bibexperimentalqueues.bib

@book{Hav:Chapman2016,
  author = {Hassin, Refael},
  date-added = {2016-04-17 00:00:25 +0000},
  date-modified = {2016-04-17 00:02:25 +0000},
  publisher = {Chapman and Hall/CRC},
  title = {Rational Queueing},
  year = {2016}
}
@article{ariely2001timely,
  author = {Ariely, Dan and Zakay, Dan},
  date-modified = {2016-05-01 02:12:35 +0000},
  journal = {Acta Psychologica},
  number = {2},
  pages = {187--207},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  title = {A timely account of the role of duration in decision making},
  volume = {108},
  year = {2001}
}
@article{ben1981effect,
  author = {Ben Zur, Hasida and Breznitz, Shlomo J},
  journal = {Acta Psychologica},
  publisher = {Elsevier Science},
  title = {The effect of time pressure on risky choice behavior.},
  year = {1981}
}
@incollection{bockenholt1993effect,
  author = {B{\"o}ckenholt, Ulf and Kroeger, Keith},
  booktitle = {Time Pressure and Stress in Human Judgment and Decision Making},
  date-modified = {2016-05-01 02:13:25 +0000},
  pages = {195--214},
  publisher = {Springer},
  title = {The effect of time pressure in multiattribute binary choice tasks},
  year = {1993}
}
@article{Cella2007164,
  abstract = {Research employing the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) has frequently shown that learning is impaired in various clinical populations. However, precisely what constitutes ``unimpaired'' control group learning remains unclear. In order to understand some of the possible factors underlying variability in control group \{IGT\} performance, the present study sought to manipulate features of the task to intentionally disrupt learning. Specifically, the present study investigated the effects of time constraints on emotion-based learning during automated administration of the IGT. For two groups of participants, a time-constraint of either 2-s or 4-s was implemented during the critical decision making period, while a control group received no time constraint. We also evaluated participants' subjective experience after every block of 20 trials. Results demonstrated that the 2-s group differed significantly from the control group. Subjective experience measures revealed rapid development of awareness of the advantageous and disadvantageous decks among all three groups. Overall, our findings demonstrate, for the first time, the effects of decision-phase time constraints on emotion-based learning and indicate that the \{IGT\} reward/punishment schedules are to some extent cognitively penetrable. },
  author = {Matteo Cella and Simon Dymond and Andrew Cooper and Oliver Turnbull},
  date-modified = {2016-05-01 02:23:19 +0000},
  doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bandc.2007.02.003},
  issn = {0278-2626},
  journal = {Brain and Cognition},
  keywords = {Emotion-based learning},
  number = {2},
  pages = {164--169},
  title = {Effects of decision-phase time constraints on emotion-based learning in the Iowa Gambling Task},
  volume = {64},
  year = {2007},
  bdsk-url-1 = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0278262607000292},
  bdsk-url-2 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bandc.2007.02.003}
}
@article{DeDreu2003280,
  abstract = {Research on time pressure (TP) in negotiation has considered strategic choice (demands and concession making) but largely ignored information processing. Based on Lay Epistemic Theory (Kruglanski, 1989) it is hypothesized that \{TP\} reduces motivation to process information systematically, and the time needed to negotiate an agreement, and that it produces greater reliance on cognitive heuristics when placing demands, and less integrative agreements. Two studies revealed that effects of time constraint on information processing in negotiation were due to higher need for cognitive closure under high TP. Study 1 also showed that negotiators use stereotypes about the opponent as a heuristic cue more under high rather than low TP. Study 2 revealed that negotiators under high \{TP\} were less likely to revise their unfounded fixed-pie perceptions during negotiation and, therefore, reached less integrative agreements. Implications for motivated information processing in negotiation are discussed. },
  author = {Carsten K.W {De Dreu}},
  date-modified = {2016-05-01 02:22:38 +0000},
  doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0749-5978(03)00022-0},
  issn = {0749-5978},
  journal = {Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes},
  number = {2},
  pages = {280--295},
  title = {Time pressure and closing of the mind in negotiation},
  volume = {91},
  year = {2003},
  bdsk-url-1 = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0749597803000220},
  bdsk-url-2 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0749-5978(03)00022-0}
}
@article{dedonno2008perceived,
  author = {DeDonno, Michael A and Demaree, Heath A},
  journal = {Judgment and Decision Making},
