated as more appropriate in medical and difficult scenarios, whereas CJ was rated as more appropriate in psychological and easier scenarios. Participants expressed greater comfort with CJ in both medical and psychological domains. Measures of participants’ beliefs about doctors and psychologists helped explain the effects of our independent variables.

(35) Accuracy of Various Algorithms for Diagnosing from a Disease by Finding Sensitivity Matrix

Hamm, Robert M. (University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center); Golmoradi, Kiamars R. (University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center); Wolfe, Timothy A. (University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center); Magrill, Talia B. (University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center); Papa, Frank J. (University of North Texas College of Osteopathic Medicine)

We report analyses of a medical diagnosis task (acute chest pain) in support of a tutorial for medical students. Accurate diagnosis is complicated by the intercorrelations among clinical findings. We generated cases from a Disease-by-Finding matrix of sensitivities and compared variants of three diagnostic approaches - similarity of case to prototype (correlation), Bayes’ Theorem, and the KBIT algorithm of Papa (1991). Relative accuracies suggest that when we lack full information about symptom interrelations, heuristic diagnosis methods may suffice for the preparation of a diagnosis tutor. Between method confusion matrices give insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the different approaches.

(36) A Natural History Model to Estimate the Potential Impact of Human Papillomavirus Vaccination to Reduce Cervical Cancer Disparities between US Females

Sanon, Myrlene (i3 Innovus); Taylor, Douglas (i3 Innovus); Kruzikas, Denise (GlaxoSmithKline); Pawar, Vivek (i3 Innovus); Gilmore, Kristen (i3 Innovus); Weinstein, Milton

Over 17 million American females do not have health insurance. Pre-cancerous cervical lesions and cancer (CC) are common in US females, and CC screening can be effective in reducing CC incidence. The objective of this study was to assess the clinical benefits of CC screening and vaccination in insured and uninsured 19-year-old females cohorts using a Markov model. Uninsured females have lower screening rates and a higher overall risk of developing CC compared with insured females. Vaccinating females, regardless of insurance status, may reduce the lifetime disparity in CC outcomes between insured and uninsured females by more than 60%.

(37) Integrating Context in Clinical Thinking: Themes and Categories Activated During the Patient Encounter

Devantier, Sarah L. (the University of Western Ontario); Minda, John Paul (the University of Western Ontario); Haddara, Wael (the Schulich School of Medicine & Dentistry); Goldszmidt, Mark (the Schulich School of Medicine & Dentistry)

When interacting with a patient, what categories are activated in a physician’s mind? Certainly diagnostic categories are activated as the physician considers a differential diagnosis, but presumably there are other active categories as well. We suggest that goal-oriented categories, such as patient management categories, are also activated. Using a forced-choice triad task we show that experienced physicians are equally likely to endorse both diagnostic and management groupings of patients, indicating that both types of category are salient when interacting with patients. Using a think-aloud protocol, we further investigate category structures in both experienced and novice physicians.

(38) Pictures Speak Louder than Numbers: On Communicating Risks to Non-Native Language Speakers

Garcia-Retamero, Rocio (University of Granada); Dhami, Mandeep K. (University of Cambridge); Galesic, Mirta (Max Planck Institute for Human Development)

People have difficulties grasping numerical concepts necessary for understanding risks. In denominator neglect, people focus on number of times a target event has happened, without considering the overall number of opportunities for it to happen. We studied denominator neglect in medical problems involving risk reduction. Polish residents in the UK were provided with risk information either in Polish or in English, and with or without icon arrays. Many participants showed denominator neglect especially when numerical information was in English. However, icon arrays proved effective in eliminating denominator neglect among these non-native language speakers.

(39) One decision at a time or the whole path at once? When the way information is provided affects prostate cancer decision making

Gavaruzzi, Teresa (DPSS, University of Padova); Zikmund-Fisher, Brian (VA; Division General Internal Medicine; CBDSM, Ann Arbor, MI); Ubel, Peter (VA; Division General Internal Medicine; CBDSM, Ann Arbor, MI); Lotto, Lorella (DPSS, University of Padova); Fagerlin, Angela (VA; Division General Internal Medicine; CBDSM, Ann Arbor, MI)

We examined the effect of two information presentation methods (e.g., information described PSA testing, biopsy, treatments) on people's willingness to undergo prostate cancer testing: sequential vs. presented all at once. Participants rated their willingness to undertake each option either right after reading each piece of information (sequential) or after reading all information. Participants receiving information all at once were less willing to undergo a biopsy and were more unsure about which treatment to have. These results highlight differences in prostate cancer decision making depending on whether the decision is presented as a single decision or as a series of decisions.

(40) A Memory Theoretic Account of Information Search: Effects of Base Rates and Sampling Biases

Lange, Nick D. (University of Oklahoma); Thomas, Rick P. (University of Oklahoma); Dougherty, Michael R. (University of Maryland)

Because base-rate differences are inherent in the ecology and experience is rife with sampling biases, it is important to study how these factors can lead to miscalibration of beliefs and promote suboptimal, even hazardous, information search. The HyGene architecture (short for Hypothesis Generation) was used to explore these effects on hypothesis generation and testing behavior through computational simulation. The model makes strong and empirically testable predictions concerning how hypothesis generation and testing are influenced by base rates and sampling biases. Additionally, the examination of multiple hypothesis-testing rules informs empirical research to address the specific information search strategies people utilize.

(41) An Examination of Individual Differences in Working Memory Capacity Effects on the Encoding and Retrieval of Information under Cognitive Load

Montano, Michael J. (Auburn University); Franco-Watkins, Ana M. (Auburn University)

People often make decisions while under additional cognitive demands, such as cognitive load or time pressure. The current experiment investigates how individual differences in working memory affect encoding of novel city size information and how cognitive load modulates the retrieval of the trained information. Participants were trained on different cities with feedback. After reaching the accuracy criterion, participants completed the decision task alone and under more demanding situations (e.g., dual-task). Results indicate that cognitive load reduces the accuracy in responding by participants. Working memory is examined to determine the role it plays in the encoding and retrieval of new information.

(42) The ecological rationality of betting on speed of retrieval in memory-based decision making

Gaissmaier, Wolfgang (Max-Planck-Institute for Human Development); Schooler, Lael J. (Max-Planck-Institute for Human Development); Marewski, Julian N. (Max-Planck-Institute for Human Development)

The need to retrieve cue information from memory induced the use of simple decision strategies, which process cues sequentially and often bet on only one good reason (Bröder & Gaissmaier, 2007). Therefore, the order in which cues are considered is particularly important. We investigated whether the speed of retrieving information allows for ordering cues successfully. The results of two experiments suggest that the speed with which cues about real objects come to mind is indeed informative. Simulations showed that feeding decision strategies with retrieval speed to order cues was largely beneficial and allowed them to compete even with multiple regression.

(43) The Relations Among the Iowa Gambling Task, Real-World Decision Outcomes and Working Memory

Furl, Brent (Wake Forest University); Jennings, Janine M. (Wake Forest University); Stone, Eric R. (Wake Forest University)

The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) was designed to mimic real-life decision making and has been used with a variety of populations. In the current experiment, we examine whether performance on the IGT is associated with positive real world decision-making outcomes using the Decisions Outcome Inventory (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007) and explore the role of conscious processing on the IGT by adding a working memory task. Surprisingly, individuals with poorer real-world decision outcomes scored better on the IGT and were most affected by working memory load. The possible role of maximizing vs. satisficing in explaining these results is discussed.

