From foe to friend and back again: The temporal dynamics of intra-party bias in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election

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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

1. Supporting analyses

1.1 Possible confounds: comprehension failure, and Wave 1 vs Wave 2 differences

In this section we address potential concerns about (i) our exclusion of participants who failed comprehension questions, and (ii) the non-panel nature of our dataset (i.e. the fact that the same people were not surveyed repeatedly). We address (i) by showing that our results are robust to including non-comprehenders. To address (ii), we first evaluate whether the sample's choices and demographics varied between Wave 1 and Wave 2 (Table S1). We see that Wave 2 has a larger female-to-male ratio, is richer, less experienced, more conservative and more likely to have voted for Hillary Clinton over Bernie Sanders during the primaries (*ps*<0.01, even after controlling for multiple comparisons with Bonferroni-corrections). Given the presence of these differences, we show that our results are robust to including the collected demographics as covariates.

| | Excludin | g non-compre | ehenders | Includ | ling comprehe | enders |
|-----------------------|----------|--------------|----------|--------|---------------|--------|
| | Wave 1 | Wave 2 | p | Wave 1 | Wave 2 | p |
| Age | 34.84 | 35.20 | 0.30 | 34.91 | 35.17 | 0.39 |
| Female | 0.49 | 0.54 | < 0.01 | 0.51 | 0.56 | < 0.01 |
| Graduated | 0.53 | 0.56 | 0.07 | 0.51 | 0.54 | 0.03 |
| Earned over \$35,000 | 0.50 | 0.54 | < 0.01 | 0.50 | 0.53 | 0.02 |
| Trust in others | 4.54 | 4.58 | 0.27 | 4.56 | 4.56 | 0.93 |
| Log(Experience) | 2.77 | 2.46 | < 0.01 | 2.63 | 2.35 | < 0.01 |
| Fiscal conservatism | 3.21 | 3.41 | < 0.01 | 3.28 | 3.45 | < 0.01 |
| Social conservatism | 2.68 | 2.82 | < 0.01 | 2.80 | 2.91 | < 0.01 |
| Democrat | 0.66 | 0.64 | 0.07 | 0.65 | 0.63 | 0.07 |
| Voted HC Primary | 0.26 | 0.35 | < 0.01 | 0.28 | 0.38 | < 0.01 |
| Republican | 0.34 | 0.36 | 0.07 | 0.35 | 0.37 | 0.07 |
| Voted DT Primary | 0.46 | 0.43 | 0.26 | 0.49 | 0.46 | 0.11 |
| Share given in the DG | 0.27 | 0.30 | < 0.01 | 0.32 | 0.35 | < 0.01 |
| Democrat | 0.28 | 0.31 | < 0.01 | 0.32 | 0.35 | < 0.01 |
| Voted HC Primary | 0.28 | 0.29 | 0.63 | 0.34 | 0.35 | 0.73 |
| Voted BS Primary | 0.28 | 0.32 | < 0.01 | 0.31 | 0.35 | < 0.01 |
| Republican | 0.25 | 0.29 | < 0.01 | 0.31 | 0.33 | 0.08 |
| Voted DT Primary | 0.22 | 0.26 | 0.08 | 0.28 | 0.32 | 0.04 |
| Voted Oth Primary | 0.27 | 0.31 | 0.04 | 0.34 | 0.34 | 0.79 |

Table S1. Mean comparisons between wave 1 and wave 2 by comprehension types: age, female-to-male ratio, percentage of participants who completed a Bachelor's degree or more, percentage of participants earning more than \$35,000, trust in others, logarithmic value of experience answering surveys online, fiscal and social conservatism, percentage of participants who identified with the Democrat party, percentage of participants who voted for Hillary Clinton during the primaries, percentage of participants who identified with the Republican party, percentage of participants who voted for Donald Trump during the primaries, share given in the Dictator game by Party and Primary candidate preferences, (two tailed) t-tests.