  number = {8},
  pages = {636--640},
  publisher = {Society for Judgment and Decision Making},
  title = {Perceived time pressure and the Iowa Gambling Task},
  volume = {3},
  year = {2008}
}
@book{gross2008fundamentals,
  author = {Gross, Donald},
  publisher = {John Wiley \& Sons},
  title = {Fundamentals of queueing theory},
  year = {2008}
}
@book{HilLie:McGH2001,
  author = {Hillier, F.S. and Lieberman, G.J.},
  date-added = {2015-02-16 06:01:47 +0000},
  date-modified = {2016-05-01 02:28:22 +0000},
  isbn = {9780072321692},
  lccn = {00025683},
  publisher = {McGraw-Hill},
  series = {McGraw-Hill International Editions},
  title = {Introduction to Operations Research},
  year = {2001},
  bdsk-url-1 = {http://books.google.de/books?id=SrfgAAAAMAAJ}
}
@article{SutKocStr:EL2003,
  abstract = {We examine the influence of time pressure on bargaining behavior in an ultimatum game. Controlling for offers, rejection rates of responders are significantly higher under a tight than under a very weak time constraint. However, this effect vanishes with repetition.},
  author = {Sutter, Matthias and Kocher, Martin and Strau{\ss}, Sabine},
  date = {2003/12//},
  date-added = {2015-02-15 22:52:22 +0000},
  date-modified = {2016-05-01 02:48:45 +0000},
  doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(03)00215-5},
  isbn = {0165-1765},
  journal = {Economics Letters},
  keywords = {Time pressure; Bargaining; Ultimatum game; Experiment},
  number = {3},
  pages = {341--347},
  title = {Bargaining under time pressure in an experimental ultimatum game},
  ty = {JOUR},
  volume = {81},
  year = {2003},
  bdsk-url-1 = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176503002155},
  bdsk-url-2 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(03)00215-5}
}
@article{KocPahTra:MS2013,
  abstract = {We study the effects of time pressure on risky decisions for pure gain prospects, pure loss prospects, and mixed prospects involving both gains and losses. In two experiments we find that time pressure has no effect on risk attitudes for gains, but increases risk aversion for losses. For mixed prospects, subjects become simultaneously more loss averse and more gain seeking under time pressure, depending on the framing of the prospects. The results suggest the importance of aspiration levels, and thus the overall probability to break even, under time pressure. We discuss the implications of our findings for decision-making situations that involve time pressure. This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.},
  annote = {doi: 10.1287/mnsc.2013.1711},
  author = {Kocher, Martin G. and Pahlke, Julius and Trautmann, Stefan T.},
  booktitle = {Management Science},
  da = {2013/10/01},
  date = {2013/04/22},
  date-added = {2015-02-15 22:42:52 +0000},
  date-modified = {2016-05-01 02:44:33 +0000},
  doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2013.1711},
  isbn = {0025-1909},
  journal = {Management Science},
  journal1 = {Management Science},
  m3 = {doi: 10.1287/mnsc.2013.1711},
  n2 = {We study the effects of time pressure on risky decisions for pure gain prospects, pure loss prospects, and mixed prospects involving both gains and losses. In two experiments we find that time pressure has no effect on risk attitudes for gains, but increases risk aversion for losses. For mixed prospects, subjects become simultaneously more loss averse and more gain seeking under time pressure, depending on the framing of the prospects. The results suggest the importance of aspiration levels, and thus the overall probability to break even, under time pressure. We discuss the implications of our findings for decision-making situations that involve time pressure. This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.},
  number = {10},
  pages = {2380--2391},
  publisher = {INFORMS},
  title = {Tempus fugit: time pressure in risky decisions},
  ty = {JOUR},
  volume = {59},
  year = {2013},
  year1 = {2013},
  bdsk-url-1 = {http://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/abs/10.1287/mnsc.2013.1711},
  bdsk-url-2 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2013.1711}
}
@article{YouGooHalWu:OBHDP2012,
  abstract = {The current research examines the effects of time pressure on decision behavior based on a prospect theory framework. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants estimated certainty equivalents for binary gains-only bets in the presence or absence of time pressure. In Experiment 3, participants assessed comparable bets that were framed as losses. Data were modeled to establish psychological mechanisms underlying decision behavior. In Experiments 1 and 2, time pressure led to increased risk attractiveness, but no significant differences emerged in either probability discriminability or outcome utility. In Experiment 3, time pressure reduced probability discriminability, which was coupled with severe risk-seeking behavior for both conditions in the domain of losses. No significant effects of control over outcomes were observed. Results provide qualified support for theories that suggest increased risk-seeking for gains under time pressure.},