(44) Optimal Foraging in Semantic Memory

Hills, Thomas (University of Basel); Todd, Peter (Indiana University); Jones, Michael (Indiana University)

We investigated how people retrieve items from memory using the category fluency task: Participants were asked to retrieve the names of as many types of animals from memory as they could in three minutes. Semantic structure was defined using a semantic space model (BEAGLE) and via hand-coded categories. We found that participants didn't appear to use a categorical

patch model, such as 'epets', but used a more fluid item-level semantic patch structure. They also left patches when the marginal (current) rate of finding items was near the average rate for the entire task, as predicted by the Marginal Value Theorem.

(45) Experience-based decisions and paired distinctiveness of rare events

Haberstroh, Susanne (University of Osnabrück, Germany); Oeberst, Aileen (University of Osnabrück, Germany)

In studies on experience-based decision making, participants usually are either presented with a fixed sample (e.g. 50 pieces of information per lottery) or participants sample the information themselves. The influence of diverging sample sizes within a pair of lotteries has not been systematically addressed so far. From research on stereotyping (Hamilton & Gifford, 1976) we know that the joint occurrence of two rare events ("paired distinctiveness") can have a strong influence on judgments and decisions. In this experiment, we combined these research approaches by studying the impact of events with a low probability in a big or a small sample.

(46) The Roar of the Crowd: Narrative Richness and Hindsight Bias

Kausel, Edgar E. (University of Arizona); Connolly, Terry (University of Arizona); Birk, Sam (University of Arizona)

Several accounts of hindsight bias rely on the subjects' ability to retrospectively construct rich narratives connecting outcomes to antecedents. In two experiments, we found that hindsight bias in judging real football games by football experts from statistical information was amplified by quite modest insertion of non-predictive but vivid features: team names (Experiment 1) and generic football-related pictures (Experiment 2). These findings suggest that ease of activation of links between antecedents and outcomes is a key mechanism of the hindsight effect.

(47) Of Lines and Bounds: The Role of Casuistry and Case-Based Reasoning in Optimizing and Non-Optimizing Decision Frameworks

Searing, Elizabeth A.M. (Georgia State University)

The concepts of casuistry and case-based reasoning provide Herbert Simon's elusive "common denominator" for reconciling the "is" and "ought" components of decision processes and their underlying preference structure (Administrative Behavior, 4th ed., 1997); for illustration, we use the SCaBR (Searing Case-Based Reasoning) method in the framing and analysis of a sample case study in multi-tiered optimizing and non-optimizing decision scenarios. We find that not only are factual and nonfactual components both quantifiable and comparable, but that such insight provides needed explanation of human decision evolution and the transitivity of preferences.

(48) Multiple aspiration levels in decision under risk

Diecidue, Enrico (INSEAD)

Aspiration levels and their impact on decision making have long been discussed (Lopes 1987, 1996). Payne (2005) showed that aspiration levels and the probability of success and failure (i.e., probability that the aspiration will be reached and probability that the aspiration will fall short of, respectively) are a relevant aspect of decision making. We develop a model that takes these aspects and the multiplicity of aspiration levels into account. We investigate the relation of this model with cumulative prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1992) and with the ideas of "goals and plans" in decision making (Krantz and Kunreuther 2007).

(49) Risk Auctions: Novel Mechanisms for Eliciting Risk Aversion Coefficients and the Impact of Probability vs. Money Framing

Olivola, Christopher Y. (University College London); Wang, Stephanie W. (California Institute of Technology)

We introduce, test, and compare two novel auction-based experimental methods for eliciting risk aversion coefficients. In these "risk auctions", participants bid the smallest sum they would prefer receiving with a given probability -or- the smallest acceptable probability of obtaining a reward, rather than receive a smaller, certain payoff. The lowest bidder receives the uncertain reward (i.e., a gamble); all other bidders receive the sure payoff. These auctions offer important advantages over other methods of elicitation. In addition, we compare how risk preferences vary depending on whether the auction focuses participants' attention on the probabilistic or monetary dimension of gambles.

(50) Revisiting the Gains-Loss Separability Assumption in Prospect Theory

Por, Han-Hui (Fordham University); Budescu, David V. (Fordham University)

Prospect theory assumes that people encode outcomes as gains/losses. The subjective value of mixed prospects is assumed to be the sum of their corresponding positive and negative components. Previous research (Wu & Markle, 2008 using choices; Budescu & Templin, 2009 using Certainty Equivalents) found different rates of violations of this assumption. We report a new study using both elicitation methods and randomly selected prospects and. Overall, we found 46.5% of the choices are consistent with the gains-loss separability assumption and 13.7% violate it (39.8% are indeterminate). Interestingly, the pattern of violations observed in the two methods is different.

(51) Levels of Theory-of-Mind Reasoning in Competitive Games

Goodie, Adam S. (University of Georgia); Doshi, Prashant (University of Georgia); Young, Diana L. (University of Georgia)

The literature on recursive reasoning ("I think that you think that I think") is pessimistic. Individuals have attributed little strategic reasoning to others, performing well against simulated non-strategic opponents, and learning slowly and incompletely against strategic opponents. In two studies, we replicated these results with a previously used game; but, with a game that was made competitive and simpler by having a fixed-sum structure, these results reversed. Against a strategic opponent, participants performed well, whereas against a non-strategic opponent they learned optimal responding slowly and incompletely. Thus, individuals may be less prone to underestimate their opponents than was previously held.

(52) Visual Attention In Mixed Gambles: Process Data and Choice Behavior

Jarnebrant, Peter (Columbia Business School); Johnson, Eric J. (Columbia Business School)

Decision process behavior has been studied widely in the process tracing literature, in particular in the investigation of preference reversals for gambles. Little attention, however, has been given the relation between the process data, and the ultimate outcome of the process, i.e., acceptance or rejection of the gamble. In two studies of mixed gamble choices, we measure as well as manipulate the decision maker's acquisition of information about the gamble. We find, as expected, that acquiring gain [loss] information increases [decreases] acceptance; opposite to expectations we find that the impact of gain information is stronger than that of loss information.

(53) Predecisional Distortion in Multiple Domains of Risky Choice

Miller, Seth A. (The Ohio State University); DeKay, Michael L. (The Ohio State University)

Evaluations of outcomes and probabilities for risky monetary gambles are often distorted in the direction of currently leading preferences, yielding significant impacts on final choices. This study examined risky choices in monetary and non-monetary domains (e.g., medical decisions, music downloads, etc.). Repeated-measures linear and logistic regressions indicated that manipulating the order in which information was presented affected predecisional distortion and final choices. Greater proportions of participants ultimately chose the initially preferred alternative, with final preferences being partially mediated through predecisional distortion. These effects were robust across the domains examined and distortion was comparable to that observed in monetary gambles.

(54) A Computational Model to Incorporate Non-commensurate Choice Options

Koop, Greg J. (Miami University); Bristow, R. Evan (Miami University); Thomas, Robin D. (Miami University); Johnson, Joseph G. (Miami University)

Decision field theory (DFT) successfully models the dynamic, stochastic nature of human decision making, yet it still requires choice options that differ only in the levels of identical attributes. We extend the scope of DFT to apply to decisions involving non-commensurate options by incorporating concepts of Coombs' ideal point theory and similarity scaling of options via multidimensional scaling. We also entertain two possible mechanisms for producing rank order preferences, rather than just a choice response, from DFT that differ with respect to the choice architecture at the time of response generation.