Results in Table S2 reveal that the inclusion of non-comprehenders and demographic controls does not affect (i) the overall positive interaction between *Outgroup* and *Week*, nor (ii) the fact that this interaction is significant among Democrats but not among Republicans in Wave 1. However, including non-comprehending participants does affect the significance of the *Democrat x Week x Outgroup* three-way interaction.

| | Democ | rats and | Democ | rats and | Repul | olicans | Demo | ocrats | Democ | rats and | |
|----------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|---------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--|
| | Republicans | | Republicans | | 01 | only | | only | | Republicans | |
| - | Exc. NC | Inc. NC | Exc. NC | Inc. NC | Exc. NC | Inc. NC | Exc. NC | Inc. NC | Exc. NC | Inc. NC | |
| Outgroup (O) | -0.049*** (0.011) | -0.036*** (0.010) | -0.099*** (0.025) | -0.084** (0.025) | -0.045 (0.045) | -0.067 (0.046) | -0.124*** (0.031) | -0.094** (0.030) | -0.046 (0.046) | -0.062 (0.045) | |
| Week (W) | | | 0.004* | 0.005* | 0.008* | 0.004 | 0.002 | 0.005 | 0.008* | 0.005 | |
| | | | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.004) | |
| O x W | | | 0.007* | 0.006* | -0.002 | 0.003 | 0.011** | 0.008* | -0.002 | 0.003 | |
| | | | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.005) | |
| Democrat (D) | | | | | | | | | 0.059 | 0.029 | |
| | | | | | | | | | (0.041) | (0.040) | |
| O x D | | | | | | | | | -0.078 | -0.032 | |
| | | | | | | | | | (0.055) | (0.055) | |
| D x W | | | | | | | | | -0.006 | 0.000 | |
| | | | | | | | | | (0.004) | (0.004) | |
| OxDxW | | | | | | | | | 0.013* | 0.005 | |
| | | | | | | | | | (0.006) | (0.006) | |
| Constant | 0.266*** | 0.299*** | 0.228*** | 0.259*** | 0.210** | 0.340*** | 0.271*** | 0.265*** | 0.201*** | 0.260*** | |
| | (0.038) | (0.036) | (0.041) | (0.040) | (0.067) | (0.066) | (0.045) | (0.043) | (0.049) | (0.047) | |
| Controls | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | |
| N | 2142 | 2883 | 2142 | 2883 | 718 | 1001 | 1424 | 1882 | 2142 | 2883 | |
| \mathbb{R}^2 | 0.110 | 0.102 | 0.123 | 0.111 | 0.143 | 0.117 | 0.121 | 0.116 | 0.125 | 0.112 | |

Table S2 (OLS) Regression results for DG giving in wave 1, excluding or including non-comprehenders (NC). **** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. Controls include: age, female-to-male ratio, percentage of participants who completed a Bachelor's degree or more, percentage of participants earning more than \$35,000, trust in others, logarithmic value of experience answering surveys online, fiscal and social conservatism, percentage of participants who identified with the Democrat party (first four models), percentage of participants who voted for Donald Trump during the primaries (fifth and sixth models), and percentage of participants who voted for Hillary Clinton during the primaries (seventh and eighth models).

With regards to Wave 2, Table S3 shows that the inclusion of participants who failed the comprehension questions and demographic controls does not change our results either. We find an (i) overall negative main effect of being paired with a supporter of the other primary candidate, β =-.084, t(2447)=-4.43, p<.001; (ii) a null interaction between in-group-bias and day, β =-.029, t(2444)=0.21, p=.834; and (iii) a null interaction between in-group-bias, day, and party, β =-.156, t(2440)=-.59, p=.558.

| | Democ | rats and | Democ | rats and | Repub | olicans | Demo | ocrats | Democi | rats and | |
|----------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|--|
| | Republicans | | Republicans | | or | only | | only | | Republicans | |
| | Exc. NC | Inc. NC | Exc. NC | Inc. NC | Exc. NC | Inc. NC | Exc. NC | Inc. NC | Exc. NC | Inc. NC | |
| Outgroup (O) | -0.058*** (0.011) | -0.047*** (0.011) | -0.050 (0.082) | -0.031 (0.076) | -0.179 (0.139) | -0.079 (0.131) | 0.001 (0.101) | -0.005 (0.094) | -0.194 (0.137) | -0.082 (0.127) | |
| Week (W) | | | 0.004 (0.003) | 0.006 (0.003) | 0.001 (0.005) | 0.004 (0.005) | 0.005 (0.004) | 0.007 (0.004) | 0.000 (0.005) | 0.004 (0.005) | |
| O x W | | | 0.000 (0.005) | -0.001 (0.004) | 0.007 (0.008) | 0.002 (0.007) | -0.003 (0.006) | -0.003 (0.005) | 0.007 (0.008) | 0.002 (0.007) | |
| Democrat (D) | | | | | | | | | -0.077 (0.122) | -0.008 (0.114) | |
| OxD | | | | | | | | | 0.222 | 0.081 | |
| D x W | | | | | | | | | (0.171) 0.006 | (0.159) 0.003 | |
| OxDxW | | | | | | | | | (0.007) -0.012 | (0.006) -0.005 | |
| Constant | 0.279*** (0.040) | 0.261*** (0.036) | 0.207** (0.070) | 0.161* (0.065) | 0.250* (0.117) | 0.171 (0.110) | 0.240** (0.083) | 0.204** (0.077) | (0.009) 0.281** (0.106) | (0.009) 0.194* (0.098) | |
| Controls | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | |
| N | 1734 | 2458 | 1734 | 2458 | 627 | 912 | 1107 | 1546 | 1734 | 2458 | |
| \mathbb{R}^2 | 0.143 | 0.119 | 0.144 | 0.122 | 0.186 | 0.141 | 0.134 | 0.113 | 0.145 | 0.122 | |