  author = {Young, Diana L. and Goodie, Adam S. and Hall, Daniel B. and Wu, Eric},
  date = {2012/7//},
  date-added = {2015-02-15 22:40:39 +0000},
  date-modified = {2016-05-01 02:49:21 +0000},
  doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2012.03.005},
  isbn = {0749-5978},
  journal = {Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes},
  keywords = {Decision making; Prospect theory; Time pressure; Probability; Choice; Gambling},
  number = {2},
  pages = {179--188},
  title = {Decision making under time pressure, modeled in a prospect theory framework},
  ty = {JOUR},
  volume = {118},
  year = {2012},
  bdsk-url-1 = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0749597812000404},
  bdsk-url-2 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2012.03.005}
}
@article{ConHey:JRY2013,
  author = {Conte, Anna and Hey, JohnD.},
  da = {2013/04/01},
  date-added = {2014-12-03 19:48:53 +0000},
  date-modified = {2014-12-03 19:49:32 +0000},
  doi = {10.1007/s11166-013-9164-x},
  fjournal = {Journal of Risk and Uncertainty},
  isbn = {0895-5646},
  j2 = {J Risk Uncertain},
  journal = {Journal of Risk and Uncertainty},
  keywords = {Alpha model; Ambiguity; Expected utility; Mixture models; Rank dependent expected utility; Smooth model; D81; C91; C23},
  la = {English},
  number = {2},
  pages = {113-132},
  publisher = {Springer US},
  title = {Assessing multiple prior models of behaviour under ambiguity},
  ty = {JOUR},
  url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11166-013-9164-x},
  volume = {46},
  year = {2013},
  bdsk-url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11166-013-9164-x}
}
@article{ChoFisGalKar:AER2007,
  author = {Choi, Syngjoo and Fisman, Raymond and Gale, Douglas and Kariv, Shachar},
  date-added = {2014-12-03 19:47:17 +0000},
  date-modified = {2016-05-01 02:20:54 +0000},
  doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.5.1921},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1921-1938},
  title = {Consistency and heterogeneity of individual behavior under uncertainty},
  volume = {97},
  year = {2007},
  bdsk-url-1 = {http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.97.5.1921},
  bdsk-url-2 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.5.1921}
}
@article{DanGisRap:AER2009,
  author = {Daniel, Terry E. and Gisches, Eyran J. and Amnon Rapoport},
  cr = {Copyright \copyright 2009 American Economic Association},
  date = {2009/12/01},
  date-added = {2014-12-03 13:28:48 +0000},
  date-modified = {2016-05-01 02:44:02 +0000},
  doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/25592553},
  fjournal = {The American Economic Review},
  isbn = {00028282},
  journal = {The American Economic Review},
  m1 = {ArticleType: research-article / Full publication date: Dec., 2009 / Copyright {\copyright}2009 American Economic Association},
  number = {5},
  pages = {2149--2176},
  publisher = {American Economic Association},
  title = {Departure times in Y-shaped traffic networks with multiple bottlenecks},
  ty = {JOUR},
  volume = {99},
  year = {2009},
  bdsk-url-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/25592553},
  bdsk-url-2 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/25592553}
}
@article{Fis:EE2007,
  author = {Fischbacher, Urs},
  da = {2007/06/01},
  date-added = {2014-12-03 13:27:19 +0000},
  date-modified = {2016-05-01 02:26:13 +0000},
  doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4},
  fjournal = {Experimental Economics},
  isbn = {1386-4157},
  j2 = {Exp Econ},
  journal = {Experimental Economics},
  keywords = {Experiment; Experimental software},
  la = {English},
  number = {2},
  pages = {171-178},
  publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers-Plenum Publishers},
  title = {z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments},
  ty = {JOUR},
  volume = {10},
  year = {2007},
  bdsk-url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4}
}
@article{GieRobCro:JAMS2011,
  author = {Giebelhausen, MichaelD. and Robinson, StaceyG. and Cronin, J. Joseph, Jr.},
  da = {2011/12/01},
  date-added = {2014-12-03 13:25:13 +0000},
  date-modified = {2016-05-01 02:26:49 +0000},
  doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11747-010-0222-5},
  fjournal = {Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science},
  isbn = {0092-0703},
  j2 = {J. of the Acad. Mark. Sci.},
  journal = {Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science},
  keywords = {Perceived quality; Price/quality heuristics; Satisfaction; Service delays; Signaling; Social influence; Waits},
  la = {English},
  number = {6},
  pages = {889--905},
  publisher = {Springer US},