(55) Impact of evidence format on judgments of probability and verdict: Accounting for the "Wells Effect"

Shoots-Reinhard, Brittany (The Ohio State University); Arkes, Hal (The Ohio State University); Mayes, Ryan (The Ohio State University)

Prior research has shown an astonishing disconnect between jurors' judgments of probability of guilt and their verdict (i.e., the "Wells effect"). Probability judgments generally follow from statistical evidence. However, verdicts can be influenced by evidence format, such as whether the evidence pertains to a base rate or witness reliability. In two studies we showed that people were less likely to award damages in cases with base rate evidence (e.g., percentage of buses using a road) than statistically identical reliability evidence (e.g., percentage of times a witness was accurate), even though probability estimates appropriately tracked both types of evidence.

(56) Soundness conditions for prescriptive decision analysis

Wallace, Richard J. (University College Cork); Ashikhmin, Ilya (Institute for Systems Analysis)

Methods of prescriptive decision analysis involve both formal methods and judgmental capacities of the (human decision maker). As a consequence, these methods must meet two kinds of soundness conditions, one related to formal adequacy, the other to the correspondence of models and methods with actual human capacities, (which is distinct from "descriptive adequacy"). This means that although such methods give rise to preference orderings that in a deep sense are 'artificial', guidelines are still needed to establish what is reasonable. The purpose of this work is to lay out such guidelines and illustrate some of their implications in practice.

(57) Decision Analysis by Proxy for the Rational Terrorist

John, Richard (University of Southern California, Dept of Psychology); Rosoff, Heather (University of Southern California, CREATE)

This paper describes a methodology for representing terrorist preferences for alternative modes of attack. The model includes multiple and conflicting objectives related to the attack, attitudes toward risk, trade-offs among various objectives, and uncertainty about attack success. The methodology utilizes judgments from experts knowledgeable about terrorist motivations and beliefs to provide assessments of relevant terrorist leader uncertainty, as well as uncertainty in their own knowledge about terrorist beliefs and values. A multi-attribute utility model is embedded within a simulation model that generates risk profiles for each attack strategy, as well as probabilities that terrorist leader will select each attack strategy.

(58) Response time methodology for testing between stochastic models of decision making

Fific, Mario (Max Planck Institute for Human Development); Rieskamp, Jörg (University of Basel)

There is a growing interest in process tracing techniques as a basis for comparing different decision making models. Such a methodology, known as systems factorial technology (SFT), is being developed to diagnose whether processes are organized in serial or parallel mental architectures, and whether a stopping rule is exhaustive or self-terminating. Using the joint analysis of both choice probability and reaction time, collected in a repeated gambling task, we compared stochastic versions of several prominent decision making models, such as the cumulative prospect theory, priority heuristic, expected value theory and logical rule-based model.

(59) Selfish Social Connectors, Their Decisions to Bridge Social Actors and Build Network Connections

Anik, Lalin (Harvard Business School); Norton, Michael I. (Harvard Business School)

Aiming to bridge the gap between social structure and the value of relationships, we investigated people's decisions to create network connections. We showed that "social capitalists" get more utility out of making connections than others. We hypothesized that people's tendency to construct ties strongly impacted the personal and social benefits they received as well as their preferences for social engagements. In six separate studies, we explored how people's perceptions of how well they built connections, as well as their specific space in the network structure impacted these individuals. We manipulated the formation of connections to distinguish the more influential connectors.

(60) Imagining a Crowd Within

Yeomans, Mike (University of Chicago); Soll, Jack (Duke University); Koehler, Derek (University of Waterloo)

Many judgments and decisions are susceptible to failures of imagination in a "narrow frame" of reference informing a decision (Larrick, 2009). Previous studies have tapped a "crowd within" (Vul & Pashler, 2008) to lessen the inherent limitations of a single viewpoint. The current study examines whether imagining the perspective of others (e.g. "what would Ariely do?") can broaden frames. Some subjects imagine how three people they know would rate 40 hollywood movies, while others imagine only their own ratings. All then estimate the mean and distribution of the movies' ratings on imdb.com, a popular website.

(61) Comparing estimation strategies in real-world environments

Woike, Jan Kristian (University of Lausanne); Hertwig, Ralph (University of Basel Hofferage, Ulrich (University of Lausanne)

Estimating quantities, from future values of stocks to waiting times at check-outs, is an important everyday task. Across several dozen real-world environments drawn from manifold domains, we analyzed the performance of estimation strategies in an extensive simulation study. We compared two classes of models: one included computationally complex models such as multiple regression and CART, the other included psychologically plausible and computationally simpler strategies such as QuickEst and the Mapping Model. We report the strategies' ability to generalize from small training sets to new data (robustness) and explore their ability to exploit statistical structures in the environments (ecological rationality).

(62) Do we underestimate the validity of linear expert models?

Kaufmann, Esther (University of Mannheim); Wittmann, Werner W. (University of Mannheim)

Linear expert models of judgment are powerful tools for studying decision making. Psychological research shows that linear models derived from judges' decisions are usually more valid than the judge. Hence, in our talk we will overview previous reviews on expert models and their evaluation for validity, leading to a meta-analytical comparison of a subsample of lens-model studies on a) task content, b) type of criteria (subjective vs. objective), and c) judges' expertise-level. Our analysis clearly supports the increased validity of expert models and implies that their success is actually underestimated.

(63) Improving Estimation Accuracy through Sequential Adjustment

Luan, Shenghua (Singapore Management University)

Estimating a criterion variable's value based on multiple cues can be a challenging task. In this study, we propose a simple way to improve estimation accuracy: Instead of seeing all cues' values at once before coming up with one single estimate, view each of them piecemeal and estimate at every step. The efficacy of this method was tested in two real-world tasks, one about estimating prices of diamonds and the other fuel efficiency of cars; and in both novices and experts. Compared with the "all-at-once" method, we found that the sequential one could improve both groups' estimation accuracy significantly.

(64) Modeling Decision Making and Cognitive Performance in the Dynamic Stock-Flow Task

Ghaffarzadegan, Navid (University at Albany - SUNY); Vakili, Keyvan (Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto)

Data from Lebiere et al. (2009) shows subjects have a great deal of difficulty in learning the Dynamic Stock and Flows Task. In this paper we introduce a simulation model that considers an analytical and an intuitive problem solving algorithms. With the combination of these modes we address major issues observed in the data and support our arguments by replicating decision making behavior in individual and aggregated level. Specifically, we argue that people can be trapped in one of the modes as modeled in the paper and never find a way to move to the correct solution.

(65) Descriptions, Experiences, and Memories: The Effects of Presentation and Representation on Choice

Koop, Gregory (Miami University); Johnson, Joseph G. (Miami University)

The "gambling metaphor" underlying the majority of decision research is often criticized, yet remains the dominant paradigm. Recently, researchers have contrasted gambles that are "described" with those that are "experienced" through sampling. Others have compared "memory-based" decisions to those among described alternatives. We have developed a unique paradigm that allows for concurrently investigating "described," "experienced," and "memory-based" decisions in a single context (a mock fantasy football league). Additionally, we use diagnostic stimuli and process-tracing measures to infer strategy use in these three conditions. We present empirical results that illuminate the differences between these formats, and offer a unifying theoretical framework.