Table S3 (OLS) Regression results for DG giving in wave 2, excluding or including non-comprehenders (NC). **** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. Controls include: age, female-to-male ratio, percentage of participants who completed a Bachelor's degree or more, percentage of participants earning more than \$35,000, trust in others, logarithmic value of experience answering surveys online, fiscal and social conservatism, percentage of participants who identified with the Democrat party (first four models), percentage of participants who voted for Donald Trump during the primaries (fifth and sixth models), and percentage of participants who voted for Hillary Clinton during the primaries (seventh and eighth models).

Thus, our results remain qualitatively similar when including participants who failed the comprehension checks and including demographic controls. Figure S1 replicates Figure 1 from the main text when including non-comprehenders.

Democrats Clinton vs. Sanders 50% 40% Money Shared Partner's Preferred Primary Candidate 0Same1Different FBI review 7125 8/29 10/10 10/13 10/20 10/24 10/27 10/31 11/03 Wave 1 Wave 2 Date Republicans Trump vs. Others 50% 40% Partner's Money Shared Preferred Primary Candidate 0Same1Different 10%

Figure S1. Fraction transferred in the Dictator Game in each week of the first wave of the study, with Locally Estimated (LOESS) 95% Confidence Intervals. RNC: Republican National Convention; DNC: Democratic National Convention. Including non-comprehenders.

Date

Wave 2

Wave 1

1.2 Predicted main effect and interaction

First we note that for Dictator game (DG) giving, being an *outgroup* recipient reduces the amount sent in both waves, while the number of weeks into our study increases it in wave 1. There is also a positive interaction between both variables in wave 1 (Table S4).

| | Dictator game giving (excl. non-comprehenders) | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------|--|--------|-----------|--------|-----------|--------|-----------|--------|--|--|
| | Wave 1 | | | | | Wave 2 | | | | |
| | Coef (se) | Beta | Coef (se) | Beta | Coef (se) | Beta | Coef (se) | Beta | | |
| Outgroup (O) | -0.043*** | -0.083 | -0.107*** | -0.208 | -0.055*** | -0.108 | -0.111 | -0.218 | | |
| | (0.011) | | (0.026) | | (0.012) | | (0.086) | | | |
| Week (W) | | | 0.007** | 0.094 | | | 0.006 | 0.060 | | |
| | | | (0.002) | | | | (0.003) | | | |
| O x W | | | 0.008** | 0.149 | | | 0.003 | | | |
| | | | (0.003) | | | | (0.005) | | | |
| Constant | 0.290*** | | 0.237*** | | 0.330*** | | 0.222*** | 0.112 | | |
| | (0.008) | | (0.019) | | (0.009) | | (0.061) | | | |
| N | 2183 | | 2183 | | 1775 | | 1775 | | | |
| \mathbb{R}^2 | 0.007 | | 0.033 | | 0.011 | | 0.016 | | | |

Table S4 (OLS) Regression results for DG giving, excl. non-comprehenders. *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.05.

1.3 Difference in dynamics between Democrats and Republicans

We also find a positive interaction between outgroup members, week into our study, and preference for the Democratic Party in wave 1 but not in wave 2, such that democrats see their outgroup bias reduced over time, unlike republicans (Table S5).