  title = {Worth waiting for: increasing satisfaction by making consumers wait},
  ty = {JOUR},
  volume = {39},
  year = {2011},
  bdsk-url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11747-010-0222-5}
}
@incollection{Gre:GWDG2004,
  author = {Greiner, Ben},
  booktitle = {Forschung und wissenschaftliches Rechnen 2003},
  date-added = {2014-12-03 13:20:05 +0000},
  date-modified = {2014-12-03 13:22:25 +0000},
  pages = {79--93},
  publisher = {GWDG Bericht},
  title = {An online recruitment system for economic experiments},
  volume = {63},
  year = {2004}
}
@article{Greiner2015,
  abstract = {This paper discusses aspects of recruiting subjects for economic laboratory experiments, and shows how the Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments can help. The software package provides experimenters with a free, convenient, and very powerful tool to organize their experiments and sessions.},
  author = {Greiner, Ben},
  date-modified = {2016-05-01 02:27:11 +0000},
  doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40881-015-0004-4},
  issn = {2199-6784},
  journal = {Journal of the Economic Science Association},
  number = {1},
  pages = {114--125},
  title = {Subject pool recruitment procedures: organizing experiments with ORSEE},
  volume = {1},
  year = {2015},
  bdsk-url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40881-015-0004-4}
}
@book{hammond2000judgments,
  author = {Hammond, Kenneth R},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  title = {Judgments under stress},
  year = {2000}
}
@book{HasHav:Kluwer2003,
  author = {Hassin, Refael and Haviv, Moshe},
  date-added = {2014-12-03 10:45:12 +0000},
  date-modified = {2016-05-01 02:27:55 +0000},
  doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-0359-0},
  isbn = {1-4020-7203-1},
  mrclass = {60-02 (60K25 90B22)},
  mrnumber = {2006433 (2004j:60001)},
  mrreviewer = {Jes{\'u}s R. Artalejo},
  pages = {xii+191},
  publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, MA},
  series = {International Series in Operations Research \& Management Science, 59},
  title = {To Queue or not to Queue: Equilibrium Behavior in Queueing Systems},
  year = {2003},
  bdsk-url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-0359-0}
}
@incollection{kaplan1993time,
  author = {Kaplan, Martin F and Wanshula, L Tatiana and Zanna, Mark P},
  booktitle = {Time pressure and stress in human judgment and decision making},
  pages = {255--267},
  publisher = {Springer},
  title = {Time pressure and information integration in social judgment},
  year = {1993}
}
@article{KooFis:JMR2010,
  abstract = {Abstract This article examines a silver lining of standing in line: Consumers infer that products are more valuable when others are behind them. Specifically, the value of a product increases as more people line up behind a person (Study 1) and when others are present (versus absent) behind a person in line (Study 2). Value increases further when directing consumers' attention to the presence of others behind them?that is, when they look backward versus forward (Study 3) and when the queue structure emphasizes the last person to join rather than the person being served (Study 4). This effect of people in line behind them is associated with increased expenditures by queuing consumers (Study 5).},
  annote = {doi: 10.1509/jmkr.47.4.713},
  author = {Koo, Minjung and Fishbach, Ayelet},
  booktitle = {Journal of Marketing Research},
  da = {2010/08/01},
  date = {2010/08/01},
  date-added = {2014-12-03 10:44:10 +0000},
  date-modified = {2016-05-01 02:45:39 +0000},
  doi = {http://dx.doi.org/1509/jmkr.47.4.713},
  fjournal = {Journal of Marketing Research},
  isbn = {0022-2437},
  journal = {Journal of Marketing Research},
  journal1 = {Journal of Marketing Research},
  m3 = {doi: 10.1509/jmkr.47.4.713},
  n2 = {Abstract This article examines a silver lining of standing in line: Consumers infer that products are more valuable when others are behind them. Specifically, the value of a product increases as more people line up behind a person (Study 1) and when others are present (versus absent) behind a person in line (Study 2). Value increases further when directing consumers' attention to the presence of others behind them?that is, when they look backward versus forward (Study 3) and when the queue structure emphasizes the last person to join rather than the person being served (Study 4). This effect of people in line behind them is associated with increased expenditures by queuing consumers (Study 5).},
  number = {4},
  pages = {713--724},
  publisher = {American Marketing Association},
  title = {A silver lining of standing in line: queuing increases value of products},
  ty = {JOUR},
  volume = {47},
  year = {2010},
  year1 = {2010},
  bdsk-url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.47.4.713}
}
@techreport{KreDeb:SSRN2013,
  author = {Kremer, Mirko and Debo, Laurens G..},
  date-added = {2014-12-03 10:39:15 +0000},