(66) Modeling Threshold Learning with Incomplete Feedback

Ghaffarzadegan, Navid (University at Albany (SUNY)); Stewart, Thomas R. (University at Albany (SUNY))

Most studies of decision threshold learning assume full feedback conditions, that is, regardless of the decision made, feedback is always provided. However, for many detection and selection problems, feedback may be available only on some of the trials (partial feedback) or may be conditional on the decision made, i.e. feedback may be available only for positive decisions, e.g. if an applicant is admitted or hired (conditional feedback). The data from selection and detection experiments shows that people behave differently under different feedback conditions and for different base rates. We develop a simulation model to investigate and explain these differences.

(67) The 'side-effect' effect, intentionality judgments, and motivated cognition

Fernandez-Duque, Diego (Villanova U.); del Rio, Victoria (Villanova U.); Kurti, Allison (Villanova U.); Hughes, Matthew (Villanova U.); Todd, Allison (Villanova U.)

People act in pursuit of goals, but sometimes their actions have other consequences along the way. Such side effects are judged to be intentional if harmful but unintentional if beneficial (Knobe, 2003). Is this asymmetry eliminated when people judge the side effects of their own actions, instead of the actions of others? Are harmful side effects judged as less intentional when paired with altruistic goals? In two experiments using vignettes, we have found little evidence of such modulations. We discuss these findings in relation to theories of motivated cognition.

(68) Forming Consistent Stories During Decision Making by Reinterpreting or Discounting Evidence: An Agent-Based Model

Chen, Lydia L. (University of Michigan)

Decision makers tend to prefer options whose supporting evidence form consistent stories. Instead of simply rewarding consistent evidence, however, people often reinterpret and discount incoming evidence to make them consistent with their favored options. Why would they do this, given the risk to decision accuracy? Controlled experiments with an agent-based model demonstrated that reinterpreting and discounting inconsistent evidence is an efficient way to achieve consistent stories, provided that the processing order of evidence is balanced. Compared to reinforcement alone, discounting and reinterpretation increased story consistency and decision speed. However, weaker stories could beat stronger stories simply by being presented earlier.

(69) The Complexities of Selective Information Exposure

Scherer, A.M. (University of Iowa); Windschitl, P.D. (University of Iowa); Smith, A.R. (University of Iowa); Rose, J.P. (University of Iowa)

Research on selective information exposure has primarily emphasized the role of choice and focused on motivation to reduce cognitive dissonance as the primary mechanism that leads to selective exposure. It is possible that pre-existing preferences, outcome desirability, and cognitive biases such as a positivity bias and focalism may play roles in selective exposure effects. Results from a study in which choice and desirability were manipulated demonstrate that while choice is important, other mechanisms can produce a selective exposure to information when no choice is made.

(70) Relational Accounting and Social Motives in Negotiation

Bottom, William (Washington University); Mislin, Alexandra (University at Buffalo, State University of New York); Boumgarden, Peter (Washington University)

We propose a model of a negotiator who maintains relational accounts regulating social exchange. The accounts generate emotional response comprising motives to compete, cooperate, or self-sacrifice. We manipulated Thaler's mental accounting scenarios and assessed subjects' emotional reactions. Having found evidence that emotional response mediates the impact of mental accounts on a widely used measure of social motive we conducted additional studies on bargaining behavior. Social motive partially mediates the impact of mental accounts on bargaining and on the implementation of negotiated agreement. Implications of mental accounting for the development of a general, multi-level behavioral theory of negotiation are considered.

(71) I am not angry with you, I am disappointed: The interpersonal effects of anger and disappointment in bargaining

Lelieveld, Gert-Jan (Leiden University); Van Dijk, Eric (Leiden University); Van Beest, Ija (Leiden University); Van Kleef, Gerben A. (University of Amsterdam); Steinel, Wolfgang (Leiden University)

In negotiations, disappointment may share the advantages of anger, but not its disadvantages. Anger has been shown to be detrimental a) when one has low power and b) when it is directed at the person (instead of the offer). Experiment 1 showed that participants offered more to disappointed opponents than to angry opponents when they negotiated with low power opponents. In Experiment 2 we showed that anger directed at the offer elicited higher concessions than anger directed at the person. The reverse was true for the effects of disappointment. Disappointment paid because it evoked feelings of guilt in opponents.

(72) Can Nervous Nelly Negotiate? How Anxiety Causes Negotiators to Exit Early and Make Steep Concessions

Wood, Alison (Wharton); Schweitzer, Maurice (Wharton)

Across four studies, we demonstrate that anxiety is both commonly associated with negotiations and harmful to negotiator performance. In our experiments, we randomly induced either low anxiety or high anxiety. Compared to negotiators experiencing low levels of anxiety, negotiators experiencing high levels of anxiety make steep concessions and exit bargaining situations early. The relationship between anxiety and negotiator behavior is moderated by negotiator self-efficacy.

(73) Is emphasizing losses (vs. gains) better in negotiations with multiple issues?

Appelt, Kirstin C. (Columbia University); Higgins, E. Tory (Columbia University)

When presented with two differently framed issues (one loss issue and one gain issue), negotiators emphasizing their loss issue are more demanding, and reach better negotiated outcomes, on this issue. In other words, there is an interaction between role and emphasized issue such that candidates emphasizing not losing hours (vs. gaining salary) are more demanding and do better on hours, whereas recruiters emphasizing not losing salary (vs. gaining hours) are more demanding and do better on salary. No effects were found for the gain issue. Results are discussed in the context of asymmetric weighting of losses versus gains.

(74) Gamer Show Experiences in Non-cooperative Bargaining

Szanto, Richard (Corvinus University of Budapest)

In the fall of 2008 a Hungarian television channel aired a gamer show where players after answering trivia questions had to agree on an unfair division of the sum of money they earned. Players had hundred seconds to reach an agreement and as time evolved the payoffs of the players were decreasing continuously. The game presented above shows similar characteristics to non-cooperative bargaining games. 36 bargaining processes were registered and coded. Findings suggest a very significant gender effect. Yet merit (i.e. how many correct answers contestants gave to the trivia questions) does not seem to be an important factor.

(75) You'd better think?! The influences of breaks and social motivation on negotiation behavior and outcomes

Harinck, Fieke (Leiden University); De Dreu, Carsten K.W. (University of Amsterdam)

We investigated how the thought processes during breaks in negotiation influence negotiation processes, and tested two competing hypotheses, based on the Motivated Information Processing in Groups Model and Unconscious Thought Theory. Fifty-one dyads with either pro-social or pro-self motivation engaged in a multi-issue negotiation. They were interrupted halfway to either reflect on the negotiation or to do a distracting task. In line with the MIP-G model, pro-social negotiators developed more cooperative attitudes, engaged in more pro-social behavior, and impasse less often than pro-self negotiators in the reflect

break condition; no such effects were observed in the distraction break condition.

(76) Strategic negotiation behaviors, self-inference, and the perception of negotiation outcomes
Swift, Samuel A. (Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University)

Research on self-inference processes have shown how powerful a person's actions can be in influencing their attitudes and beliefs. While most previous research artificially constrains behavior, the negotiation context provides a naturalistic environment to study the self-inference process by creating incentives for strategic rather than genuine behaviors. Previous work focuses on beliefs about the self while this work shows that the perception of economic outcomes can be affected as well. Participants in buyer-seller negotiations in which strategic behavior was unconstrained report lower satisfaction and decreased total utility compared to control condition negotiations in which persuasive behaviors were not an option.