| | Wav | e 1 | | | | | Wave | 2 |
|----------------|----------|---------|-----------|--------|-----------|--------|-------------|--------|
| | Democr | ats and | Republi | icans | Democ | erats | Democrat | ts and |
| | Repub | licans | onl | y | only | | Republicans | |
| | Coef | Beta | Coef (se) | Beta | Coef (se) | Beta | Coef (se) | Beta |
| | (se) | | | | | | | |
| Outgroup (O) | -0.044 | -0.086 | -0.044 | -0.087 | -0.135*** | -0.261 | -0.272 | -0.534 |
| | (0.047) | | (0.047) | | (0.032) | | (0.145) | |
| Week (W) | 0.013** | 0.177 | 0.013** | 0.175 | 0.004 | 0.059 | 0.001 | 0.011 |
| | (0.004) | | (0.004) | | (0.003) | | (0.006) | |
| O x W | -0.002 | -0.028 | -0.002 | -0.029 | 0.013** | 0.232 | 0.012 | 0.438 |
| | (0.005) | | (0.005) | | (0.004) | | (0.008) | |
| Democrat (D) | 0.090* | 0.166 | | | | | -0.119 | -0.224 |
| | (0.040) | | | | | | (0.128) | |
| OxD | -0.090 | -0.166 | | | | | 0.254 | 0.466 |
| | (0.057) | | | | | | (0.181) | |
| D x W | -0.009 | -0.155 | | | | | 0.008 | 0.278 |
| | (0.005) | | | | | | (0.007) | |
| OxDxW | 0.015* | 0.237 | | | | | -0.015 | -0.481 |
| | (0.007) | | | | | | (0.010) | |
| Constant | 0.173*** | | 0.173*** | | 0.264*** | | 0.295** | |
| | (0.034) | | (0.033) | | (0.022) | | (0.104) | |
| N | 2183 | | 732 | | 1451 | | 1775 | |
| \mathbb{R}^2 | 0.040 | | 0.041 | | 0.035 | | 0.017 | |

Table S5 (OLS) Regression results for DG giving, excl. non-comprehenders. *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05.

1.4 The effect of the Democratic National Convention in Dictator game giving, among Democrats We find that among Democrats a dummy for observations occurring a week after the Democratic National Convention has equivalent (or even slightly better) predictive power (R^2) than a continuous variable for weeks.

| | Dictator ga | me giving among De | mocrats (excl. non-compr | ehenders) |
|-----------------------|-------------|--------------------|--------------------------|-----------|
| | Coef (se) | Beta | Coef (se) | Beta |
| Outgroup (O) | -0.135*** | -0.261 | -0.078*** | -0.151 |
| | (0.032) | | (0.018) | |
| Week (W) | 0.004 | 0.059 | | |
| | (0.003) | | | |
| August 8 or later (A) | | | 0.032 | 0.062 |
| | | | (0.019) | |
| O x W | 0.013** | 0.232 | | |
| | (0.004) | | | |
| O x A | | | 0.092** | 0.151 |
| | | | (0.027) | |
| Constant | 0.264*** | | 0.281*** | |
| | (0.022) | | (0.013) | |
| N | 1451 | | 1451 | |
| \mathbb{R}^2 | 0.035 | | 0.035 | |

Table S6 (OLS) Regression results for DG giving among Democrats, excl. non-comprehenders. *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05.

We also note that among Democrats, out-group bias is seen before August 8th but not afterwards.

| | Dictator game giving among Democrats (excl. non-comprehenders) | | | | | | | |
|----------------|--|-----------------------|----------|----------------------|--|--|--|--|
| | Before Ai | ugust 8 th | After Au | gust 8 th | | | | |
| | Coef (se) | | | | | | | |
| Outgroup (O) | -0.078*** | -0.154 | 0.014 | 0.026 | | | | |
| | (0.018) | | (0.020) | | | | | |
| Constant | 0.281*** | | 0.314*** | | | | | |
| | (0.013) | | (0.014) | | | | | |
| N | 780 | | 671 | | | | | |
| \mathbb{R}^2 | 0.024 | | 0.001 | | | | | |

Table S7 (OLS) Regression results for DG giving among Democrats, excl. non-comprehenders. *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05.

1.5 The effect of the National Conventions in Dictator game giving, among Republicans We find that, among Republicans, there is an out-group bias before and after the Democratic and Republican National Conventions, but not during them.