  date-modified = {2015-02-15 23:57:46 +0000},
  institution = {Chicago Booth},
  number = {12-28},
  title = {Herding in a queue: a laboratory experiment},
  url = {http://ssrn.com/abstract=2128796},
  year = {2013},
  bdsk-url-1 = {http://ssrn.com/abstract=2128796}
}
@article{KumKri:JSR2008,
  annote = {10.1177/1094670507313543},
  author = {Kumar, Piyush and Krishnamurthy, Parthasarathy},
  date = {2008/02/01},
  date-added = {2014-12-03 10:37:18 +0000},
  date-modified = {2016-05-01 02:46:45 +0000},
  fjournal = {Journal of Service Research},
  journal = {Journal of Service Research},
  journal1 = {Journal of Service Research},
  n2 = {Customers often decide between service providers on the basis of their anticipated waiting times. The duration of the wait depends on two factors: the customer processing speed at the service location and the level of congestion at the time of arrival. While processing speed is an intrinsic operating characteristic of a service provider, congestion is a contingent characteristic that depends on customers' choices between the service provider and its competitors. Consequently, a customer's waiting time at a service location is characterized by an externality because it depends on the concurrent choices made by other customers. In this article, the authors examine how customers account for this externality when choosing between service providers that differ in the uncertainty surrounding their service times. The authors show that the uncertainty surrounding anticipated congestion at service locations suppresses risk aversion with respect to service times. However, if the overall market is expected to be over- or undercrowded, then risk aversion is restored and customer choices favor the low-uncertainty service provider. A partial explanation for the variance in customers' decision strategies lies in the extent to which they focus on the arrival process versus the service process when making their decision.},
  number = {3},
  pages = {282--292},
  title = {The impact of service-time uncertainty and anticipated congestion on customers' waiting-time decisions},
  ty = {JOUR},
  volume = {10},
  year = {2008},
  bdsk-url-1 = {http://jsr.sagepub.com/content/10/3/282.abstract}
}
@article{LecSchDub:JCR1995,
  author = {Leclerc, France and Schmitt, Bernd H and Dube, Laurette},
  date-added = {2014-12-03 10:34:30 +0000},
  date-modified = {2016-05-01 02:33:52 +0000},
  fjournal = {Journal of Consumer Research},
  journal = {Journal of Consumer Research},
  number = {1},
  pages = {110--19},
  title = {Waiting time and decision making: Is time like money?},
  volume = {22},
  year = {1995},
  bdsk-url-1 = {http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jconrs:v:22:y:1995:i:1:p:110-19}
}
@article{LuMusOliSch:MS2013,
  annote = {doi: 10.1287/mnsc.1120.1686},
  author = {Lu, Yina and Musalem, Andr{\'e}s and Olivares, Marcelo and Schilkrut, Ariel},
  booktitle = {Management Science},
  da = {2013/08/01},
  date-added = {2014-12-03 10:31:28 +0000},
  date-modified = {2016-05-01 02:47:17 +0000},
  doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1120.1686},
  fjournal = {Management Science},
  isbn = {0025-1909},
  journal = {Management Science},
  journal1 = {Management Science},
  m3 = {doi: 10.1287/mnsc.1120.1686},
  number = {8},
  pages = {1743--1763},
  publisher = {INFORMS},
  title = {Measuring the effect of queues on customer purchases},
  ty = {JOUR},
  volume = {59},
  year = {2013},
  year1 = {2013},
  bdsk-url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1120.1686}
}
@article{Nao:E1969,
  abstract = {A queueing model--together with a cost structure--is presented, which envisages the imposition of tolls on newly arriving customers. It is shown that frequently this is a strategy which might lead to the attainment of social optimality.},
  author = {Naor, P.},
  cr = {Copyright \copyright 1969 The Econometric Society},
  date = {1969/01/01},
  date-added = {2014-12-03 10:28:50 +0000},
  date-modified = {2016-05-01 02:47:40 +0000},
  doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1909200},
  isbn = {00129682},
  journal = {Econometrica},
  m1 = {ArticleType: research-article / Full publication date: Jan., 1969 / Copyright {\copyright}1969 The Econometric Society},
  number = {1},
  pages = {15--24},
  publisher = {The Econometric Society},
  title = {The regulation of queue size by levying tolls},
  ty = {JOUR},
  volume = {37},
  year = {1969},
  bdsk-url-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1909200},
  bdsk-url-2 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1909200}
}
@techreport{OxoBis:Calgary2005,
  address = {Calgary},
  author = {Oxoby, Robert J. and Bischak, Diane},
  date-added = {2014-12-03 10:23:48 +0000},
  date-modified = {2016-05-01 02:54:18 +0000},
  institution = {Department of Economics, University of Calgary},
  title = {Passing the time: other-regarding behavior and the sunk cost of time},