(77) Distinct neural correlates for the processing of magnitude, probability and uncertainty of potential monetary gains and losses

Canessa, Nicola (Universita' Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Milan, Italy); Chierchia, Gabriele (Universita' Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Milan, Italy); Motterlini, Matteo (Universita' Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Milan, Italy); Baud-Bovy, Gabriel (Universita' Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Milan, Italy); Cappa, Stefano (Universita' Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Milan, Italy)

Decision-making involves the weighting of magnitude, probability and uncertainty of potential gains/losses. Neurophysiological investigations highlighted the role of mesolimbic dopaminergic neurons in coding magnitude and probability (and their integration in expected-value) as well as uncertainty, but related neuroimaging studies in humans have provided largely inconsistent results. We addressed this issue by using functional-Magnetic-Resonance-Imaging and a parametric design that independently varied both reward-magnitude (from 1 to 100\$) and probability (from 1% to 100%) for both wins and losses. Results highlighted that the neural processing of the basic decision-parameters involves specific regions involved in reward-anticipation, emotional and cognitive processing, and conflict monitoring.

(78) An fMRI Study of Ecological Rationality: Group Size, Kinship, Group Composition and Risky Choice

Wang, X.T. (University of South Dakota); Zheng, Hongming (Chinese Academy of Sciences); Zhu, Liqi (Chinese Academy of Sciences)

We explored brain activation patterns of 23 Chinese participants when they made risky choices between a sure option and a gamble of equal expected value in different hypothetical social group contexts. The fMRI and behavioral results showed that small-group and kinship cues activated more limbic structures of the brain and resulted in a stronger risk seeking preference. ACC plus frontal lobe activations reflected a conflict in decision preference when the group at risk was a heterogeneous mixture of strangers and kin. Overall, our findings lend support to the notion of domain-specific brain modules for evolutionally recurrent and ecologically relevant tasks.

(79) Individual Differences in Social Comparison and Decision Making

Corser, Ryan (University of Toledo); Jasper, J.D. (University of Toledo); Rose, Jason (University of Toledo)

Research shows that mixed-handers more so than strong-handers can maintain multiple and oftentimes opposing representations. Because of this, mixed-handers demonstrate greater Stroop interference and better appreciate visual paradoxes. The current study extended this work into paradigms involving the comparison of self versus others. In Experiment 1, subjects rated their proficiency on a number of skills; in Experiment 2, subjects estimated their likelihood of winning a trivia game. Results indicated that, as predicted, mixed-handers show smaller above- and below-average and shared circumstance effects. Theoretical implications as well as ongoing work on brain asymmetry, egocentrism, and decision-making will be discussed.

(80) Policy Bundling to Overcome Loss Aversion: A Method for Improving Legislative Outcomes

Milkman, Katherine L. (Wharton); Mazza, Mary Carol (Harvard Business School); Shu, Lisa L. (Harvard Business School); Tsay, Chia-Jung (Harvard Business School); Bazerman, Max H. (Harvard Business School)

Policies that would create net benefits for society often lack legislative support because losses loom larger than gains psychologically. To reduce this harmful consequence of loss aversion, we propose a policy bundling technique in which related bills with both costs and benefits are combined. We confirm across four legislative domains that this bundling technique increases support for bills that have both costs and benefits. We demonstrate this effect is due to changes in the psychology of decision making rather than voters' willingness to compromise.

(81) Biases Present in State Standard Setting Methods

Templin, Sara (University of Alabama)

No Child Left Behind mandates that all students be "proficient" in reading and math by 2014. Individual states are responsible for setting these standards and ideally we would expect these standards to be based solely on a student's ability. However, when

setting these standards, states often rely on ratings provided by teachers. Using the standard setting data from a Midwestern state (representing seven grade levels in both reading and mathematics), we show that proficiency ratings are subject to anchoring effects (based on average classroom ability) and rater biases (differential scale usage), leaving a student's proficiency to chance rather than ability.

(82) Axing the Taxman: The Psychology of Tax Aversion

Sussman, Abigail B. (Princeton University); Olivola, Christopher Y. (University College London)

Tax collection is critical for maintaining a country's infrastructure. However, most of us dislike paying taxes. Although a distaste for paying taxes could be rational on economic grounds, we show this aversion extends beyond disliking the costs incurred through taxation, and that the mere thought of taxation can alter political attitudes. In Study 1, respondents were more willing to travel 30 minutes for an 8% tax-free discount on a television than for a 9% tax-unrelated discount. In Study 2, respondents were more likely to identify with anti-tax political parties the more frequently taxes were mentioned in the media.

(83) Likelihood Judgment and Other Regarding Behavior

Peterson, Nathaniel (Carnegie Mellon University); Weber, Roberto (Carnegie Mellon University)

The goal of this research is to help better understand how individuals form their perceptions of what is likely to happen to others and how such perceptions influence their willingness to pay for stochastic improvements to others' welfare. Using laboratory experiments, we test the role of social distance and control both for how much individuals care about others' outcomes, when consequences are certain, and for the actual likelihood of those outcomes. Applications include helping to understand why people are often unwilling to pay much for other-regarding preventive causes.

(84) Time Horizons in Interdependent Security

Hardisty, David (Columbia University); Kunreuther, Howard (University of Pennsylvania); Krantz, David (Columbia University); Arora, Poonam (Columbia University)

Many real-world social dilemmas require interdependent players to protect against a large loss that has a low annual probability of occurring. Examples include protecting against terrorism (shared border security), protecting against disease outbreak (think of bird flu), or climate change. Decisions on whether to invest in protection may be made year by year, or investment may be precommitted for a number of years. Normally, when an outcome is delayed, the subjective uncertainty goes up. However, we hypothesized and found that with recurring low probability events, increasing the time horizon would increase the subjective probability and thus (paradoxically) increase investment rates.

(85) The joint effect of description and experience

Erev, Ido (Technion); Ert, Eyal (Harvard)

The paper explores the joint effect of description and experience on choice behavior in different settings. In the basic control condition the participants were asked to select once between "0 with certainty", and a "21 outcomes risky gamble." The outcomes and their probabilities were precisely described. In the experimental condition the participants were encouraged to sample the risky prospect before reaching their decision. The results reveal large differences between the two conditions: The participants behaved "as if" they overweight rare events in the control (description only) condition, and underweight rare events in the experimental (description & sampling) condition.

(86) On the decision to explore

Weiss, Kinnert (Technion); Erev, Ido (Technion)

The decision to explore is studied in simple experiments. In each trial the participant is asked to select one of 100 unmarked keys that are presented in a matrix on a computer screen. Each choice leads to an immediate presentation of the trial's payoff on the selected key. The results reveal robust deviations from optimal exploration that reflect underweighting of rare events. The participants exhibited under-exploration when the common outcome of exploration was disappointing, and over-exploration when the common outcome of exploitation was disappointing. This pattern can be captured with a model that assumes reliance on small samples of experiences.

(87) Just How Comparative Are Comparative Judgments?

Radzevick, Joseph R. (Carnegie Mellon University); Moore, Don A. (Carnegie Mellon University)

Some have claimed that comparative judgments are not really comparative at all, but that instead tend to overweight one of the two elements that underlie the comparison (i.e., differential weighting). Across three studies, we investigate the nature of comparative judgment by examining their speed and efficiency. We find only limited support for previous claims. While we replicate differential weighting, this effect largely disappears with a different elicitation format. Furthermore, evidence for differential weighting is absent in reaction time data. Our findings suggest that a simplification of theories of comparative

judgment may be in order.