| | Dictator game giving among Republicans (excl. non-comprehenders) | | | | | | | | |
|----------------|--|---------|------------------|--------|-----------------|--------|--------------------|-------|--|
| | All weeks | sampled | Before July 18th | | After July 28th | | During Conventions | | |
| | Coef (se) | Beta | Coef (se) | Beta | Coef (se) | Beta | Coef (se) | Beta | |
| Outgroup (O) | -0.078*** | -0.154 | -0.084* | -0.178 | -0.071** | -0.137 | 0.031 | 0.063 | |
| | (0.020) | | (0.036) | | (0.024) | | (0.046) | | |
| Conventions | -0.072* | -0.104 | | | | | | | |
| (C) | (0.035) | | | | | | | | |
| OxC | 0.109* | 0.117 | | | | | | | |
| | (0.050) | | | | | | | | |
| Constant | 0.290*** | | 0.232*** | | 0.311*** | | 0.219*** | | |
| | (0.014) | | (0.026) | | (0.017) | | (0.032) | | |
| N | 732 | | 172 | | 441 | | 119 | | |
| \mathbb{R}^2 | 0.021 | | 0.032 | | 0.019 | | 0.004 | | |

Table S8 (OLS) Regression results for DG giving, excluding or including non-comprehenders (NC). *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; ** p<0.05.

2. Experimental materials

Screen 1


| qualtrics. | com* | | | | |
|----------------------|--------------------------|---|----------------------|-------------------------------|---------|
| Welcome! | | | | | |
| your Work | erID.) Your WorkerID | hanical Turk Worker starts with the letter A nave your correct Work | and has 12-14 letter | rs or numbers. It | is NOT |
| Note that you ← → C | ur WorkerID can be found | | | | ☆ 😘 🔧 |
| amazor | nmechanical turk | Your Account HIT | 's Qualifications | 181,131 HITs available now | Account |
| | | duction Dashboard Sta | | | for whi |
| Pind HITS Dashb | containing | not , <u>click here</u> .) | | pay at least \$ 0.00 | require |





If Republican: If Democrat:







You have been randomly assigned to interact with another MTurk worker. You cannot participate in this study more than once.

The only thing you know about this person is that they affiliate with the party. They have said that in the 2016 primary election, they supported

Participant's party here
Their candidate's name here





Their name here



Their name here


You start with 40 cents and the other person starts with 0.

This interaction has one single decision:

You choose how many of the 40 cents to transfer to the other person.

Your bonus will be whatever you keep. The other person's bonus will be whatever you transfer to them.

The graphic below shows a summary of the interaction:





You MUST answer these questions correctly to receive your bonus!

What transfer maximizes the other person's bonus?

0 10 20 30 40

What transfer maximizes your bonus?

What transfer results in both of you earning the same bonus?

>>


Screen 8




Please choose how many cents you will transfer to the other person:


0 5 10 15 20 25 35 30 40 \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc


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Screen 11 (collected only after week 8)





| To what extent do you | feel you can trust | other people that | you interact with in | your daily life? | | |
|---|----------------------|----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1 - Very little | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 - Very much |
| | | | | | \circ | |
| I would rather do some | thing that requires | s little thought tha | n something that is | sure to challenge my | v thinking abilitie | |
| 1 - Very untrue | - | 2 | 3 | 4 | y triiritang dibilitat | 5 - Very true |
| O | | | 0 | | | |
| | ` | | | | | |
| I trust my initial feelings | s about people. | | | | | |
| 1 - Very untrue | | 2 | 3 | 4 | | 5 - Very true |
| | (| | | 0 | | |
| How strongly do you be | elieve in the existe | ence of a God or | Gods? | | | |
| 1 - Very little | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 - Very much |
| O C | 0 | 0 | 0 | | 0 | O |
| O | | | | | | Ü |
| What is your country of | f residence? | | | | | |
| United States | | | | | | |
| ○ India | | | | | | |
| Other | | | | | | |
| Other | | | | | | |
| Politically, how conserv | ative are you in te | erms of social iss | ues | | | |
| 1 - Very liberal | 2 | 3 | | 4 | 5 | 6 - Very conservative |
| | \circ | |) | 0 | | 0 |
| Politically, how conserv | vative are you in te | erms of fiscal issu | es | | | |
| 1 - Very liberal | 2 | 3 | | 4 | 5 | 6 - Very conservative |
| O O | 0 | | | | 0 | O = very conservative |
| | | | , | | | 0 |
| About how many surve | ys/studies have y | ou participated in | on MTurk before? | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| To what extent have yo | u previously partic | ipated in other st | udies like to this one | (i.e. that involve the | dividing up of m | noney)? |
| 1 - Nothing like this | | | - Something like thi | | | |
| scenario | 2 | | scenario | 4 | 5 - | Exactly this scenario |
| 0 | | | 0 | | | 0 |
| Unlike some other requother individual. For our | | | | | | |
| 1 - Very skeptical | | • | | - | _ | 7 - Very confident |
| that other was real | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | that other was real |
| | | | | | | |