  year = {2005}
}
@article{payne1988adaptive,
  author = {Payne, John W and Bettman, James R and Johnson, Eric J},
  journal = {Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition},
  number = {3},
  pages = {534},
  publisher = {American Psychological Association},
  title = {Adaptive strategy selection in decision making.},
  volume = {14},
  year = {1988}
}
@book{payne1993adaptive,
  author = {Payne, John W and Bettman, James R and Johnson, Eric J},
  publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
  title = {The adaptive decision maker},
  year = {1993}
}
@article{RapSteMakZwiSea:TRB2010,
  abstract = {We study batch queueing systems with continuous time, finite commuter populations, single server, and endogenously determined arrival times. Symmetric equilibrium solutions in mixed strategies are constructed and subsequently tested in two experiments that examine two different batch queueing models, one with a fixed server capacity, and the other with a variable server capacity. With experience in playing the stage queueing game repeatedly, experimental results from groups of 20 subjects support equilibrium play on the aggregate level when the server capacity is fixed and commonly known. When it is known to be variable, randomly changing from round to round, subjects diverge from equilibrium play and increase their individual payoffs substantially by significantly shortening their waiting time.},
  author = {Rapoport, Amnon and Stein, William E. and Mak, Vincent and Zwick, Rami and Seale, Darryl A.},
  date = {2010/12//},
  date-added = {2014-12-03 10:21:59 +0000},
  date-modified = {2016-05-01 02:47:59 +0000},
  doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.trb.2010.01.005},
  isbn = {0191-2615},
  journal = {Transportation Research Part B: Methodological},
  keywords = {Batch queueing; Game theory; Constant and variable capacity; Experiments},
  number = {10},
  pages = {1166--1185},
  title = {Endogenous arrivals in batch queues with constant or variable capacity},
  ty = {JOUR},
  volume = {44},
  year = {2010},
  bdsk-url-1 = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0191261510000135},
  bdsk-url-2 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.trb.2010.01.005}
}
@article{RapSteParSea:JEBO2004,
  abstract = {We study a class of queueing problems with endogenous arrival times formulated as non-cooperative n-person games in normal form. With multiple equilibria in pure strategies, these queueing games give rise to problems of tacit coordination. We first describe a Markov chain algorithm used to compute the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium solution, and then report the results of an experimental study of a large-scale (n=20) queueing game with fixed service time, FIFO queue discipline, and no early arrivals. Our results show consistent and replicable patterns of arrival that provide strong support for mixed-strategy equilibrium play on the aggregate but not individual level.},
  author = {Rapoport, Amnon and Stein, William E. and Parco, James E. and Seale, Darryl A.},
  date = {2004/9//},
  date-added = {2014-12-03 10:20:23 +0000},
  date-modified = {2016-05-01 02:48:13 +0000},
  doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2003.07.003},
  fjournal = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization},
  isbn = {0167-2681},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization},
  keywords = {Queueing; Endogenous arrival times; Mixed-strategy equilibrium; Experimentation},
  number = {1},
  pages = {67--91},
  title = {Equilibrium play in single-server queues with endogenously determined arrival times},
  ty = {JOUR},
  volume = {55},
  year = {2004},
  bdsk-url-1 = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016726810400006X},
  bdsk-url-2 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2003.07.003}
}
@incollection{rastegary1993interactions,
  author = {Rastegary, Haleh and Landy, Frank J},
  booktitle = {Time pressure and stress in human judgment and decision making},
  pages = {217--239},
  publisher = {Springer},
  title = {The interactions among time urgency, uncertainty, and time pressure},
  year = {1993}
}
@article{rieskamp2008inferences,
  author = {Rieskamp, J{\"o}rg and Hoffrage, Ulrich},
  date-modified = {2016-05-01 02:41:55 +0000},
  journal = {Acta Psychologica},
  number = {2},
  pages = {258--276},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  title = {Inferences under time pressure: How opportunity costs affect strategy selection},
  volume = {127},
  year = {2008}
}
@article{SeaParSteRap:EE2005,
  author = {Seale, DarrylA. and Parco, JamesE. and Stein, WilliamE. and Rapoport, Amnon},
  da = {2005/06/01},
  date-added = {2014-12-03 09:02:55 +0000},
  date-modified = {2016-05-01 02:37:25 +0000},
  doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-005-0872-1},
  fjournal = {Experimental Economics},