(88) Out of Sight, Out of Mind: On the Irrational Side of Egocentrism in Social Comparisons

Chan, Steven (New York University); Chambers, John R. (University of Florida); Kruger, Justin (New York University)

When people compare themselves with others, they focus on their own characteristics more than on those of others. Consequently, they tend to overestimate their comparative standing for instances of high absolute standing (driving a car) and underestimate them for low ones (programming a computer). In contrast to recent normative accounts of myopic comparisons, this research explored whether this egocentric tendency is partly explained by greater salience and accessibility for self versus other information. We measured and manipulated this self-other accessibility difference and demonstrated stronger above- and below-average effects when it was large and weaker effects when it was small.

(89) Nonselective Optimism and Pessimism among Professional Traders and Stock Market Analysts

Klar, Yechiel (Tel Aviv University); Pollack, Yael (Tel Aviv University)

When people compare themselves with others, they focus on their own characteristics more than on those of others. Consequently, they tend to overestimate their comparative standing for instances of high absolute standing (driving a car) and underestimate them for low ones (programming a computer). In contrast to recent normative accounts of myopic comparisons, this research explored whether this egocentric tendency is partly explained by greater salience and accessibility for self versus other information. We measured and manipulated this self-other accessibility difference and demonstrated stronger above- and below-average effects when it was large and weaker effects when it was small.

(90) The Role of Mental Representation in Experienced-based Choice

Camilleri, Adrian R. (UNSW); Newell, Ben R. (UNSW)

Research has observed that different choices can be made about structurally identical risky decisions depending on whether information about outcomes and their probabilities are learned by description or experience. Recent evidence has been equivocal with respect to whether this phenomenon is entirely an artefact of biased samples. The current experiment elucidates the controversy by examining decision maker's mental representations, using either verbal or non-verbal judgment probes. We find that: (1) judgment accuracy depends on how options are learned about and how estimates are probed, and (2) that there may indeed be an explanatory role for the level of mental representation.

(91) One man's trash is another man's treasure: Context dependency in decision making under risk

Ungemach, Christoph (University of Warwick); Stewart, Neil (University of Warwick)

Dominant theories of risky choice assume that monetary amounts are directly transformable into subjective equivalents using psychoeconomic functions. We investigated whether this transformation is really independent of the distribution of similar attribute values in memory. In exchange for their receipts we offered supermarket customers the opportunity to draw a ticket from one of two lotteries. It could be shown that preference for the risky lottery was related to the distribution of item prices bought prior to choice. The higher the proportion of prices falling within the two lottery wins, the more likely were the participants to choose the risky option.

(92) Misperception of randomness decreases prediction accuracy

Scheibehenne, Benjamin (Indiana University); Wilke, Andreas (Konrad Lorenz Institut); Todd, Peter M. (Indiana University)

Detecting sequential dependencies is the basis for discovering useful predictable patterns in the environment. To test this ability, we had participants repeatedly choose between betting on the next outcome of a random or an autocorrelated sequence, presented next to each other. Our results indicate that most people preferred betting on a random sequence over a negatively autocorrelated one and thus missed the opportunity for above-chance payoff. This contradicts the idea of a general human ability to recognize patterns and indicates a tendency to perceive clumps. Furthermore, in line with this tendency, most participants used win-stay/lose-shift as a default strategy.

(93) Conditions leading to biases in favor of self-selected hypotheses

Whitman, Jennifer C. (University of British Columbia); Woodward, Todd S. (University of British Columbia)

In this study we investigated the conditions that can lead us to be biased towards endorsing internally generated interpretations more readily than externally generated ones. In a probabilistic reasoning task, we required participants to rate the probability of a focal hypothesis relative to a set of alternate hypotheses. We found that they judged self-selected focal hypotheses to be more probable than externally selected ones. If evidence for the focal hypothesis was high, the bias in favor of self-selected hypotheses was strongest if evidence for the alternate hypotheses was also high.

(94) Testing Different Accounts of Insensitivity to Answer Diagnosticity

Rusconi, Patrice (University of Milan-Bicocca); McKenzie, Craig R. M. (University of California, San Diego)

Previous studies showed how people are insufficiently sensitive to the differential informativeness of different answers to the same question. We compared different accounts of this phenomenon. We devised two studies (N = 142) in which participants estimated the posterior probability given an answer to a question about the presence of a feature. Participants' estimates mostly fell between the normative conditional probability and the normative posterior probability, showing that when revising their beliefs people are not determined solely by the given conditional probabilities (as implied by the inverse fallacy and matching accounts), but are also sensitive to the normative posterior probabilities.

(95) Deconfounding recognition and recall in random sequence generation

Heyman, James (University of St. Thomas); Zelubowski, James (University of St. Thomas)

Previous research has shown that, in general, people are randomness-challenged. This has largely been attributed to short-term memory (STM) biases. However, these findings have potentially been influenced by the most common elicitation method, which actually ascribes the measured behavior entirely to STM while not accounting for the ability for people to explicitly look at previous choices. To control for this confounding we had 181 respondents generate a simulated set of random coin flips in one of two methods. The results show that the negative effect of STM is smaller than had been previously reported.

(96) Not the base rate, but the imbalanced structure that matters

Hattori, Masasi (Ritsumeikan University); Nishida, Yutaka (Osaka University)

Two experiments examined Hattori and Nishida's (2009) equiprobability hypothesis that base rate tasks are difficult not because people tend to ignore base rate information, but because their default equiprobability assumption conflicts with the task structure. In Experiment 1, the degree of imbalance in structure was manipulated and the results indicated that as the task structure approaches to people's assumption, their performance improved. In Experiment 2, a new type of base rate task (with an inverse imbalanced structure and a high base rate) employed and the results showed that the imbalanced structure rather than a low base rate impede Bayesian inference.

(97) Strategies for Co-variation judgments

Gilkey, Justin M. (Bowling Green State University); Anderson, Richard B. (Bowling Green State University)

Previous research suggests that decision-makers can use at least two judgment strategies when assessing population correlations from sample data: a descriptive strategy and an inferential strategy. Furthermore, research suggests that environmental constraints, such as the task environment, might influence which of these strategies a decision-maker utilizes. Participants in the current experiment judged the strength of correlations via both a rating and a frequency estimation task. Preliminary results suggest individual differences in decision-maker's confidence ratings about their judgments may predict the direction of the relationship between n-per-sample and subjective correlations in rating tasks but not in frequency estimation tasks.

(98) Assessing Joint Distributions via Isoprobability Contours

Marcus, James C. (Fordham University); Budescu, David V. (Fordham University); Abbas, Ali A. (University of Illinois)

We examine a new method for assessing joint distributions by tracing isoprobability contours (points with identical cumulative probabilities) inferred from preferences between binary gambles. We assess 25% and 50% isoprobability contours for two domains SAT-V and SAT-Q scores and height and weight. We elicit contours in each domain on two separate occasions (several days apart). For some subjects we assess the same contour (25% or 50%), and for others we assess different contours across sessions. To determine the quality of the results we analyze the monotonicity and internal consistency (across sessions and contours) of the subjects' judgments.

(99) Encounter frequency in the small number range

Obrecht, Natalie A. (Rutgers University); Chapman, Gretchen B. (Rutgers University)

We asked subjects to judge how likely an event is based on multiple percentages and their associated sample sizes (e.g. 10% of 200 hyenas had short fur, 15% of 100 had short fur, what are the changes that a hyena will have short fur?). Obrecht et al. (2009) showed that laypeople give equal weight to such percentage data, ignoring differences in sample size. We found that sample size neglect is reduced for subjects higher in numeracy when the provided percentages describe extremely small samples, such as 100% of 1, compared to when they summarize higher magnitude sample sizes.

(100) Subjective Integration of Probabilistic Information from Description and from Experience

Shlom, Yaron (University of Maryland)

This research compares normative and subjective principles of integrating description- and experience-based probabilistic information. Participants in three experiments estimated the proportion of red balls in a bag on the basis of observing a sequence of draws (experience) and receiving a summary of an independent sample (a description). Subjective integration was more sensitive to experience than description in a manner that depended on source presentation sequence, description format and perceived description trustworthiness. Findings have implications for information integration models, for interpreting the description-experience gap in risky choice, and for developing decision aids.

(101) Do subjects maximize gain in search? Comparison of visual and nonvisual sequential decision making tasks

Pedersini, Riccardo (Harvard Medical School & Brigham and Women's Hospital); Morvan, Camille (New York University); Maloney, Laurence T. (New York University); Horowitz, Todd S. (Harvard Medical School & Brigham and Women's Hospital); Wolfe, Jeremy M. (Harvard Medical School & Brigham and Women's Hospital)

We compared two sequential decision making tasks, a speeded visual search and an analogous unspeeded economic task. In both tasks the goal was to find a target among distractors in a series of visual displays. Since half the displays contained no target, the subject's challenge was to decide whether to break off the search in one display and go on to the next. Performance in the visual search task was near optimal. Surprisingly, performance in the superficially easier economic task was markedly suboptimal: subjects stopped searching too soon and were influenced by the outcomes of recent trials.

(102) Probability weighting in risky choice: Affect and probability format

Suter, Renata (University of Basel); Pachur, Thorsten (University of Basel); Hertwig, Ralph (University of Basel)

Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) proposed that risky choice between affective non-monetary prospects differs from risky choice between monetary prospects in terms of differences in how probabilities are processed. Berns et al. (2007), however, found a similar probability weighting function for non-monetary gambles as had been previously found for monetary gambles, suggesting no differences in the processing of probabilities. We directly contrasted probability weighting functions for monetary and non-monetary choices using a within-subject design. Moreover, we tested whether differences in the weighting function depend on whether probabilities are communicated numerically or graphically.

(103) Curiosity killed the cat, but what did it do to dissonance? Seeking counterfactual information

Summerville, Amy (Miami University)

After making a decision, how will individuals respond to the opportunity to learn about foregone alternatives? The model of regret-aversion (Zeelenberg, 1999) predicts that individuals are motivated to avoid counterfactual information in order to insulate themselves from potential regret. In contrast, I suggest that considering the theory of post-decisional cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) leads to the prediction that individuals who are highly dissatisfied with their decisions will seek this information. In the current research, both negative outcomes and the experience of dissatisfaction increased such counterfactual-seeking; moreover, counterfactual-seeking was able to reduce dissonance.

(104) Regret in interpersonal and self contexts: US-Japan comparison

Komiya, Asuka (Kyoto University); Watabe, Motoki (Waseda University); Miyamoto, Yuri (University of Wisconsin Madison); Kusumi, Takashi (Kyoto University)

We conducted two experiments to investigate how contexts and cultures interact to influence the intensity of regret. In Study 1, Japanese and American undergraduates recalled their most regrettable experiences both in interpersonal and self contexts, and rated the intensity of their regret. In Study 2, Japanese and American students played roulette either in the interpersonal or self condition, and reported the intensity of regret they felt after losing. Both studies showed that in interpersonal situations, Japanese felt regret more strongly than Americans, whereas in self situations, Japanese felt regret as strongly as Americans. Contextual effects on regret are discussed.

(105) Modeling foregone payoffs in a sequential choice task

Frey, Renato (University of Basel); Rieskamp, Jörg (University of Basel)

When people decide repeatedly n for example choosing every month in which of several stocks to invest money n they may not only learn from outcomes of chosen alternatives, but also from outcomes of alternatives they did not choose, i.e. from foregone payoffs. We compared the predictions of three learning models (a standard reinforcement learning model, a temporal difference learning model, and a threshold model) in the devil's task (involving sequential choice either with or without information on foregone payoffs). The modeling suggests that learning should be faster in the presence of foregone payoffs.

(106) The role of feedback-induced anticipated regret in avoiding subsequent risks

Burson, Katherine A. (University of Michigan); Larrick, Richard P. (Duke University); Stornelli, Jason A. (University of Michigan); Witmer, Megan E. (University of Michigan)

In this research, we explore the role of anticipated feedback on anticipated regret and the consequences for subsequent choices. In a dissonance reduction paradigm, we show that in comparison to consumers expecting partial feedback (i.e. information on the chosen option only), consumers expecting full feedback (i.e. information about the selected alternative and foregone choices) experience more anticipated regret, and thus cannot reduce dissonance about their choice. In a consumption context, consumers who are anticipating full feedback on an initial choice (and hence regret) go on to select safer, conventional options in an unrelated choice task.

(107) I choose certainty for me and uncertainty for you: the role of responsibility aversion in self/other framing
Leonhardt, James (University of California, Irvine)

In a hypothetical medical decision problem, participants choose between two certain options or an uncertain option; however, unlike the Asian Disease Problem the uncertain option does not offer the possibility of avoiding a loss altogether; rather the outcome of each option is known to be of equal value. When participants are choosing for themselves only 37% choose the uncertain option, but when choosing for an identified person "a university student with blonde hair named Sally Smith" 67% choose the uncertain option ($t(131)=2.847, p=.005$). Responsibility aversion is introduced to explain this self versus other framing effect.

(108) Looking Forward to Not Looking Back: The Role of Anticipated Regret in Work-family Conflict
Reb, Jochen (Singapore Management University); Bagger, Jessica (Sacramento State University)

Individuals often face conflicting time demands from family and work. In an experimental study we examined the role of anticipated regret in resolving instances of work-family conflict among 204 working parents. Drawing on both the work-family and decision-making literatures, we hypothesized and found that anticipated regret predicted work-family preferences. Furthermore, anticipated regret mediated more distal determinants of work-family preferences, in particular, work pressure, work centrality, and family centrality. These findings suggest that anticipated emotions play a significant role in how individuals resolve work-family conflict. Implications and future research directions are discussed.

(109) Egocentric predictions about other people's emotional states: When we don't project our own emotional experiences to others.
Kudo, Eriko (Tokyo Woman's Christian University)

People anticipate greater regret for losing by a narrow margin than a wide margin. In this study, participants who missed a reward by a narrow margin experienced regret but much less than they had expected. However, those participants didn't project their emotional states to others when asked to predict others' emotional states in the same situation. Their predictions didn't differ from those who not experiencing the event and had no chance of knowing their predictions were wrong. These results suggest that we egocentrically make predictions about others' emotional states not projecting our own unexpected feelings because we think our own experience is unique.

(110) Continuous vs. binary: On the compensatory strategies of judgments
Zhao, Jiaying (Princeton University); Oppenheimer, Daniel (Princeton University)

Many researchers have recently argued that people employ different judgment strategies in continuous as opposed to binary choice paradigms. We here report evidence that a single compensatory strategy might underlie both paradigms. Specifically, we find that predictions generated from judgments made in a continuous paradigm can predict binary judgments better than several prominent binary non-compensatory heuristics such as the recognition heuristic and the Take the Best heuristic (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; 1999). This finding has important implications for theoretical frameworks that rely on strategy switching such as the adaptive toolbox (Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999).