  isbn = {1386-4157},
  j2 = {Exp Econ},
  journal = {Experimental Economics},
  keywords = {batch queueing; equilibrium solution; experiment; coordination},
  la = {English},
  number = {2},
  pages = {117-144},
  publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers},
  title = {Joining a queue or staying out: effects of information structure and service time on arrival and staying out decisions},
  ty = {JOUR},
  volume = {8},
  year = {2005},
  bdsk-url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-005-0872-1}
}
@incollection{stiensmeier1993information,
  author = {Stiensmeier-Pelster, Joachim and Sch{\"u}rmann, Martin},
  booktitle = {Time pressure and stress in human judgment and decision making},
  pages = {241--253},
  publisher = {Springer},
  title = {Information Processing in Decision Making under Time Pressure},
  year = {1993}
}
@article{svenson1990choices,
  author = {Svenson, Ola and Edland, Anne and Slovic, Paul},
  journal = {Acta Psychologica},
  number = {2},
  pages = {153--169},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  title = {Choices and judgments of incompletely described decision alternatives under time pressure},
  volume = {75},
  year = {1990}
}
@book{svenson1993time,
  author = {Svenson, Ola and Maule, A John},
  publisher = {Springer},
  title = {Time pressure and stress in human judgment and decision making},
  year = {1993}
}
@article{SteRapSeaZhaZwi:GEB2007,
  abstract = {We study the decisions agents make in two queueing games with endogenously determined arrivals and batch service. In both games, agents are asked to independently decide when to join a queue, or they may simply choose not to join it at all. The symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium of two games in discrete time where balking is prohibited and where it is allowed are tested experimentally in a study that varies the game type (balking vs. no balking) and information structure (private vs. public information). With repeated iterations of the stage game, all four experimental conditions result in aggregate, but not individual, behavior approaching mixed-strategy equilibrium play. Individual behavior can be accounted for by relatively simple heuristics.},
  author = {Stein, William E. and Rapoport, Amnon and Seale, Darryl A. and Zhang, Hongtao and Zwick, Rami},
  date = {2007/5//},
  date-added = {2014-12-03 09:01:14 +0000},
  date-modified = {2016-05-01 02:48:28 +0000},
  doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.08.008},
  isbn = {0899-8256},
  journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
  keywords = {Batch queueing; Equilibrium solution; Experimental economics},
  number = {2},
  pages = {345--363},
  title = {Batch queues with choice of arrivals: Equilibrium analysis and experimental study},
  ty = {JOUR},
  volume = {59},
  year = {2007},
  bdsk-url-1 = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825606001011},
  bdsk-url-2 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.08.008}
}
@book{Tra:CUP2009,
  author = {Train, Kenneth E.},
  date-added = {2014-12-03 08:59:41 +0000},
  date-modified = {2016-05-01 02:38:45 +0000},
  doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511805271},
  edition = {Second},
  isbn = {978-0-521-74738-7},
  mrclass = {91B06 (62-01 62C05 62P20 65C60)},
  mrnumber = {2519514 (2010m:91055)},
  pages = {x+388},
  publisher = {Cambridge University Press, Cambridge},
  title = {Discrete choice methods with simulation},
  year = {2009},
  bdsk-url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511805271}
}
@article{Lin:EL2014,
  author = {Lindner, Florian},
  date-added = {2014-12-03 08:57:25 +0000},
  date-modified = {2014-12-03 08:57:55 +0000},
  doi = {10.1016/j.econlet.2013.10.019},
  fjournal = {Economics Letters},
  issn = {0165-1765},
  journal = {Econom. Lett.},
  mrclass = {91A90},
  mrnumber = {3139321},
  number = {1},
  pages = {7--11},
  title = {Decision time and steps of reasoning in a competitive market entry game},
  url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.10.019},
  volume = {122},
  year = {2014},
  bdsk-url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.10.019}
}
@article{LinSut:EL2013,
  author = {Lindner, Florian and Sutter, Matthias},
  date-added = {2014-12-03 08:57:25 +0000},
  date-modified = {2016-05-01 02:34:27 +0000},
  doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.06.005},
  fjournal = {Economics Letters},
  issn = {0165-1765},
  journal = {Econom. Lett.},
  mrclass = {91A90 (91A26)},
  mrnumber = {3093657},
  number = {3},
  pages = {542--545},
  title = {Level-{$k$} reasoning and time pressure in the 11--20 money request game},
  volume = {120},
  year = {2013},
  bdsk-url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.06.005}
}
@article{KocSut:JEBO2006,