(111) My preference may not be my decision: Post-decisional dissonance and framing
Corbin, Jonathan (Appalachian State University); McElroy, Todd (Appalachian State University); Smith, Stephanie (Appalachian State University)

We examine how post-decisional dissonance influences the framing effect. We manipulated decisional perspective, having participants rate either their "preference" or "decision" of alternatives. We derived our predictions from post-decisional dissonance which proposes that after making a choice people experience dissonance. To alleviate this dissonance, people prefer their chosen alternative more and their non-chosen alternative less after the decision. Therefore, when presented with a framing task and asked to rate their decision people should experience cognitive dissonance and framing effects should be more robust than when people are asked to rate their preference between the alternatives. Our findings support this hypothesis.

(112) Parsing the cognitive stream: Partitioning of events as a factor in judgments under uncertainty
Brase, Gary L. (Kansas State University)

An ecological rationality approach to statistical reasoning hypothesizes a privileged status for frequency representations and an individuation principle to guide parsing of objects, events, and locations into easily countable units. In contrast, a heuristics and biases approach hypothesizes no privileged status for frequencies and a partition-edit-count principle for parsing sets. A series of experiments (N=211) demonstrate both that a key support for the partition-edit-count hypothesis is largely due to changes in the task question rather than partitioning manipulations, and a frequency presentation of the task directly improves performance. These results favor an ecological rationality perspective and the associated frequency hypothesis.

(113) Misleading communication and biased evaluation of probabilities: The case of the ratio bias

Macchi, Laura (University of Milan); Bagassi, Maria (University of Milan); Passerini, Gabriella (University of Milan); D'Addario, Marco (University of Milan); Sala, Valentina (University of Milan)

In classical judgment and decision tasks, communicative heuristics, by processing intention and context, are often considered as obstacles to rational judgments. According to our alternative view, the obstacle is a text formulation inadequate to transmit the experimenter intention and the aim of the task. In this perspective, we investigate the ratio bias (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). According to us, the phenomenon is an effect of the experimental paradigm that transmits a misleading aim of the task, by inducing the equal ratio neglect. Four experiments provide evidence of our hypothesis. Through a pragmatic reformulation of classical problems the bias strongly decreases.

(114) Effects of Competition and Uncertain Evaluation on Performance

Hartzler, Beth (Bowling Green State University); Anderson, Richard (Bowling Green State University)

Kareev and Avrahami (2007) found that when two agents are competing on a simple task, those pairs working under low scrutiny perform significantly better than those working under high scrutiny. In the present experiment, the design of Kareev and Avrahami's study was adapted to include manipulation of the number of competing agents (either 2 or 40), and each agent's probability of winning (.5 or 1/n). Preliminary data indicate a greater practice effect for participants completing the task under low scrutiny than those completing the task under high scrutiny.

(115) Detecting varieties of cheating: An evolutionary algorithm or deliberate relevance seeking

Ayal, Shahar (Duke University); Klar, Yechiel (Tel Aviv University)

What kind of cheating-protection devices should consumers use to avoid being victims of fraud? Using the Wason selection task, we define three types of cheating. We use these varieties of cheating to juxtapose the cheating detection algorithm approach with an alternative relevance-seeking approach that relies on more flexible and deliberate thinking. The results show that our participants outperformed the evolutionary algorithm by looking for the most relevant cheating threats. These results suggest that efficient cheating detection cannot rely on an automatic algorithm, but rather requires flexibility and a thorough understanding of the situation at hand.

(116) Elements of Trust: Cost, benefit, and backward induction

Evans, Anthony (Brown University); Joachim Krueger (Brown University)

Backward induction predicts that trust should depend upon the incentives of the trustee to reciprocate. However, the current work demonstrates that trustors perceive the choice egocentrically (primarily in terms of potential costs and benefits). We report evidence that trust is evaluated in two stages: In the initial stage, the first mover assesses her own incentives. If the incentives to trust are considered sufficient, she then evaluates the perspective of the trustee (backwards induction). This process is supported by rates of trust and reaction time data.

(117) Does competition foster trust? The role of tournament incentives

Keck, Steffen (INSEAD, Decision Science Area); Karellaia, Natalia (INSEAD, Decision Science Area)

This paper reports experimental results from a sequential dyadic trust game where competition is operationalized by manipulating payoff schemes across four conditions. Trustors and trustees were rewarded based either on their absolute performance in the game (baseline condition) or on how well they have done relative to two other participants playing the game in the same role (competition conditions). We find that competition among trustors significantly increases trust. On the other hand, competition among trustees decreases reciprocity. There is no evidence that trustors anticipate this lower reciprocity.

(118) Influences of Personality and Situation on Behavior in Economic Games

Hoffmann, Mareike (University of Erfurt); Rockenbach, Bettina (University of Erfurt); Betsch, Tilmann (University of Erfurt)

Assuming behavior is a function of person X situation (Lewin, 1936), we analyzed decision making in a trust and a coordination game by simultaneously considering differences in personality traits and situational variables, such as differences in the regulatory focus. Personality was assessed with the 16-Personality-Factor-Test (Schneewind & Graf, 1998) and a self-report. Most notably, offers in the trust game were negatively influenced by the interaction between the trait vigilance and the prevention

condition; back transfers were positively influenced by the interaction between the willingness to cooperate and the promotion condition. In the coordination game, hardly any behavioral effects were found.

(119) More Pain Less Gain: Social Preferences in the Allocation of Bads

Davis, Alexander (Carnegie Mellon University); Miller, John (Carnegie Mellon University); Weber, Roberto (Carnegie Mellon University)

Concern for fairness is significantly enhanced when people allocate bad compared to good resources. Survey and laboratory studies using the dictator game demonstrate that people are more willing to be fair or even prefer disadvantageous unfairness when allocating bads compared to goods. Almost no participants who behaved in a completely selfish manner when allocating financial gains were willing to behave selfishly when allocating a painful event, and many of these seemingly selfish people were willing to take more than half of the painful event on themselves. We argued that resource valence may greatly change the functional form of social preferences

(120) The effects of flood experience, perceptions and trust on flood protection purchase

Soane, Emma (London School of Economics); Schubert, Iljana (London School of Economics); Challenor, Peter (University of Southampton); Lunn, Rebecca (University of Strathclyde); Narendran, Sunitha (Kingston University); Pollard, Simon. Cranfield University

This paper examines public perceptions of flooding and considers how to develop communication strategies that will increase flood preparation. The research model was based on prior studies of flood experience, perceptions and trust in information sources. Participants were 2109 home owners who completed an online survey. Data showed that concern and receptiveness to information influenced the decision to protect the home. Further, personal responsibility for managing flood risk was associated with low levels of trust in government and regulators. Finally, few people chose to access additional information about flooding showing the need for focused information communication strategies.

(121) Disclosure drive: Understanding when and why people disclose private information

John, Leslie (Carnegie Mellon University); Loewenstein, George (Carnegie Mellon University); Acquisti, Alessandro (Carnegie Mellon University)

Much of the research on privacy focuses on people's perceptions of the costs of revealing information. Yet, there is ample evidence that people voluntarily reveal vast quantities of information, suggesting that there is an inherent desire disclose. We propose that to understand information revelation, one must look at both sides of the equation -- the costs and the benefits. In two studies, we show that making disclosure salient facilitates information revelation when the desire to disclose is activated; the reverse effect occurs when the desire to protect one's privacy is activated.