  abstract = {Many decisions in economics and finance have to be made under severe time pressure. Furthermore, payoffs frequently depend on the speed of decision-making, as, for instance, when buying and selling stocks. In this paper, we examine the influence of time pressure and time-dependent incentive schemes on the quality of decision-making in an experimental beauty-contest game. We find that convergence to equilibrium is faster and payoffs are higher under low time pressure than under high time pressure. Interestingly, time-dependent payoffs under high time pressure lead to significantly quicker decision-making without reducing the quality of decisions.},
  author = {Kocher, Martin G. and Sutter, Matthias},
  date = {2006/11//},
  date-added = {2014-12-03 08:55:25 +0000},
  date-modified = {2016-05-01 02:45:01 +0000},
  doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2004.11.013},
  fjournal = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization},
  isbn = {0167-2681},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Behavior \& Organization},
  keywords = {Quality of decision-making; Time pressure; Incentives; Beauty-contest experiment},
  number = {3},
  pages = {375--392},
  title = {Time is money---Time pressure, incentives, and the quality of decision-making},
  ty = {JOUR},
  volume = {61},
  year = {2006},
  bdsk-url-1 = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268105001873},
  bdsk-url-2 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2004.11.013}
}
@article{Rub:EJ2007,
  author = {Rubinstein, Ariel},
  date-added = {2014-12-03 08:37:01 +0000},
  date-modified = {2016-05-01 02:42:32 +0000},
  doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02081.x},
  fjournal = {The Economic Journal},
  isbn = {1468-0297},
  journal = {The Economic Journal},
  number = {523},
  pages = {1243--1259},
  publisher = {Blackwell Publishing Ltd},
  title = {Instinctive and cognitive reasoning: A study of response times},
  ty = {JOUR},
  volume = {117},
  year = {2007},
  bdsk-url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02081.x}
}
@article{Rub:JDM2013,
  author = {Rubinstein, Ariel},
  date-added = {2014-12-03 08:33:17 +0000},
  date-modified = {2014-12-03 08:34:54 +0000},
  fjournal = {Judgment and Decision Making},
  journal = {Judgment and Decision Making},
  number = {5},
  pages = {540---551},
  title = {Response time and decision making: An experimental study},
  volume = {8},
  year = {2013}
}
@techreport{Conte:JERP2014,
  abstract = {This paper estimates the determinants of decision time for different types of decision maker in the context of an experimental investigation of multiple prior models of behaviour under ambiguity. Four models are considered: Expected Utility, Smooth, Rank Dependent Expected Utility and Alpha model. The results of a mixture model which assigns subjects to types enable us to distinguish the factors influencing the decision time of each of these four types. We find that the different types are influenced by different factors. In general, the Rank Dependent type takes more time, followed by the Smooth, the Expected Utility and finally the Alpha type, whose decision time is always the lowest. Our results reflect the relative complexity of the preference functionals used by the different types. Consequently, the importance of looking at the process of pairwise choices rather than simply at the choice made is raised to the attention of theorists and analysts.},
  author = {Anna Conte and John D. Hey and Ivan Soraperra},
  date-modified = {2016-05-01 02:43:27 +0000},
  institution = {Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics},
  keywords = {decision time; choice under uncertainty; censored regression},
  number = {2014-004},
  title = {{The Determinants of Decision Time}},
  type = {Jena Economic Research Papers},
  url = {http://ideas.repec.org/p/jrp/jrpwrp/2014-004.html},
  year = 2014,
  bdsk-url-1 = {http://ideas.repec.org/p/jrp/jrpwrp/2014-004.html}
}
@article{verplanken1993need,
  author = {Verplanken, Bas},
  journal = {Journal of Research in Personality},
  number = {3},
  pages = {238--252},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  title = {Need for cognition and external information search: Responses to time pressure during decision-making},
  volume = {27},
  year = {1993}
}
@article{wright1974harassed,
  author = {Wright, Peter},
  date-modified = {2016-05-01 02:39:47 +0000},
  journal = {Journal of Applied Psychology},
  number = {5},
  pages = {555},
  publisher = {American Psychological Association},
  title = {The harassed decision maker: Time pressures, distractions, and the use of evidence.},
  volume = {59},
  year = {1974}
}
@article{zakay1985post,
  author = {Zakay, Dan},
  journal = {Acta Psychologica},
  number = {1},
  pages = {75--80},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  title = {Post-decisional confidence and conflict experienced in a choice process},
  volume = {58},
  year = {1985}
}

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